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Achieving coherence and coordination in a complex system like a school district is 
complicated by the nested layers of the organization. This structure allows for teachers in 
classrooms and schools in a district to operate autonomously, as their organizational 
layers insulate those in the center from external demands and mandates. The COVID-19 
pandemic represented an external demand that led district leaders to implement a series 
of situational reforms that affected nearly every aspect of the educational organization.  
 
This qualitative study examines how the experiences and decision-making processes of 
district, school, and teacher leaders from a single district in Maine during the COVID-19 
pandemic contributed to the district’s coordination and coherence throughout the crisis. 
Key findings demonstrate that while district leaders acted to establish a decision-making 
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process that centralized decisions, aligned policies, and allocated resources to meet the 
evolving demands of delivering education during a pandemic, there were factors that 
acted to facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of these actions. The most consequential 
factor related to district coherence was the presence of relational trust throughout the 
system, as it enhanced communication and collaboration, which contributed to broad 
diffusions of knowledge across the system. When relational trust was high, members also 
tolerated uncertainty and adopted changes more readily. The changing conditions and 
novelty of decisions confronting educational leaders also led to increased networking 
within the district and across districts in the region. This collaboration led to greater 
homogeneity and decreased school-based autonomy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In March 2020, only four months after the first cases of the novel coronavirus 
(COVID-19) were first reported in Wuhan, China, schools throughout Maine, and the rest 
of the United States, began closing their doors to “support [the] response efforts to delay 
and mitigate the outbreak” (Office of Governor Janet T. Mills, 2020). Though infection 
rates throughout the world and in other parts of the country were high, at the time of the 
school closures in Maine on March 15, 2020, there were seven cases in the state. The 
Governor’s declaration of a Civil State of Emergency ended classroom instruction in all 
public schools “as soon as reasonably practicable” (Office of Governor Janet T. Mills, 
2020) and prohibited gatherings of more than ten people in public places. This order 
closed the state, and school and district leaders worked to first attend to the basic needs of 
students in their communities, as well as to those of their staff members, before turning 
their attention to providing an equitable learning experience for students.  
Statement of the Problem 
There is little question that highly-coordinated and coherent central offices and 
schools can lead to improved student outcomes (Fullen & Quinn, 2016; Chrispeels, et al., 
2008; Johnson, et al., 2015; Rorrer et al., 2008), but there have been few research studies 
exploring how district and school leaders act together to coordinate and establish 
coherence. Rorrer (2008) characterized the district as an institutional actor, defining the 
district as “an organized collective … bound by a web of interrelated and interdependent 
roles, responsibilities, and relationships” (p. 308). In districts, particularly smaller 
districts, central office leaders act as both individuals and as components within this 
organized collective institutional actor. The hierarchical, nested organizational structure 
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of a school district poses a challenge to implementing and sustaining change in a 
coordinated and coherent manner. In addition, the district exists in the context of broader 
external entities, including federal and state policy domains, that impose reforms on local 
districts. 
 Though not an external policy mandate, the COVID-19 pandemic was an external 
force—a crisis—that caused significant disruption to all aspects of education and 
required each district to act as an organized collective to provide instructional leadership 
and reorient the district to direct resources—human, social, and physical—to provide 
education during the pandemic. Coordinating resources and ensuring that information 
flowed between central offices and schools led districts to assume a more centralized 
approach, characterized by district-wide responses, as opposed to encouraging greater 
school autonomy (Netolicky, 2020; Hubbard et al., 2020). Because few school and 
district leaders had encountered a disruption to education requiring school closures—
indeed the magnitude of the disruption to schooling caused by the COVID-19 pandemic 
was considered “unprecedented” and “cataclysmic” (Supovitz & D’Auria, 2020)—
leaders sought guidance outside of their local districts (Netolicky, 2020), including from 
other leaders from around the state and from the Maine Department of Education.  
 Because the nested nature of districts’ organizational structures posed a challenge 
to effectively conveying complex information through each of the layers of the 
organization, the existence or absence of relational trust throughout the organization 
affected these efforts to achieve a coherent and coordinated district response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
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Organizational Challenges to Coordination and Coherence 
Researchers have sought to understand why some reform initiatives—whether 
they were introduced internally, within the district, or by external entities like the federal 
or state government—last, whereas others do not. Elmore (1996) described the nested      
nature of educational institutions, at the federal, state, and local levels, as a primary 
obstacle to scaling educational reform. Individual classrooms within a school, schools 
within a district, localized districts within a state, and states in the country comprise the 
nested structure of educational institutions. Efforts to reform schooling to improve 
educational outcomes can originate at any of these levels or from within any of these 
domains and, depending on one’s place in the educational institution, a reform may be 
perceived as externally driven and controlled.  
Prior to the extraordinary events of March, 2020 when the Governor’s declaration 
of a Civil State of Emergency directed all local education agencies (LEAs) in the state to 
close school buildings to in-person schooling, superintendents and local school boards 
had historically exercised primary educational decision-making authority, as granted to 
them by the Maine constitution. As the pandemic’s effects were felt throughout the 
country, in many states greater decision-making authority shifted to states as governors 
and state legislatures made decisions to close and reopen schools. However, because 
Maine, like other states in the northeast of the United States, has a history of local 
control, whereby school boards located in the community are responsible for governing 
and managing public schools in that community (Great Schools Partnership, 2016), 
subsequent decisions about reopening schools were made at the district level. During the 
pandemic, district leaders throughout Maine were forced to shift their orientation from 
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one focused largely on local concerns, to one characterized by greater connections to 
other districts and external policy domains, particularly the Maine Department of 
Education, to develop plans for directing and leading schools during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Throughout the spring and the summer of 2020, in particular, district leaders 
sought guidance related to reopening plans from state officials, including the Maine 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS), and the Maine Department of Education (MDOE). In addition, districts looked 
to these agencies for assistance with questions related to the administration and 
accounting of the funds received through the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (CARES) Act, passed in March of 2020.  
While districts in Maine had the authority to decide when and how to reopen 
schools, a month following the initial closure, pressure to reopen from external entities—
including the federal government—began to mount. In mid-April, 2020, the White House 
released Opening Up America Again guidelines, which identified the necessary 
conditions for states to relax some of the measures adopted to mitigate the spread of the 
virus. Though the plan stipulated that state and local officials could modify the criteria 
based on the local circumstances, the plan reflected the early pressure on states and 
districts to reopen schools and the economy. The pressure that external entities, including 
the federal, state, and local communities, applied to reopen schools affected district 
decision-making, particularly in light of pressure from teachers’ unions, which also 
exerted pressure on districts (Sawchuk, 2020).  
The tension between local control and centralized authority also exists, though on 
a smaller scale, in the relationship between central offices and schools. Districts 
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throughout the country, large and small, grapple with the challenge of balancing central 
office-driven initiatives, which often are dictated by federal and state mandates, with 
building-driven, autonomous initiatives (Johnson et al., 2015). Like those who advocate 
for local control, proponents of building-level personnel-driven initiatives argue that the 
personnel that are closer and more directly involved with the school community are better 
situated to understand and respond to the needs (Murphy, 1989). In addition, research has 
shown that building-level, teacher-led reform work leads to increased professionalism 
and organizational learning (Dufour & Eaker, 2008).   
While there is evidence that building-level reforms carried out by school leaders 
and teachers can lead to improvements in student achievement (Stein et al., 2016), 
research points to the need for centralized leadership at the district level to be able to 
carry out and sustain gains in its schools and districts (Honig, 2013, Johnson, et al., 
2015). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Hubbard, Mackey, and Supovitz (2020) found 
that districts’ responses tended to be more centralized or top-down when there were 
existing centralized practices and infrastructure, including established cross-district 
leadership teams and centralized technology support. Though such centralization ensured 
consistency, Hubbard and her colleagues found that coordinating across the district led to 
delays in communication and overly broad guidance. Those districts that were oriented to 
allow greater autonomy at the school level encouraged schools and leaders to manage 
many of the decisions, limiting centralized tasks to food delivery and technology 
distribution. However, in cases where schools exercised greater autonomy, districts 
confronted equity issues across the system.  
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 The central office or district leadership-driven reforms are necessary to realize the 
district’s mission and vision while also ensuring equity across schools (Tujilo, 2012). At 
the same time, district and school leaders recognize that schools within the same district 
have different needs arising from different student populations and staff members’ 
experience and skills, including those of the principal (Honig, 2009). If centralized 
leadership is necessary to carry out the vision for the district and to coordinate resource 
movement that ensures equity and achievement for students, and if the assets and needs 
of each school in the district require different goals and resources that suggest greater 
school autonomy, then more must be known about how district and school leaders 
balance the tension between centralized and autonomous (school-based) decision making 
and resource allocation necessary to meet continuous school improvement goals.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this phenomenological case study was to examine leaders’ 
experiences of managing the evolving and sometimes contradictory guidance from 
external entities, like the federal and state policy domains, and lead their district and 
schools throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a grounded theory approach, I 
explored the actions that district leaders took to coordinate resources and communicate 
decisions and guidance, and those factors that impacted the effectiveness of their actions. 
The results from the phenomenological case study of the actions that leaders took to 
achieve coordination and coherence in their district to implement and sustain the changes 
necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic will provide understanding of how these actions 
contributed to stakeholders’ perceptions of the changes, as well as those of the 
organization leaders.  
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Research Questions  
Overarching question: How do district leaders achieve coordination and 
coherence in complicated systems comprising many schools, each with its own culture, in 
order to implement and sustain change necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic? 
• How do district leaders determine how centralized controls are exercised and how 
much autonomy each school maintains? 
• How do district and school leaders generate will and build capacity for 
systemwide change? 
• How do stakeholders’ understanding of the reforms affect the implementation of 
the change? 
Significance of the Study 
The COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, led to abrupt school closures 
around the world and forced nearly 51 million students in the United States to be 
educated remotely. District and school leaders were quick to respond, targeting resources 
to staff and students to enable emergency remote learning to take place. As districts 
planned for the fall and the return to school, myriad changes to practices, routines, and 
policies needed to be made and adopted. While school reform is typically undertaken 
with intention to make systemic improvements, the changes adopted by districts during 
the pandemic were immediate responses to the crisis that evolved into longer-term 
situational reforms.  
Through the review of the literature, I will assert that during the COVID-19 
pandemic, leaders and districts, as institutional actors, were instrumental in implementing 
and carrying out changes and that the change processes and roles that leaders played were 
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consistent with reform implementation research, as they required generating will and 
building capacity to make the changes. In addition, leaders throughout districts acted to 
mediate the effects of external influences and bridge school systems’ nested layers to 
establish policy coherence and reallocate resources.  
Finally, while marked research has explored the role of district and school leaders 
in implementing reform and in balancing which sets of decisions and resources are 
managed centrally and which are handled by schools more autonomously, most of the 
research has focused on large school districts situated in urban settings (Honig, 2009; 
Johnson, et al., 2015). While many of the findings of these studies are relevant to schools 
in urban, suburban, and rural districts, the application and relevance of other findings, 
particularly those pertaining to the reorientation of central office administrators to 
support building level leaders (Honig, 2009; Honig, 2012; Johnson, et al., 2015), to 
schools in small, rural districts is less evident. This is of particular interest, given the size, 
organization, and distribution of school districts in Maine. Of the 281 districts in Maine 
in 2019, no one district serves more than 10,000 students and only two have student 
enrollments greater than 5,000 students (Maine Department of Education, 2019). To 
understand how district leaders achieve coordination and coherence in complicated 
systems, it is important to examine how the size of the district central office and the roles 
played by district and school leaders compare with those described in the research on 
leaders in large districts. Although some factors, such as communication, is simpler in a 
small district, the leaders in a small district must navigate a system that comprises many 
of the same complexities of larger districts, as it is also composed of nested layers 
arranged hierarchically. 
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This study will contribute to the understanding of leaders’ actions and experiences 
during the pandemic, and of the factors at play that affected the effectiveness of leaders 
leading complex systems in an extraordinary period of time.  
Definition of Key Terms 
1. Central Office: Describes the location of district leadership as well as the district-
level policy domain. 
2. Coherence: Fullan & Quinn (2016) defined coherence as “what is in the minds 
and actions of people individually and especially collectively” (p. 2); coherence 
refers to a high degree of alignment within a system, allowing focused work 
toward common goals. 
3. COVID-19 Pandemic: COVID-19 is the disease caused by a new coronavirus, 
SARS-CoV-2. The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global 
pandemic in March, 2020 (State of Maine COVID-19 Response: Office of the 
Governor, 2020). 
4. District Leaders: Includes superintendent and central office administrators who 
have oversight of multiple schools and district decisions. 
5. Emergency Remote Learning: Teaching and learning experiences that take place 
as a result of a crisis-driven shift to distance or online instruction of coursework 
that was not intentionally designed for online delivery (Hodges et al., 2020).  
6. Externally-Driven Mandates: Regulations or policies issued at the federal or state-
level policy domain. “Mandates are used when policy makers seek to achieve a 
uniform effect across a multitude of entities” (Firestone, 1989, p. 152).  
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7. Local Control: School boards located in the community are responsible for 
governing and managing public schools in that community (Great Schools 
Partnership). 
8. Policy Domain: The level at which a mandate is issued or received, including 
federal, state, district, and school. 
9. Relational Trust: An organization property arising from “interpersonal social 
exchanges in school communities” (Bryk & Schneider, 2002, p. 12). 
10. Scaling-Up Reform: Expanding reform to additional classrooms, schools, and 
districts and sustaining change in multilevel systems as seen in changes in 
classroom instructional practices (Coburn, 2003). 
11. School Leaders: Includes building-level administrators, including the principal, 
members of the school’s leadership team, and other members of the staff who act 
as leaders, in formal or informal positions. 
12. Situational Reform: Changes that were implemented and sustained during the 
pandemic to allow teaching and learning to take place. 
13. Stakeholders: Those who have a concern in and are directly affected by the school 
reform. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 This review of literature supports four assertions, which are the basis for the 
significance of the study:  
1. District leaders play an important role in introducing, implementing, and 
sustaining reforms in the district’s schools. 
2. Coordinating and establishing coherence between the district and buildings is 
necessary for successfully implemented reforms, as is maintaining a shared 
purpose and collective vision. 
3. It is important to examine how leaders in smaller districts manage reforms to 
understand how these responses compare with those of leaders in larger districts. 
4. Maine’s recent experiences with externally-driven mandates may affect how 
leaders implement subsequent reforms. 
These assumptions are explored in this review of the literature, which is divided 
into eight sections and examines research related to the role that district leaders play in 
achieving coordination and coherence to introduce, implement, and sustain reform. The 
first section will focus on the disparate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on students 
and communities, highlighting schools’ initial responses. While the literature review 
examines research related to reform, it is important to contextualize the reforms that will 
be examined in this research as those that have been put into place in response to the 
crisis of the pandemic. To that end, the second section explores the ways in which school 
reform generally differs from situational reforms, like those implemented during the 
pandemic. The third section examines the history of school reform in the United States 
and the role of each policy domain, including federal, state, and local entities. The 
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purpose of this section is to outline the evolving role played at each policy domain level 
and how the shift of authority from one domain to another affects the other domains.  
To understand the roles played by the district and its leaders, the fourth and fifth 
sections of the review of literature explore how relational trust and social networks 
facilitate reform implementation and diffusion throughout a complex system. The 
subsequent section examines the four roles of district leaders: providing instructional 
leadership, reorienting the organization to reassign resources and change the culture, 
establishing policy coherence between the reform work and other policies and 
procedures, and maintaining an equity focus to implement and sustain reforms. This 
section is followed by an examination of how complex systems, like school districts, 
achieve coherence. In the eighth and final area of review, I considered how the existing 
body of literature is applied to Maine, where the districts are significantly smaller than 
those studied in the literature. In addition to the size of the districts, I will explore 
whether the recent history of repealed mandates affects stakeholders’ willingness to 
engage in subsequent reform efforts, particularly those mandated at the state or federal 
domains. 
COVID-19—Spring, 2020: Attending to Basic Needs and Addressing Inequitable 
Impact 
This sudden closure of schools in Maine on March 15, 2020, coupled with the 
disruption caused by other closures throughout the state, forced districts to transform all 
of their operations in order to continue to provide education and other services. Districts 
recognized that, with the closure of schools and businesses, many students would face 
food insecurity. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.), 10.9% of Maine’s 
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population lived in poverty in 2019; and of the more than 178,000 students in Maine, 
42.3% qualified for free or reduced-priced meals in schools (Maine Department of 
Education, n.d.). Food insecurity poses risks to children’s physical health, and meals 
provided by schools are an important measure to address food insecurity and lead to 
improved academic performance (VanLancker & Parolin, 2020). School districts 
throughout the country were able to continue to provide meals for students within days of 
school closures and throughout the pandemic. The first federal emergency coronavirus 
legislation relaxed rules for the meals that schools provide to students, allowing schools 
to set up meal delivery and pick-up locations (Ujifusa, 2020). 
In addition to addressing food insecurity, districts also marshalled resources to 
address other issues, including locating students and removing barriers to accessing 
education by providing students with devices and hotspots. Prior to the pandemic, 16.8% 
of students in Maine were considered chronically absent from school in the 2018-2019 
school year (Maine Department of Education, n.d.). Students already experiencing 
educational disruption caused by health challenges, unstable employment, high rates of 
mobility, homelessness, or housing insecurity were more likely to be negatively affected 
by the pandemic and were more likely to have higher rates of disengagement from school 
(García & Weiss, 2020). Respondents to a national survey conducted by the EdWeek 
Research Center reported that one in five students was not participating in school in the 
spring during emergency remote learning. In high-poverty schools, which are 
characterized by more than 75% of students qualifying for free and reduced price meals 
(FRAM), nearly 30% of students were not engaged in remote learning. In low-poverty 
schools where fewer than 25% of students qualified for free or reduced meals, only 12% 
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of students were reported as absent or not engaging in emergency remote learning (Kurtz, 
2020). Finding students was complicated by inequities in students’ internet access, which 
made it difficult to determine whether or not students were receiving messages 
consistently. Based on 2019 data in Maine, while more than 89% of households reported 
having a household computer, only 82.1% reported having a broadband connection (U.S. 
Census Bureau, n.d.). 
COVID-19 and Situational Reforms 
 When introducing reform initiatives, school district leaders first identify the 
problem—typically related to the educational core of curriculum and instruction—and 
identify how the reform will address it. This process of generating will (Rorrer, et al., 
2008; Firestone, 1989) involves conveying the need for the change and establishing a 
vision and goals to support the reform. Institutions, and the leaders in those institutions, 
then mobilize resources to build capacity to carry out the reform. Building capacity and 
generating will for the reform are ongoing processes that are iterative and require 
organizational and individual attention and focus. The impetus for a reform initiative to 
be adopted and incorporated into the organization is the problem it seeks to address.  
 Because the pandemic was global and affected nearly every aspect of people’s 
lives, there was little need to convince people—to generate the will—that significant 
changes to practice would have to be made. As districts pivoted to emergency remote 
learning in response to a global pandemic, and then as they made plans to return to in-
person learning in the fall, there seemed to be no end to the problems that needed to be 
addressed. Policy makers and district leaders were forced to focus on capacity building 
rather than generating will because there was a common understanding of the problems 
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that faced educational institutions during this time: How to continue the act of educating 
students while keeping everyone in the organization safe. Firestone (1989) asserted that 
building capacity involved three actions: Mobilizing personnel; developing functions 
related to change, including promoting a shared vision and putting resources into place to 
realize the vision; and connecting the district and schools to target supports and to 
increase participation and buy-in throughout the district. The United States (U.S.) 
Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act on 
March 27, 2020, only weeks after schools throughout the country closed to in-person 
instruction. This legislation injected more than $2 trillion into the U.S. economy and was 
used by school districts to obtain the resources needed to provide schooling in a remote 
context and to prepare for students to return for in-person learning in the fall (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, n.d.). These financial resources were used by districts to put 
into place resources necessary to transform their districts from an in-person instruction 
model to an emergency remote learning structure. 
 The reforms that were identified and adopted throughout the spring, summer, and 
fall were unlike other reforms in that the solutions that were adopted, including providing 
remote learning for those who could not return for in-person instruction, reducing class 
sizes, and changing the schedule for in-person learning to allow for social distancing, 
addressed a crisis and thus were situational and not expected to be sustained once the 
crisis of the pandemic passed. The problem of defining how schools should operate 
during a pandemic required solutions or situational reforms that were novel, differed by 
state and region, and were sometimes based on what schools in other countries put into 
place weeks or months ahead of the United States.  
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 Many of the practices related to educational reform, including introducing, 
implementing, and sustaining the reform, could be applied to the situational reforms 
precipitated by the pandemic. Like other reforms, when introducing and implementing 
the situational reforms, leaders need to generate will and build capacity to make the 
changes. To effectively generate will and build capacity in this critical time, district 
leaders also needed to attend far more closely to relational trust or social trust in school 
communities. Relational trust involves the “distinctive qualities of interpersonal social 
exchanges in school communities, and how these cumulate in an organizational property” 
(Bryk & Schneider, 2002, p. 12). The presence of high relational trust throughout an 
organization enhanced the introduction, implementation, and perpetuation of the changes.  
The Role of Federal, State, and Local Governments: A History 
Even in the earliest years of the United States, the country’s leaders and early 
educators saw the benefit of and need for an educated electorate. While an educated 
electorate was valued, the history of American schools reflects the changing beliefs about 
the role that schools should play in society (Ravitch, 2009; Payne, 2010). The changing 
role of public education in American society reflected the economic, cultural and political 
contexts of the time. In the United States’ first century, publicly-funded education, 
including the Common School movement (Cohen & Mehta, 2017; Togneri & Anderson, 
2003) reflected the values of having an informed electorate to maintain the ideals of a 
strong democracy; education was a public good with the benefits accruing to everyone in 
society (Labaree, 1997). While these values were shared throughout the country, 
decisions about education—including who and what was taught—were the domain of the 
immediate community and the local school board.  
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The Industrial Revolution and the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth 
century led to the adoption of education policy that reflected different roles for education: 
Vocational and technical education that prepared students for the workplace (Ravitz, 
2009; Pijanowski, 2019). While education was still considered a public good that 
benefited the broader society, social efficiency, which was characterized by educational 
stratification that grouped students into their roles in society (Ravitz, 2009; Labaree, 
1997; Elmore, 1996) became a goal of education. Public schools continued to sort 
students, preparing them for work or liberal arts education, throughout the twentieth 
century, a process that served to reinforce existing inequities. These inequities were 
compounded by the local nature of schools; students attended schools in their 
communities, and the quality of the educational opportunities varied widely, depending 
on the community. Recognizing that locally funded schools were leading to underfunding 
and inequalities, states began to play a more active role in funding schools. According to 
Pijanowski (2019), “by the start of World War I, over a quarter of the state legislatures 
enacted some form of equalization program to complement deficient local funding” (p. 
2). The educational system’s reliance on local and state funds meant that economic 
downturns could have devastating effects on education not only at local levels, but across 
states, as well. This was seen during the depression in 1933 when local school boards 
defaulted on salaries and schools were forced to close (Smith, 1982, as cited in 
Pijanowski, 2019).  
Though some federal funds were introduced into schools between 1930 and the 
middle of the twentieth century, during these decades local communities grew 
increasingly dependent on state funds. According to The Tax Foundation (1954) (as cited 
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in Pijanowski, 2019), the average state share of the educational expenditures in the 
United States jumped from 17% in 1930, to 40% 20 years later. 
In 1965, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was signed into 
law, marking the beginning of the contemporary era of state and federal policy-making 
(Shelly, 2011). Prior to the adoption of ESEA, public education was the domain of state 
and local governments. This Civil Rights Act was intended to provide federal funding to 
low-income schools to address inequalities in school systems and improve economic 
outcomes for students, schools, and the communities (Kantor, 1991; Brady et al., 2014). 
ESEA represented the first significant federal involvement and oversight of public 
education, as the funding were tied to accountability measures with which school districts 
needed to comply. The goal of ESEA was to close the achievement gaps between high 
and low-income students. However, this goal was not realized (Payne, 2008; Shelly, 
2011; Pijanowski, 2019). 
The next wave of reforms in the contemporary era were reforms that reflected a 
politically conservative context. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational 
Reform, published in 1983, identified American schools as failing and identified 
measures to address this failure (Brady et al., 2014; Payne, 2010). After the release of, A 
Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, Maine followed a number of 
other states in enacting legislation to address concerns about public education. According 
to Tugend (1984), the Education Reform Act (1984) was the most significant reform in 
Maine in more than 20 years and set out standardized course-completion requirements for 
graduation, mandatory kindergarten, teacher stipends, and standardized testing. Each of 
the initiatives in this groundbreaking law was intended to improve the quality of teaching 
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and learning.  Six years later, a review of the improvements following the passage of this 
act led to the publication of “Maine’s Common Core of Learning,” which outlined the 
vision for the knowledge, skills and attitudes students should have upon graduating from 
high school. 
The enactment of Goals 2000: Educate America Act in 1993, which called on 
states to adopt standards and standardized testing, marked the beginning of a steady 
increase in the number of federal mandates (Shelly, 2011). Maine responded to the 
mandate for the adoption of standards and standardized testing by passing the System of 
Learning Results Established in 1995, and adopting the Maine Learning Results in 1996 
(Maine Department of Education, 1996). This law established long-range educational 
goals and standards for schools. It also mandated the assessment of student performance 
of these standards. The adoption of shared standards was considered highly controversial 
because, to many, it represented the State appropriating a power that was considered a 
local one—specifically, the power to determine what should be taught. At the heart of 
this controversy is the tension between local control and State oversight. While the Maine 
Constitution requires the State to monitor the results of student learning in communities, 
schools and districts have the authority to set curriculum and criteria for what students 
must do to attain a diploma, (Maine Department of Education, 1997). Thus, when this bill 
was introduced, its opponents argued that these common standards and performance 
indicators represented an erosion of powers once held entirely by local districts. 
The Maine Learning Results described what students graduating from Maine high 
schools should know and be able to do. Subsequently, the accountability requirements of 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (No Child Left Behind [NCLB], 2002) led states, 
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including Maine, to enact other laws and policies directing schools to assess students’ 
achievement of the Learning Results through state and locally-developed assessment 
systems. When the Maine Learning Results were adopted in 1996, the Comprehensive 
Assessment System was to be made up of two measures of student proficiency of the 
Learning Results: the Maine Education Assessment (MEA), and additional assessments 
that were locally developed and constituted the Local Assessment System (LAS). “These 
locally developed assessments were to be valid and reliable and ultimately provide an 
accurate representation of students’ achievement of the Learning Results” (Fairman & 
Harris, 2005, p. 1). School Administrative Units (SAUs) began working on the Local 
Assessment Systems (LAS) in 2003, but abandoned the efforts after the Governor 
declared a moratorium on the LAS in 2006.   
Though the LAS was nullified in 2006, the federal accountability mandates of the 
No Child Left Behind Act remained in place. Standards coupled with these accountability 
requirements provided the basis for the adoption of proficiency-based learning practices 
(Certo et al., 2008). In 2012, Maine enacted a law that required school districts to 
implement proficiency-based diploma requirements. This law required local districts to 
use the Maine Learning Results as the basis for establishing local standards that defined 
proficiency. Consequently, local districts adopted different targets and had varying 
definitions of what it meant to be proficient (Johnson & Stump, 2018). Shifting the 
mandate for defining proficiency from the state level to the local district level 
undermined the goal of improving equity between districts and ensuring that students 
were meeting similar proficiencies that were aligned to state benchmark assessments. 
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After six years of district implementation, the law requiring schools and districts to 
certify that a student achieved proficiency in the Learning Results was repealed.  
The history of school reform in the United States and in Maine is relevant because 
the federal and state mandates that have been introduced, revised, and replaced over the 
last 40 years have resulted in schools and districts in a constant state of reform (Elmore, 
1996) without building capacity within educational organizations to know what is needed 
to carry out the reform (Forman et al., 2017; Honig & Hatch, 2004). The rapid series of 
educational reforms has contributed to a decreased sense of collective efficacy, as these 
reforms have not led to improved student achievement, nor have they improved equity in 
schools (James, 2016; Forman et al., 2017; Saphier, 2019).  
As the federal and state involvement and oversight increases in areas that had 
previously been the domain of districts and schools—including standards, curriculum 
alignment, teacher preparation and effectiveness, professional development, and 
monitoring school performance and improvement—the role of the school district as an 
independent decision-making entity is less defined (Heller, 2018; Shelly, 2011; Payne, 
2010). This complex history of the relationship between local districts and federal and 
state departments of education informed how these policy domains interacted throughout 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act included education-related provisions to support child nutrition programs, 
childcare and K-12 institutions, as well as $13 billion for the Elementary and Secondary 
School Emergency Relief Fund (ESSERF). The ESSERF funds were distributed to states, 
which then allocated the funds to districts based on their Title 1 allocation and could be 
used for educational purposes that were authorized under current federal programs 
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(Anguiano et al., 2020). These funds were used to address a range of educational needs 
arising from disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, including purchasing 
technology to support distance learning, facilities improvements, and COVID-related 
mitigation resources—including personal protective equipment (PPE), professional 
development, and resources to address the needs of students with disabilities and English 
learners. While these funds have some restrictions and reporting and accounting 
requirements, local education agencies had a great deal of discretion in deciding how to 
spend these funds. 
The federal government provided funding to districts and relaxed some mandates. 
At the end of March, the U.S. Department of Education waived the assessment 
requirement in the Every Student Succeeds Act (Gewertz, 2020). While the U.S. 
Department of Education waived the testing requirement, it emphasized that during the 
period of school closures, learning must continue. It rejected requests to support 
Congressional waivers to the free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and least 
restrictive environment (LRE) requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) (U.S. Department of Education, 2020). Maintaining these 
requirements meant that school districts needed to continue to work to meet students’ 
individual education programs (IEP), despite the challenges posed by emergency remote 
learning.  
As districts developed new procedures for emergency remote learning and began 
planning to return to school in the fall, the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) took 
an active role in providing supports to school administrative units and educators in the 
field. While the MDOE provided guidance and support in the form of weekly webinars 
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hosted by content area specialists and resources to support emergency remote learning on 
the MDOE website, superintendents throughout the state sought more guidance and 
direction on a number of issues—including how attendance should be taken, how grading 
and reporting should occur, and how graduations should take place, given the 50-person 
limit placed on gatherings—that had typically been the purview of the school 
administrative unit (SAU). The MDOE responded to these requests by increasing its 
presence at regional meetings of superintendents and by convening the leaders of 
educational organizations throughout the state, representing the perspectives of 
stakeholders throughout the field. These regular meetings allowed the MDOE to hear and 
respond to questions and concerns raised by educators.  
As districts began planning for the reopening of schools, they again sought 
guidance and clear directions from the MDOE about health and safety requirements, 
defining what distance learning should entail, how to manage the requirements of IDEA, 
and how to manage sports and arts programs. Throughout the spring and summer, the 
Commissioner of Education and other members from the MDOE continued to meet with 
superintendents and educational leaders to provide updates from other departments, 
including the Maine Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS), and to develop guidelines for returning to school. In July, 
the MDOE, working with Maine CDC, released the Framework for Returning to 
Classroom Instruction. This framework included a “series of health and safety 
precautions that all schools were required to follow to protect the safety and well-being of 
staff, students, and their families if they decide to return to in-classroom instruction” 
(Office of Governor Janet T. Mills, 2020). The other parts of the framework included 
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guidance related to supporting staff and students’ social, emotional, behavioral, and 
mental health; academic programs and student learning considerations; and common 
expectations for hybrid and remote learning models. The framework also included the 
COVID-19 School Health Advisory System, which established a three-tier classification 
system based on a county’s relative risk of COVID-19 transmission. While parts of the 
framework were presented as guidance, the framework’s health and safety considerations 
included six requirements that superintendents had to certify were being followed to 
accept federal COVID-relief funds. By issuing the rest of the framework, including the 
COVID-19 Health Advisory System, as guidance, the MDOE sought to honor the local 
control of SAUs, while still providing clear guidelines that district leaders could use to 
plan for the return to in-person instruction.  
Over the last 60 years the role that federal and state governmental organizations 
had played in mandating educational reforms aimed at improving student outcomes has 
expanded. This expansion established a precedent for and expectation of federal and state 
involvement and direction. Over the 2020-2021 school year, during the COVID-19 
pandemic, federal and state governmental organizations continued to be involved in local 
education policy. Throughout the year, local leaders were forced to respond to frequently 
changing and sometimes contradictory guidance from federal and state governmental 
organizations when instituting local policy and procedure.   
Leading From Crisis to Recalibration: The Role of Relational Trust 
 The sudden closure of school buildings required districts to pivot their operations, 
resources, and approach to provide emergency remote learning. While putting into place 
policies and procedures during emergency remote learning, district and school leaders 
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were also beginning to make plans for the return to school in the fall. When staff and 
students returned to in-person instruction in the fall, many changes had been planned for 
and implemented, recalibrating the schooling experience. These were significant and 
complicated changes to practices, routines, and structures that leaders needed to diffuse 
throughout the system—across buildings and into each classroom. And many of the 
practices, routines, and structures would need to be changed as the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic—including the rates of infection in the community, growing 
understanding of the virus, and shifting political and societal inputs—also changed. 
Relational trust between stakeholders, including district leaders, principals, teachers, 
school board members, parents, and members of the community was an important 
element in the successful implementation and sustainability of these situational reforms.  
Relational Trust 
 According to Rousseau and her colleagues (1998) trust is the willingness to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another person or institution based on “positive expectations” 
regarding the intentions, drivers, and behavior of the other (Mayer et al., 1995; Pirson & 
Malhotra, 2007). “Trust is based on the expectation that one will find what is expected 
rather than what is feared” (Deutsch, 1973, as cited in McAllister, 1995). Trust is a vital 
element in an organization for it to function effectively and coherently. In schools, trust 
among teachers and in the principal is related to improved collaboration, collective 
efficacy, and student achievement (Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000; Tschannen-Moran, 
2001; Bryk & Schneider, 2003). Trust in the district and those leading it is especially 
important during crises when there is much uncertainty (Frederiksen, 2014; Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002; Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000). “Trust functions as a ‘lubricant’ 
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greasing the way for efficient operations when people have confidence in other people’s 
words and deeds” (Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000, p. 549). In a complex organization 
like a school district, social relationships and social exchanges between members of the 
school community are an integral part of the operations and these exchanges are more 
productive when they occur in a high-trust context 
Drawing on theories of social capital, Bryk & Schneider (2002) assert that 
individuals who are part of the school community make up a complex network of 
members who play different roles in the organization. While the scope of this research, 
based on a longitudinal study of 400 Chicago elementary schools, is limited to the 
school-level, the framework and findings can be applied to the district and district 
leaders, particularly those serving small districts. According to the researchers, the roles 
that people play—teacher, student, principal, and parent—affect the social exchanges, as 
each member is aware of their role set and the obligations associated with it. Relational 
trust is established when members have confidence that others will fulfill obligations and 
expectations in their shared work of educating students (Robinson, 2010). Because 
schools and districts are arranged hierarchically, the social exchanges between people in 
different role sets are asymmetrical, with a participant from one role set having more 
power than the other in the organization. Despite the asymmetry, the members in the 
organization depend on each other to function effectively in their role and these mutual 
dependences create risk and vulnerability (Mayer et al., 1995; Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 
2000; Pirson & Malhotra, 2007). “Consequently, deliberate action taken by any party to 
reduce this sense of vulnerability in others—to make them feel safe and secure—builds 
trust across the community” (Bryk & Schneider, 2003, p. 41). As the sense of risk and 
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vulnerability is reduced, members of the school community are more willing to engage in 
the new task or reform though they may not feel comfortable or confident (Rousseau, 
1998; McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995; Handford & Leithwood, 2013). 
The day-to-day interpersonal social exchanges between people with different role 
obligations lead participants to interpret or discern the intentions of the other and whether 
or not they are fulfilling these role obligations. This assessment is shaped by each 
individual’s set of motives, including moral-ethical values, social status and esteem, and 
material self-interests. Each member’s reputation and history also affect how their 
intentions and actions are discerned (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Frederiksen, 2014; 
Handford & Leithwood; 2013; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015). When a member’s 
actions are consistent with the expectations of their role, relational trust in the individual 
and the larger organization is enhanced (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Handford & 
Leithwood, 2013). Researchers have identified myriad factors that contribute to 
trustworthiness including respect, and personal regard for others (Bryk & Schneider, 
2002), competence (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Pirson & Mahotra, 2007; Handford & 
Leithwood, 2013; Hoppes & Holley, 2013; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015), 
benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995; Pirson & Mahotra, 2007; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 
2015), openness or transparency, and consistency (Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015; 
Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Hoppes & Holley, 2013). Relational trust is observed in an 
organization when these factors are discerned. Conversely, the perceived absence or 
deficiency of any of these factors can undermine the sense of trust in the individual and 
organization.  
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While deliberate action can be taken by any member of a school community to 
reduce the sense of vulnerability in others, the hierarchical nature of school districts 
means that there is a power asymmetry between members and, as such, those members 
with greater power in the system can impact relational trust throughout the organization 
differently. In their research, Tschannen-Moran & Gareis (2015) and Handford & 
Leithwood (2013) examined the effects of teachers’ trust in school leaders on student 
achievement and school climate. Researchers found that trust in leaders, specifically their 
principals, increased the likelihood that a person would take a professional risk because 
the sense of vulnerability is diminished (Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002; Rousseau et al., 1998). Tschannen-Moran & Gareis (2015) found that 
trustworthy leadership contributed positively to student achievement and to the school 
climate. They also concluded principals that were perceived as trustworthy were seen as 
both approachable and engaged deeply as an instructional leader, and these qualities 
contributed to a collegial culture. This collegial culture reflected other leadership 
characteristics associated with perceptions of trustworthiness, including competence, 
commitment, integrity, and personal regard for others. Tschannen-Moran & Gareis 
(2015) connected the effect that teachers’ trust in the principal had on the sense of trust 
between other members of the school: 
Where teachers felt that they could put their faith in the principal and that their 
principal was someone to whom they could turn for assistance with instructional 
matters, teachers perceived their colleagues to be more committed to students and 
that they were competent, cooperative, and supportive. (p. 82) 
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In such a school climate, interpersonal trust is strengthened as individuals throughout the 
organization perceive that others care for them and are fulfilling their role obligations. 
Consequently, the members experience strong social affiliation throughout the school 
community, strengthening their social network that allow for greater coordination and 
coherence throughout the school. 
 Researchers have identified a number of characteristics associated with a leader’s 
perceived trustworthiness. Handford and Leithwood (2013) examined a number of these 
characteristics—including consistency and reliability, competence, openness, respect, and 
integrity—and found that a leader’s perceived competence acted as a dominant influence 
on teachers’ attribution of leader trustworthiness. They found respect to be a salient 
characteristic in teachers’ discernment of a leader’s trustworthiness. This section 
examines these two characteristics more closely because competence was found to be so 
dominant in teachers’ perception of a leader’s trustworthiness, and because respect 
involves a leader’s recognition of the vital role that each member of the organization 
plays in the functioning of the organization. 
Competence in Core Role Responsibilities 
 Researchers distinguish between technical or functional competencies and 
interpersonal competencies (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007; Handford & Leithwood, 2013; 
Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015). Functional competencies are work-related skills that 
involve managing the day-to-day operations of the school and district in a skilled and 
dependable manner (Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Pirson & Malhotra, 2007). In 
addition to functional competence, a leader also needs to demonstrate interpersonal 
competence. Tschannen-Moran (2004, as cited in Handford & Leithwood, 2013), defined 
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this competence as, “engaging in problem solving, fostering conflict resolution (rather 
than avoidance), handling difficult situations, being flexible.” These skills reflect the 
leader’s style and emotional intelligence. In their analysis, Pirson & Malhotra (2007) 
found that these interpersonal skills and the capacity to communicate a strategic vision 
were of greater importance to those with more frequent interactions with the organization 
and its leaders. Those in the organization—in the school or in the district—have more 
frequent social exchanges with the leaders and, as a result, are better able to evaluate a 
leader’s skill in these areas. Pirson & Malhotra also found that as the intensity increased, 
those high-intensity stakeholders experienced heightened vulnerability and, to discern 
that the leader or organization was trustworthy, expected consistency in the behavior of 
the leader or organization. 
 In their analysis of teachers’ trust in school leaders, Handford & Leithwood 
(2013) examined those trust-building characteristics and specific leadership practices 
associated with these characteristics that teachers identified as most salient when 
discerning a principal’s trustworthiness. Of the attributes associated with principal 
trustworthiness, they found that perceptions of a principal's competence were most 
influential on all teachers’ discernments of principal trustworthiness. Handford & 
Leithwood explored the specific leadership practices associated with competence and 
found that functional, work-related skills which included being visible in the building, 
engaging in classroom observations, and providing specific feedback about instruction 
were mentioned most frequently in the interviews with teachers and reflected teachers’ 
perceptions of the leader’s competence. While these functional, work-related skills 
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include some technical skills or management of school operations, they also involve 
those skills that require interpersonal competence.  
 When a leader’s competence is in question, stakeholders who depend on the 
leader experience an increased sense of vulnerability and risk, and, as a result, 
stakeholders’ trust in the leader is lost (Tschannen-Moran, 2001; Bryk & Schneider, 
2002; Handford & Leithwood, 2013). “Competence is vital since people are unlikely to 
listen to or depend upon someone whose abilities they don’t respect. Generally, 
employees need to believe that the leader has the skills and abilities to carry out what he 
or she says they will do” (Lines et al., 2005, as cited in Handford & Leithwood, 2013). 
While there are other characteristics that are associated with leader trustworthiness, 
competence is fundamental to trust; without a sense that the leader will competently carry 
out the functional tasks necessary to lead the building or district, trust cannot be 
established and the benefits of organizational trust cannot be realized (Rousseau et al., 
1995; Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Bryk & Schneider, 2002).  
Respect 
 Relational trust is conditioned on the social respect that occurs through day-to-day 
social exchanges, interactions, and communications between all members of the 
community. “Maintaining a modicum of respect in these exchanges is a base condition 
for sustaining civil social interactions within a community. Such respect needs to be 
reciprocated by parties in each role set” (Bryk & Schneider, 2002, p. 23). Respectful 
exchanges allow for affective-based trust, which is trust that is grounded in the emotional 
bonds between individuals, to be established (McAllister, 1995). When social respect 
occurs consistently and is an established norm in a learning community, the social 
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exchanges necessary for relational trust persist throughout the community of 
interdependent stakeholders. Conversely, when social respect is not maintained, 
exchanges decline, thus adversely affecting the existence and cultivation of a community 
of learners and the discernment of relational trust (Tschannen-Moran, 2001; Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002).  
 According to Bryk & Schneider (2002), members of a school community 
demonstrate social respect when they acknowledge the indispensable role that each 
member of the organization plays in the education of students. Members of a school and 
district exhibit respect for other members by genuinely listening to concerns and 
observations raised and incorporate this feedback into decisions and practices. Social 
respect is found across all role relationships, including teachers and students, parents and 
teachers, parents and administrators, teachers and administrators, building leaders and 
central office leaders, and the superintendent and school board members.  
In their examination of teachers’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of a leader, 
Handford & Leithwood (2013) found that teachers in high-trust schools reported respect 
as a central factor in their discernment of a principal’s trustworthiness when the principal 
acknowledged their work and skill and provided specific feedback that indicated they 
were aware of the teacher’s work. Social respect reduces risk and promotes increased 
collaboration and social exchanges that lead to a sense of connectedness throughout the 
organization across the network of members (Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Tschannen-
Moran, 2001; Bryk & Schneider, 2002).  
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The Power of Social Networks to Diffuse Reform 
 When people are members of a high-trust organization, they are more likely to 
engage in collaborative work with colleagues that leads to a greater sense of belonging. 
As the number of social exchanges increases, members of the school or district form 
informal social structures or networks that strengthen the transfer of information, as well 
as organizational norms (Daly et al., 2009). Social network analysis involves 
systematically mapping the patterns of interpersonal interactions and communication to 
identify the ways in which people in an organization are connected. Coburn and Russell 
(2008) found that the structure of social networks—the strength and arrangement of the 
ties linking members—is associated with the effectiveness of reform implementation. 
According to this research, tie strength is related to the strength of the connection 
between the members of the network. Strong ties in a network accommodate the transfer 
of complex knowledge, whereas weak ties more effectively facilitate the transfer of 
technical advice. In a complex organization like a school district, a single member of the 
organization can serve in multiple roles, including, for example, being simultaneously a 
classroom teacher, grade level leader, and member of a district curriculum committee. 
This single member of the organization is linked to or spans layers, interacting with other 
members throughout the organization. Strong social networks have been found to 
strengthen communities, develop leadership skills of members, and contribute to 
improved student achievement (Daly et al., 2009). In addition, strong social networks are 
instrumental in shifting the focus from the individual to the organization and the goals of 
the organization.  
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 In their study of social networks, Daly and his colleagues (2009) found that in 
school districts, principals were the primary channel through which reform initially is 
conveyed and diffused. Additionally, they found that though principals received the same 
information relative to the reform, their interpretations and approaches when conveying it 
to their teachers and staff varied, affecting how the reform was implemented. While they 
found that in addition to principals’ varying interpretations of the reform, grade level 
leaders also interpreted and communicated the reform in diverse ways. Despite these 
variations, when the social network was strong, members were able to co-create a shared 
understanding of the reform, facilitating its implementation.  
 This research is significant because when reform is introduced into a system with 
strong, established professional and social networks, the reform is both understood more 
accurately and implemented more effectively. 
School Reform: A Framework to Understand the Role of District Leaders 
 Rorrer et al. (2008) provided a narrative synthesis of previous findings of the role 
that districts play in school reform and improvement efforts. Using a narrative synthesis 
as the methodology, the authors used a six-stage iterative process to set the criteria for 
examining the research, select the studies, draw out the data and evaluate the study 
quality, synthesize the data, and report the results of the review. They reviewed 82 
published sources, including 52 peer reviewed/refereed articles, four books, 16 policy or 
research center reports, and ten other sources. Of these, 63 were empirically based, 12 
were conceptual, three were syntheses of research, and four were identified as “other” 
(Rorrer, et al., 2008). As a result of this narrative synthesis, the authors identified four 
essential roles for districts in educational reform: providing instructional leadership, 
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reorienting the organization, establishing policy coherence, and maintaining an equity 
focus. “Together, these roles envelop aspects of district leadership, management, values 
and norms, operations, and governance” (p. 314).  
 Rorrer et al. (2008) concluded that districts functioned as institutional actors, 
which they defined as those that “influence the institution from within by influencing the 
development and implementation of solutions to identified problems” (Cahn, 1995, as 
cited in Rorrer, et al., 2008). In their research, Rorrer et al. (2008) referred to a district as 
an organized collective, which included superintendents, school boards, mid-level 
administrators, and principals that worked together as a network connecting the district to 
schools to improve equity and student achievement. In their qualitative study of 
educators’ and leaders’ perception of three reform efforts, Johnson & Chrispeels (2010) 
found that by coordinating the linkages between district administrators and the schools in 
the district, particularly the relational and ideological linkages, district leaders were able 
to ensure coherent instructional focus, organizational learning, greater accountability for 
the reform, and enhanced commitment to the reforms. This finding is significant because 
it is consistent with Rorrer et al.’s (2008) conceptualization of the district as an 
institutional actor, which can act as a collective that can organize, coordinate, and direct 
educational resources within the system (See Figure 1). 




Districts as Institutional Actors in Improving Achievement and Advancing Equity 
 
Note. This figure reflects the four roles that districts, as institutional actors, play to 
implement reform. Adapted from “Districts as Institutional Actors in Educational 
Reform,” by A. K. Rorrer, L. Skrla, and J. J. Scheurich, 2008, Educational 
Administration Quarterly, 44(3), p. 335. (https://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X08318962). 
Copyright 2008 by SAGE publications. 
 
Maintaining an Equity Focus  
James Spillane (1998) characterized districts as “non-monolithic” because while 
an external entity, like the state, can mandate policy that requires school reform, the 
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reform mandate is first interpreted by the district and, ultimately, by those in the schools. 
“Reformers propose that educators teach in ways that cannot be precisely specified by 
external agencies. Thus, local educators have to play a major role in working out what 
reformers’ proposals mean for their schools” (Spillane, 1998, p. 34). Though district 
leaders can interpret and advocate for the reform, it is incumbent on the district leaders to 
generate the will and build capacity for the change to be understood and adopted.  
 By appealing to a common set of ideals and beliefs, district and school leaders 
begin to generate will and establish a shared sense of purpose. One of those shared beliefs 
is that schools should educate all students and, by maintaining a focus on equity, school 
leaders are able to seed the context and need for reform by owning existing and past 
inequity that exists culturally and systemically (Rorrer et al., 2008). Schools nested 
within the same school district can serve significantly different students and 
communities. The different student populations contribute to the need for district leaders 
to provide differentiated direction and support to schools to improve teaching and 
learning to increase equity. Because systemic inequities in schools often reflect social, 
culture, and economic inequities in the broader community, district and school leaders 
must acknowledge them and foreground issues of equity when planning and 
implementing reforms (Rorrer et al., 2008; Pijanowski, 2019; Trujillo, 2013). During the 
COVID-19 pandemic, students and their peers within the same districts and schools were 
affected very differently. Students from low-income families were less likely to have 
access to devices or internet, and students in schools with more than 75% of students 
eligible for free or reduced meals were three times more likely to be truant than their 
peers in schools with fewer than 25% of students eligible for free or reduced meals 
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(Herold, 2020). During the pandemic, students with the greatest needs—those in high 
poverty schools—were more likely to be truant or to disengage from school. Though 99% 
of school leaders reported taking measures to address equity during the pandemic (Kurtz, 
2020), the achievement gap is expected to grow. Schools anticipate the need to allocate 
significant resources to address learning loss, particularly for those students who were 
most adversely affected throughout the pandemic. In addition to addressing academic 
needs, schools will also need to provide nonacademic services and supports (Hoffman & 
Miller, 2020).  
 An equity focus involves acknowledging historical inequities as well as 
addressing and correcting systemic structures that perpetuate and exacerbate inequities. 
By owning past inequities and maintaining an equity focus, district and school leaders 
have an important filter through which they can evaluate reforms, adopting those that will 
serve all the students in the district. The need to maintain an equity focus when students 
return to in-person learning full time is of greater importance, as districts need to reorient 
the organization to address these inequities and foreground equity (Rorrer, 2008; 
Hoffman & Miller, 2020).  
Providing Instructional Leadership  
Ronald Edmond (1979) reviewed research on effective schools and identified 
seven correlates that were present in effective schools; providing instructional leadership 
was one of the seven correlates. While there is ample research noting the need for 
principals to be effective instructional leaders (Blasé & Blasé, 2000; Honig, 2012; 
Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Togneri & Anderson, 2003; Fullan & Quinn, 2016; 
Edmond, 1979), there are relatively fewer studies examining how instructional leadership 
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is measured in district leaders such as superintendents (Honig, 2013; Forman et al., 
2017).  
 Throughout the history of American education, the responsibilities of the 
superintendent have evolved. With the rapid growth of school systems in large, urban 
areas at the turn of the twentieth century, the role of the school district superintendent 
shifted from instructional leader and teacher to a manager of the larger bureaucracy 
(Cuban, 1984; Heller, 2018; Cross, 2015; James, 2016; Jennings, 2012). As the pressure 
to reform schools to improve student achievement and ensure equitable access to 
education has mounted, providing instructional leadership has been a greater emphasis, 
requiring the people in these roles to continue to manage the bureaucracy of the 
organization while also providing instructional leadership (Rorrer et al., 2008; Honig, 
2013). “With the mounting interest in using effective schools research, the older model of 
a school chief knowledgeable about both curriculum and instruction and visible in the 
schools beyond the symbolic tour is reasserting itself” (Cuban, 1984, p. 146). Though 
district leaders act as instructional leaders, they continue to bear the responsibility of 
managing and overseeing the operational aspects of a school district, particularly in 
smaller districts where district central offices are smaller. In addition to responsibility for 
providing instructional leadership and management of operations, district leaders are also 
expected to be able to introduce, implement, and sustain educational reform.  
 Introducing, implementing, and sustaining reforms, particularly those reforms of a 
complex organization like a school district, involve what Corcoran, Fuhrman, & Belcher 
(2001) identified as broad strategic decisions:  
• Deciding what to do, which is the problem of design and adoption;  
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• Determining how to get it done, which involves coordinating support and 
focusing resources; and 
• Scaling up or replicating those successful reforms to other settings. 
Rorrer et al. (2008) observed two important elements of providing instructional 
leadership that district leaders adopt when introducing and implementing a reform: 
generating will and building capacity. Generating will aligns with Corcoran et al.'s (2001) 
first step: deciding what to do. To generate will, a district leader must identify the 
problem and communicate why this problem is urgent enough to require coordinated and 
intentional changes. The COVID-19 pandemic was an undeniable and pressing 
problem—a crisis—that required immediate action. In the crisis, convincing people to 
believe that the many changes were necessary was not as pressing as making sure people 
understood what the changes were and how to implement them. As a result, 
communicating what the change involved and building capacity to implement the change 
needed to occur sometimes in the absence of generating will. 
Once the need for change is identified, the district leader must identify the 
proposed solution and communicate to stakeholders what this solution entails. To 
generate will to adopt the proposed reform, the district leader must appeal to a common 
set of values, beliefs, and ideologies (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Forman et al., 2017; 
Elmore et al., 2014). The leader must also attend to the personal relationships in the 
organization by being personally engaged, encouraging multiple perspectives, and 
maintain a focus on instruction (Reeves, 2006; Forman et al., 2017). Each of these 
behaviors engenders a commitment to continue to improve and to work toward shared 
goals (Rorrer, et al., 2008).  
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In their study of scaling-up school reforms, Coburn (2003) expanded the 
definition of scale from the number of schools enacting the reform to include the depth of 
change within the school district necessary to internalize and sustain the reform. To 
successfully take a reform to scale, Coburn (2003) identified four interrelated 
dimensions: depth, sustainability, spread, and shift in reform ownership. These 
dimensions also apply to crisis response and situational reforms, but are complicated by 
the rate of changes. These interrelated dimensions expand upon Rorrer et al.’s (2008) 
conceptualization of the four roles the district plays in instituting reforms, providing 
greater emphasis on the sustainability of a reform and the shift in the sense of who owns 
the reform—from an externally-mandated initiative, to one that stakeholders perceive as 
an internally-driven one.  
To shift ownership of the reform from externally-directed, to one for which the 
responsibility is held by stakeholders at the school level, district leaders must attend to 
the “attitudes, motivation, and beliefs that underlie an implementor’s response to a 
policy’s goals or strategies” (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 172). Generating will is a part of both 
the design and adoption of the reform, as well as the coordination of supports and 
resources to carry out the reform. Generating will involves conveying the need for the 
reform and addressing stakeholders’ beliefs and assumptions. Coburn (2003) considered 
the interrelated dimension of depth to include teachers’ beliefs about how students learn 
and what constitutes effective instruction. Rorrer et al. (2008) described the need for 
district leaders to attend to teachers’ and principals’ attitudes, beliefs, and motivations as 
necessary for generating will. Providing instructional leadership, particularly when 
implementing a reform, requires district leaders to generate the collective will by 
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articulating the vision and convincing stakeholders of the need for the change—to sell the 
vision and help those who must carry out the reform understand how the reform fits 
within the broader goals of the organization (Firestone, 1989). In addition to believing in 
the importance of the change, those enacting the reform must experience a sense of 
urgency, or what Honig (2003) called a “warrant for change” (p. 315).  
Generating will is one element of instructional leadership that reflects what 
Johnson and Chrispeels (2010) referred to as relational and ideological linkages. 
Relational linkages were characterized by trusting professional relationships within and 
across levels of a district. The ideological linkage reflects the shared values, vision, and 
goals of the district. Reforms that will result in improved outcomes for students will 
require changes to the core of education, which include the structures, classroom 
practices, and the nature of how teachers and students interact (Elmore, 1996; Coburn, 
2003; Honig, 2003; Johnson et al., 2008). To generate the will for such changes, leaders 
of the district and school must relate to stakeholders both ideologically and relationally—
appealing to minds and hearts (Daly et al., 2015).  
Both the relational and ideological linkages are critical to generating will and 
building a commitment to the decision to make the reform. Corcoran et al. (2001) found 
that the three districts in their study were unable to implement and sustain the identified 
reform efforts, in part, because they were not able to generate the will or commitment to 
the reform. But the authors also identified issues related to how the reforms were carried 
out. The authors noted that for a reform to be successfully implemented, resources 
supporting the reform must be coordinated.  
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Rorrer et al. (2008) identified this as the building capacity element of instructional 
leadership; the capacity to enact the collective will of the district. It is “the district’s 
ability and capability to enact its will” (p. 316).  If generating will allows stakeholders to 
understand what the reform is and why it is needed, capacity building defines how the 
reform can be carried out. To build capacity a district leader must marshal resources, 
including human, social, and physical, in an intentional and coordinated manner (Elmore 
et al., 2014). Forman et al. (2017) noted the pivotal role that capacity plays in any reform 
effort: “The success of any instructional intervention, improvement initiative, or policy is 
better understood as a challenge of teacher learning and organizational capacity building 
rather than a challenge of faithful implementation” (p. 10). If generating will allows 
stakeholders to understand what the reform is and why it is needed, capacity building 
defines how the reform can be carried out. Cohen & Mehta (2017) found that successful 
reforms “either offered the educational tools, materials, and practical guidance educators 
needed to put the reform into practice, or they helped educators to capitalize on existing 
tools, materials, and guidance” (p. 646). Capacity involves the resources necessary for the 
reform to be implemented.  
These resources include, but are not limited to, personnel, knowledge, skills, and 
materials. Spillane & Thompson (1997) identified three variances in building capacity: 
human capital, social capital, and physical capital, each of which must be attended to 
when implementing and sustaining reforms. Physical capital is the material resources, 
labor, and time necessary to carry out the reform. Human capital entails the knowledge, 
disposition and commitment or will to adopt the change. Finally, social capital includes 
the knowledge of local reformers and professional networks. Using social-network 
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theory, Daly et al. (2015) identified the effectiveness of social networks and prosocial ties 
as leading to increased productivity, improved organizational functioning, and 
information transfer. This sharing of knowledge and experience through professional 
networks builds trust and collaboration between stakeholders.  
In sum, to provide instructional leadership, district leaders must generate will for 
the reform and build capacity to make changes. Generating will and building capacity are 
necessary for stakeholders to be willing to examine and change underlying pedagogical 
principles and beliefs and assumptions about teaching and learning.  
Reorienting the Organization and Establishing Policy Coherence 
 Two other roles that that districts play in reform efforts, according to Rorrer et 
al.’s (2008) narrative synthesis of previous research, are to reorient the organization—
which involves refining organizational structures and processes and changing the district 
culture—and to establish policy coherence. Policy coherence requires district leaders to 
manage and mediate externally-driven mandates from federal and state entities, as well as 
from local actors. District leaders are frequently under tremendous pressure to reform 
quickly and, as a result, will often field additional and competing calls for new reforms, 
even while managing existing reforms. Reorienting the organization and establishing 
policy coherence require the aligning of organizational structures, redefining roles, 
coordinating resources, and maintaining a focus on the instructional core. This alignment 
is necessary for the implementation and sustainability of any reform (Cobb et al., 2018; 
Johnson et al., 2015; Forman et al., 2017; Honig, 2009; Coburn, 2003).  
In their study of three large urban districts’ process of adopting and implementing 
a reform, Corcoran et al. (2001) described the tension that arose between central office 
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and school-level leaders as the reform process was underway. This study reflected the 
structural challenges that exist for districts and schools in decision-making, implementing 
reforms, and monitoring and accountability. In each of the three districts, the roles in the 
reform decision were not defined. While central office leaders wanted building-level 
leaders and stakeholders to make decisions about the school improvement strategy and 
professional development, they also wanted to ensure that the decisions made were 
evidence-based best practices. Corcoran et al., (2001) found that the decentralization of 
decision-making, coupled with weak district guidance in the adoption and 
implementation of the reforms undermined the use of evidence-based decision making. 
The researchers found that school-based stakeholders, including teachers and school 
leaders, were instead more apt to make choices based on other drivers, including ease of 
use, ability to continue with current practices, and other teachers’ recommendations; they 
were not driven to adopt a reform based on research findings and data.  
As reforms are introduced and implemented, school-based stakeholders make 
choices in how the reforms will be implemented based on their beliefs about teaching and 
learning, as well as their interpretation of what the reform entails. Larry Cuban (1998) 
observed the dynamic interplay between the reform and those implementing it. Reforms 
“are adopted and, as they are implemented, undergo changes that transform them in ways 
that few of the designers of the original reform could predict, or even claim ownership” 
(p. 455). To achieve coordination and coherence in a complex organization characterized 
by classrooms nested in departments and grades within multiple schools in the district, 
district leaders must attend to the shared goals and vision by maintaining contact and 
communication with the stakeholders throughout the system, particularly with the 
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building-level leaders (Saphier & Durkin, 2011; Reeves, 2006). District leaders must be 
aware of serious barriers to change that exist within complex educational organizations.  
Jerald (2005) identified predictable sets of internal obstacles that can be found 
across organizations and include technical, cultural, and political challenges. Technical 
challenges reflect a lack of understanding how to implement the change. Cultural 
challenges are seen when a reform conflicts with teachers’ or stakeholders’ beliefs and 
ideology. In addition to these predictable internal barriers, external barriers, including 
insufficient support, and insufficient control over resources, are also significant 
impediments to successful implementation of reform. District leaders working to address 
these barriers must do so both through generating will and building capacity, but also by 
removing other barriers (Jerald, 2005). Reorienting the organization and establishing 
policy coherence require district leaders redistribute and align resources—human, social, 
and physical—to support the reform work. In addition, researchers argue that to truly 
reorient the organization, the day-to-day tasks of those in district offices must be 
restructured to focus on instructional leadership and direct support of school leaders 
(Honig, 2009; Honig, 2013; Jerald, 2005; Rorrer et al., 2008).  
 Reorienting the organization requires that leaders not only avoid other competing 
priorities, but that they also change their behaviors and practices to support instructional 
leadership. As instructional leaders, superintendents and central office administrators 
provide support to principals by helping them learn to strengthen their instructional 
leadership skills. Honig (2012) studied three large urban districts that were in the process 
of transforming the work practices of central office to focus on teaching and learning, 
examining the practices of central office leaders, called Instructional Leadership 
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Directors (ILDs) to strengthen principals’ instructional leadership. The ILDs were 
considered part of the central office, as they reported directly to the superintendent. 
Honig found that the restructuring of the responsibilities of the central office staff to 
assume ILD roles that required them to engage in intensive job-embedded supports for 
principals had the effect of focusing the work of central office on teaching and learning. 
This direct modeling of instructional leadership also had the effect of building principals’ 
skills and behaviors that Blasé and Blasé (2000) associated with effective instructional 
leaders. Specifically, when ILDs partnered with principals in classroom observations and 
modeled giving feedback to teachers in classroom observations, the ILD and principal 
demonstrated collaboration, modeling effective instructional practices and providing 
feedback.  
 In small districts, central office administrators, including superintendents, 
assistant superintendents, and curriculum directors, are more likely to engage in more 
intensive supports for principals. According to Hentschke and his colleagues (2009), 
superintendents focus on system coherence of the interconnected aspects of the academic 
program, including standards, curriculum, and assessments. In these districts, leaders 
assume increased hands-on involvement, characterized by increased personal 
involvement in a variety of instructional leadership roles. In addition, central office 
leaders also engage in more bridging activities that increase the flow of information and 
knowledge between schools and central office to facilitate implementation. Bridging can 
also include connecting the district to other, external organizations to introduce new ideas 
and achieve organizational goals (Honig, 2009). 
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Achieving Coherence in Complex Educational Organizations 
Within Rorrer et al.’s (2008) broad definition of a district, there is a need to 
understand the relationship between the school-level leadership and district-level 
leadership, which is usually represented by the principal-superintendent relationship. 
Johnson and Chrispeels (2010) observed the tension between centralized bureaucratic 
controls, which are the domain of district and central offices, and the professional 
discretion afforded to teachers in each school. This tension is also reflected throughout 
the broader educational organizations at the federal, state, and district contexts. Elmore 
(1996) described the "nested" nature of educational institutions—at all levels—as a 
primary obstacle to scaling educational reform. In addition, the author observed that the 
core of education—the interaction between students' role in learning and teachers' 
understanding of the nature of knowledge, as well as the structures of education—is 
rarely disturbed by educational reforms. Instead, reform efforts target aspects of 
educational structures that do not have significant impacts on sustained improvements in 
educational outcomes. Elmore posited that educational reforms that come closest to the 
core are those that will encounter the greatest resistance and, as a result, encounter 
additional challenges to implementation and sustainability. A teacher’s willingness to 
accept or to buy into making a change in their instructional practice depends on whether 
the change is consistent with their beliefs (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Elmore, 1996; 
Elmore et al., 2014).  
Weick (1976) explored how systems are coupled loosely or tightly, and Rorrer et 
al. (2008) adapted this work in their framework to describe the complexity of the 
relationships between the district and schools. The authors observed that while there 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
49 
could be tight coupling in one part of the system, there could be a loose coupling in 
another part of the system. The authors refer to this as variable coupling and assert that in 
school districts, “variability in coupling between roles permits districts to be more 
responsive to their political, social, and economical contexts” (p. 337). Such an allowance 
in the relationship between the district office and schools reflects the different needs that 
exist between schools within the same district. And while the loose coupling allows for 
greater autonomy and responsiveness at the school level based on the needs of the 
students, it also ensures significant variance between classrooms in schools, and between 
schools in the same district in how reforms will be interpreted and implemented 
(Spillane, 1998).  
Recognizing the potential for inequity between schools in the same district, 
Johnson and her colleagues (2015) examined how five large urban districts managed the 
relationship between their central offices and their schools and how consistently they 
centralized or decentralized decision-making. They found that existing practices favored 
school-level decision making, but “what mattered most was achieving coherence . . . One 
key to achieving coherence was establishing mutually supportive relationships and trust 
between the central office and the schools” (p. 21). The relationship between central 
office and schools is especially important when the district is implementing reform. It is 
also critical in times of crisis and upheaval. Bryk and Schneider (2002) assert that the 
presence of relational trust in the organization is the “connective tissue” that binds 
together members of the organization and facilitates the implementation of reforms.  
 The Relational Trust Framework (Bryk & Schneider, 2002) coupled with the 
theory of districts as institutional actors (Rorrer et al., 2008), provides a meaningful basis 
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to explore how leaders in a district employ leadership practices—including providing 
instructional leadership, generating will, establishing and maintaining trust, and building 
capacity—when implementing a reform. The framework also provides a means to 
examine the organizational processes, including the work undertaken by district and 
school leaders to reorient the district and to establish policy coherence. A district leader’s 
performance in each of these roles is closely related to the successful implementation and 
“scaling-up” (including sustaining) of a reform.  
District Leadership in Maine 
 Most research examining the relationship between central offices and schools has 
been conducted in large, urban districts (Johnson et al., 2015; Honig, 2003; Honig, 2009; 
Spillane, 1998). Districts were defined as large if they served more than 10,000 students. 
While there are benefits of scale in large districts, the size of the district, specifically the 
number of schools and staff, complicates the goal of achieving coherence and any 
semblance of homogeneity in the implementation of reform. 
 Maine has no district that could be classified as large, using this criterion. In 
2019, Maine schools served a total of 183,120 students in 610 schools. Maine has 281 
districts. Of those 281 districts, 64 have student enrollments greater than 1,000, 30 have 
student enrollments greater than 2,000, and only two have student enrollments greater 
than 5,000 (Maine Department of Education, 2019). In the smaller districts in Maine, 
district leaders carry out the four interdependent roles—providing instructional 
leadership, establishing policy coherence, reorienting the district, and maintaining an 
equity focus—despite having different organizational structures, fewer resources, and 
fewer central office staff, relative to those available to district leaders in large districts.  
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Overall Summary and Appropriateness of Literature Review 
 Through a review of the relevant literature, four assertions are made, and these are 
the basis for the significance of the study. First, district leaders play an important role in 
introducing, implementing, and sustaining reforms in the district’s schools. Second, 
coordinating and establishing coherence between the district and buildings is necessary 
for successfully implemented reforms, as is maintaining a shared purpose and collective 
vision. Third, the existing literature examining the role of district leaders in the reform 
process is drawn largely from large, urban districts. It is important to understand whether 
district leaders in Maine manage reforms in smaller districts in a manner similar to their 
counterparts in large districts. Fourth, Maine’s recent experiences with externally-driven 
mandates, particularly in the context of the state’s local-control history, may provide 
additional barriers that district leaders have to overcome when implementing a reform. 
Examining how leaders in Maine manage the four roles of district leaders in reform can 
provide valuable insights and inform our understanding of reforms in Maine.   




AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
53 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
District leaders play a vital role in introducing, implementing, and sustaining 
reforms and changes in the district’s schools, particularly those changes that are 
mandated by an external policy domain and are not initiated by the district. The abrupt 
closure of schools in Maine and throughout the country to stem the transmission of 
COVID-19, followed by the shift to emergency remote learning, and eventual return to 
school, have been historic and unprecedented in American education. In this time, school 
and district leaders’ roles and responsibilities changed as each member of the 
organization solved problems, directed resources, and managed changing, often 
contradictory guidance from multiple external entities, including federal, state, and local 
policy domains. The evolving understanding of the virus, as well as surging rates of 
infections, represented another external force that affected educational policy, operations, 
and leadership. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic the balance of power between the 
different policy domains was also affected as each local educational agency (LEA) 
maintained local control of educational decisions while also looking to state and federal 
entities for direction and guidance.  
Though the scale of closures was historic and unprecedented, the nature of the 
impact on the districts resembles that of other externally-mandated initiatives in that the 
district leaders were forced to implement changes that affected all stakeholders and 
impacted how instruction was delivered. In implementing extended school closures and 
return to school plans, district and school leaders worked together to provide instructional 
leadership, establish policy coherence, reorient the organization, and maintain a focus on 
equitably meeting the needs of all learners (Rorrer et al., 2008). As district and school 
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leaders developed plans and procedures addressing the operation of schools, the tension 
between centralization and localization of decision making was seen at the district level 
where district leaders worked to introduce and implement sweeping changes, while 
building-level leaders also worked to respond to the needs of their school communities, 
including staff, students, and families. Often, the needs of each school community varied 
within the same district. As school leaders responded to the demands of their 
communities, district leaders worked to provide policies and guidance that attempted to 
address the diversity within the district.  
Implementing changes on such a scale, and in a matter of days and weeks, 
required district leaders to examine myriad aspects of the district. The policies and 
practices that emerged reflect the non-monolithic nature of school districts and have led 
to within-district variations in policy implementation. This variation results from a 
number of factors, including each district’s approach to decision making and the way that 
decision-making responsibilities were shared with building-level leaders, and the manner 
in which district and school leaders collaborated to generate will and build capacity 
(Rorrer et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2015). In addition, the implementation of policy 
changes reflected differences in a district’s organizational arrangement (Spillane, 1998), 
the coherence of messaging, and existing institutional structures and practices (Coburn et 
al., 2016; James et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2015; Elmore et al., 2014). Examining the 
variations between the schools within the same district allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of how policies are interpreted in order to be carried out within the same 
school district (Spillane, 1998).  




 The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze how school and district 
leaders collaborated to coordinate their responses to the many challenges that arose 
during the COVID-19 pandemic amid the need to implement and sustain coherent 
system-wide changes. I used a constant comparative method to analyze the data and 
compare portions—drawn from interviews, observations, and documents—to identify 
similarities and differences in order to discern patterns and themes (Merriam & Tisdell, 
2016). My study explored how district and school leaders balanced centralizing or 
decentralizing decision-making authority during the pandemic, a context that required 
flexibility and responsiveness as the context changed frequently. In addition, I examined 
the actions leaders took to achieve coherence across the layers of the school district. 
Finally, when considering how leaders balanced centralization and decentralization, and 
the actions taken to achieve coherence throughout a complex system, I sought to 
understand how the relatively small size of the district affected these processes and 
actions.  
The following research questions were addressed in this study:  
How do district leaders achieve coordination and coherence in complicated systems 
comprising many schools, each with its own culture, in order to implement and sustain 
change? 
• How do district leaders determine how centralized controls are exercised and how 
much autonomy each school maintains? 
• How do district and school leaders generate will and build capacity for 
systemwide change? 
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• How do stakeholders’ understanding of the reforms affect the implementation of 
the change? 
Methodological Overview 
I am interested in understanding how district leaders interpreted their experiences 
during the COVID-19 pandemic as they worked to coordinate and establish coherence in 
complicated educational systems. To answer these questions, I used a qualitative 
methodology from the interpretivism paradigm because the focus is on participants’ 
understanding of—and the meaning they made within the context of—their experiences 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Rossman & Rollis, 2017). Because I am interested in 
understanding leaders’ experiences of managing and coordinating the changes brought 
about by the COVID-19 pandemic to establish and maintain coherence throughout their 
school systems, I used a single-case study methodological design. Yin (2014) asserts that 
case study research is appropriate when the focus of the study is on a contemporary 
situation or issue that the researcher does not control and research questions require 
description to answer “how” or “why.” A single-case study design was appropriate 
because it meets Yin’s (2014) rationale for the common case. Yin described the objective 
of the common case—a rationale for using a single-case study design—as “to capture the 
circumstances and conditions of an everyday situation” (p. 52). While the COVID-19 
pandemic is not an “everyday situation,” it has been a commonly experienced event and, 
as such, a single-case study can yield insights about experiences and actions.  
Though there are limitations to a qualitative study of this nature, understanding 
the lived experiences of those most directly affected by structural reforms—including 
abrupt shift to remote learning following the closure of schools in the spring of 2020 and 
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the return to school in the fall under significant health and safety mitigation strategies—is 
both valid and necessary to understand the nuances of how district leaders manage 
complex systems to coordinate the change in a coherent manner.  
Qualitative understanding of cases, according to Robert Stake (2006), “requires 
experiencing the activity of the case as it occurs in its context and in its particular 
situation. The situation is expected to shape the activity, as well as the experiencing and 
the interpretation of the activity” (p. 2). In this study, the “activity of the case” (district 
leaders’ decisions and actions to carry out the district-wide changes throughout the 
pandemic) focused on a single district. As district leaders managed and coordinated these 
changes, the implementation throughout the district was affected by the local conditions 
and realities of the schools within the district. Understanding this within-district variance 
was an important feature of this study, as it reflected the differences between school 
communities in the same district, which may have contributed to the pressure to allow 
greater autonomy between schools.  
According to Merriam & Tisdell (2016), “interpretive research, which is the most 
common type of qualitative research, assumes that reality is socially constructed; that is, 
there is no single, observable reality. Rather, there are multiple realities, or 
interpretations, of a single event” (p. 9). The research questions were answered through 
the use of three rounds of semi-structured interviews conducted with four different 
leaders and a group of teacher leaders from a single district: the Superintendent, Assistant 
Superintendent, principals from two different schools in the district, and a group of 
teacher leaders drawn from the entire district.  
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Yin (2014) recommends four strategies to guide qualitative analysis. These 
strategies are working the data from the “ground up”; developing a case description; 
examining plausible rival explanations; and relying on theoretical propositions. While 
there are existing frameworks for the study of an educational leader’s role in 
implementing and sustaining school reforms, the shift to emergency remote learning and 
other transformations in public education resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic were 
not entirely consistent with these existing theoretical frameworks. District leaders, 
principals, and teachers navigated one novel experience after another, from the earliest 
days of the shift to emergency remote learning, to the return to school in the fall, to 
navigating the rising COVID-19 numbers in the winter. These experiences suggest the 
use of a “ground up” analytical strategy because common patterns and relationships 
emerged throughout the analysis of the data through the constant comparative method 
(Yin, 2014; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). 
Selection and Sampling Strategies 
I chose a single-case study design because it allowed me to focus on a single case 
and conduct three in-depth, semi-structured interviews each with four individual leaders 
and a group of teacher leaders. By conducting three rounds of interviews, spaced across 
the summer, fall, and winter of 2020 and 2021, I was able to capture the experiences and 
perceptions of participants over time. The single case also allowed for describing and 
analyzing the similarities and differences between different members of the same district 
to understand how district leaders manage complex systems to coordinate change in a 
coherent manner.  
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This study used purposive sampling using criterion-based selection. Purposive or 
“purposeful sampling is based on the assumption that the investigator wants to discover, 
understand and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can 
be learned” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 96).  In addition, the district selected for this 
study is information-rich, in that the schools within the district differ and, therefore, will 
provide insights about the central question related to the actions of district leaders in 
implementing this reform (Patton, 2015 as cited in Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  
The purpose of this study is to understand how leaders in a district navigated the 
changing context of the pandemic to implement and sustain changes in their district. To 
better understand how leaders diffuse information about new policies and practices across 
many schools, I used the following criteria to identify sample district: superintendents 
with three years of tenure in the same district and serving as superintendent during the 
2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years; districts of more than 1000 students; and central 
office leadership structure that includes a curriculum director or assistant superintendent 
responsible for curriculum. To gather this information, an informal poll was sent out 
through the state’s organization of curriculum directors who shared it with curriculum 
directors and assistant superintendents of the districts around the state.  
Based on the responses to this informal poll, four districts were identified that met 
the study criteria, and two superintendents expressed a willingness to participate. School 
Administrative Unit Q (SAUQ) was identified for this study. Over the course of the 
study, I conducted three in-depth interviews of four individual participants and a focus 
group of teachers. Those at different layers of the district organization were represented 
in the observations and interviews. Of the fifteen interviews, twelve of them were with 
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administrators, while three were with teachers. The decision to have a greater 
representation of the administrators’ perspective was an intentional one because it 
allowed me to answer my research questions most effectively. By interviewing teachers 
in the focus group, I was able to capture teachers’ understanding and interpretation of 
those decisions made by administrators at different levels of the district and those made at 
the state and national level.  In addition, I observed School Board meetings and reviewed 
documents, which were crucial pieces of evidence that were used to generate rich, 
detailed descriptions of participants’ experience. 
 School Administrative Unit Q (SAUQ) is a school district in Maine that serves a 
number of towns under a single School Board and central office (see Table 1). The towns 
in this school administrative unit have different histories, industries, and economic needs. 
The median household income (in 2019 dollars) in the different towns in SAUQ ranged 
between just above the state’s median household income to more than $10,000 below the 
state’s median household income (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). While the middle and high 
schools served students from all of the towns, elementary schools were distributed 
throughout the SAU, and the student population in each of the schools reflected that 
community’s demographics, including income. As such, the numbers of students who 
qualified for free or reduced meals ranged from 28% in one school, to more than 58% in 
another school in SAUQ. The leaders from two of the elementary schools in the district 
















SAUQ <2000 / <800 PK-5 44% 22% 
Pine Tree Elementary <200 PK-5 28% 15% 
River Bend Elementary <200 K-5 37% 28% 
Note. Adapted from https://www.maine.gov/doe/dashboard. Copyright 2020 by Maine 
Department of Education: ESSA Dashboard. 
 SAUQ is led by Superintendent Michael Jacoby, a pseudonym adopted to 
maintain the confidentiality of the participant. Mr. Jacoby is a native of the area, who has 
been in his position for seven years. Prior to becoming superintendent of SAUQ, Mr. 
Jacoby was a teacher, principal, and a central office administrator in a district in the 
region. SAUQ’s assistant superintendent, Theresa Sampson, also grew up in the area. She 
attended schools and taught in SAUQ before moving into leadership positions in the 
system four years ago. The principals in the study have been in their positions for years 
and had established relationships with the teachers and staff in each of their buildings 
when they were called on to navigate the changing landscape of schooling during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Principal Thomas Bennett has been in his position at Pine Tree 
Elementary School for six years. Prior to becoming principal, he was a teacher and 
teacher leader in the district. Rebecca Ahern, the principal of River Bend Elementary 
School, has been in the position for eight years. She has worked in SAUQ for more than 
twenty years.  
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The focus group participants represented schools throughout SAUQ. This group 
of teachers was an established group that provided district leadership related to 
curriculum, instruction, and assessment. All eight of the teachers in the focus group were 
female and served in formal and informal leadership roles in their schools and in the 
district’s educational association. According to the business manager for SAUQ, 60% of 
the staff in SAUQ live in the district and 80% live in the region (Emergency School 
Board Meeting, March, 2020). Of the twelve participants in this study, eight indicated 
that they lived in the district and five talked of their experience as parents of students who 
attend schools in the district. This allowed these participants to reflect on their 
experiences as teachers or administrators and as parents in SAUQ. All participants in the 
study were White.  
Theoretical Framework 
 Rorrer et al.’s (2008) conceptualization of the district as an institutional actor that 
provides instructional leadership, establishes policy coherence, and reorients the 
organization while maintaining an equity focus provided an initial frame for the 
examination of the actions and processes adopted by leaders as they shepherded the 
district through externally-driven changes. It was especially applicable in the context of 
the nation-wide shift to emergency remote learning in March of 2020 and the continuing 
work to open schools and provide instruction to students during the 2020-2021 school 
year because this crisis required leaders to move between the different tasks to implement 
these changes. Maintaining an equity focus, as described by Rorrer et al. (2008), requires 
foregrounding equity and “owning past inequity, including highlighting inequities in 
system and culture” (p. 328). While an equity focus can be the driver of reform, in a crisis 
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like the COVID-19 pandemic, when data points to inequities in education, equity 
becomes the lens through which decisions about policies, resources, and instruction were 
made. 
 School districts are complex and nested organizations, which makes the 
implementation of any new policies and procedures complicated. Spillane (1998) 
characterized districts as “non-monolithic,” conceding that districts are made up of 
schools that serve different populations and are led by different leaders, each with 
different beliefs that affect how policies are interpreted and implemented. Johnson and 
Chrispeels (2010) identified five types of connections or linkages between the policy 
domains—federal, state, district, and school. These included resource, structural, 
communication, relational, and ideological linkages, and, together, they illustrate the 
complex connections throughout the district and broader educational system. It is 
important to examine these linkages between a central office and its schools to identify 
which linkages yielded greater coordination and coherence. 
 Johnson and Chrispeels (2010) found that when implementing changes, leaders 
needed to attend to relational and ideological linkages throughout the system to increase 
stakeholders’ commitment and to ensure coherent instructional focus and organizational 
learning. They defined the relational linkages as “trusting professional relationships 
within and across levels of the system” (p. 743), and ideological linkages as those 
“reflecting the shared values, vision, and goals and what constitutes good instructional 
practices” (Lasky, 2004, cited in Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010, p. 743). I explored the role 
of trust in leaders and in the organization as a factor that promoted or hindered how 
changes were adopted by members of the district. Using Bryk and Schneider’s (2002) 
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theory of relational trust as a social resource for school improvement, I examined how 
trust was related to members’ commitment to the organization and the changes.  
 This study adapted elements of both Rorrer et al.’s (2008) and Johnson and 
Chrispeels’ (2010) frameworks. To understand how district and building leaders built 
capacity for the initial change to emergency remote learning, the planning for returning to 
school, and the opening of schools, I considered how they marshalled resources and 
attended to policy coherence—themes found in both frameworks. Interview questions 
were crafted with these frameworks in mind and the concepts found in the frameworks 
informed the initial themes that arose in the first cycle of coding. These themes were 
explored in subsequent interviews.  
Data Collection 
The research questions were answered through the use of three in-depth, semi-
structured interviews conducted with the four different administrators, interviewed 
individually. In addition, three in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
a group of teacher leaders. These interviews were conducted in three stages, July-August, 
2020; November, 2020; and January-February, 2021. Conducting interviews in rounds, at 
those times, allowed me to learn about participants’ experiences and understandings of 
the initial phases of implementation and the sustainability of the changes as time passed. 
Through these interpretive research interviews, patterns and themes emerged and were 
constructed through inductive analyses. 
 In-depth interviewing allows the researcher “to understand the lived experience of 
other people and the meaning they make of that experience” (Seidman, 2006, p. 9). It is 
also appropriate because participants’ experiences cannot simply be observed, and the 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
65 
depth of detail cannot be gathered through a survey. Merriam & Tisdell (2016) describe 
the semi-structured interview as being guided by the need for specific information that is 
to be gathered from each respondent, allowing the questions to be used in a flexible 
manner, not dictated by wording or order. 
Following Seidman’s (2006) three-interview series model, I focused the first 
interviews on establishing the context of the leaders’ experience and invited participants 
to share information about their backgrounds and their path to assuming a leadership role. 
These interviews, conducted in July and August of 2020, also provided an opportunity for 
the participants to recall their experience of the beginning of the pandemic, through the 
subsequent school closures, and the preparations for the opening of school. The second 
round of interviews, held in November of 2020, focused on participants’ recollection and 
experience of the first two months of the year. This round also incorporated themes, 
including relational trust, that arose in the first set of interviews and included questions 
based on those themes. The final interviews, in winter of 2021, were designed to allow 
participants to reflect on their experiences as leaders and the role that the district played 
in implementing and directing the organization throughout the pandemic. All interviews 
with administrators lasted 60-90 minutes, and each of the interviews with the group of 
teacher leaders lasted 90-100 minutes. A protocol was used to guide these semi structured 
interviews, and additional questions were posed to clarify the participant’s answers and to 
examine emerging themes.  
Because the research focused on participants representing four different role 
responsibilities—superintendent, assistant superintendent, principals, and teacher 
leaders—four different interviewing protocols were used. The focus of the interviews was 
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on participants’ perception of the central office-school relationships, their experience of 
how decisions were made during the implementation of the changes, the supports 
received by members of the other stakeholder groups, and how these relationships and 
supports changed their perception of the reform. To understand participants’ perception 
of the reform, they were also asked about how they believe the decisions and actions 
during the initial implementation affected the central office-school relationship, their 
understanding of the changes, and the progress toward implementing the shift to distance 
learning. 
In addition to interviews, some documents were also collected and analyzed. The 
documents included the district’s Continuity of Learning Plan and their Return to School 
Plan, which was approved by the district’s Board. Other documents included 
correspondence from district leaders to school personnel and members of the public, and 
the results of surveys administered to staff and families. In addition, I observed School 
Board meetings that were live-streamed, as well as recordings of prior School Board 
meetings. These meetings spanned March of 2020 through February of 2021. These 
observations and documents allowed greater triangulation between data points.  
Data Analysis 
I generated interview questions based on the theoretical frameworks, focusing on 
the roles that leaders assumed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and on how the 
district’s orientation toward centralization affected the adoption and implementation of 
changes. In light of the social distancing requirements in place due to COVID-19, all 
interviews were conducted through video conferencing using the Zoom application. All 
confidential files were saved using cloud storage provided by the University of Southern 
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Maine (USM). The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. I used the 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) program Nvivo in the 
coding and analysis of the data. 
Interviews and data were initially analyzed through Rorrer et al.’s (2008) 
conceptualization of districts as institutional actors and the linkages Johnson and 
Chrispeels’ (2010) identified to explain how central office relates to schools to carry out 
reforms. In my first-cycle coding, I coded data using some a priori codes based on these 
theoretical conceptualizations and additional codes reflecting emerging themes that arose 
from the interviews, observations, and review of documents. The semi-structured form of 
the interviews allowed for other themes to emerge, including those related to the 
importance of the perception of trustworthiness of the leader and the district as an 
organization. In the second-cycle coding, codes were reorganized and grouped into 
categories that included some of those a priori codes, including school autonomy vs. 
centrally-directed decision making and providing instructional leadership. Additional 
categories included uniqueness of COVID, coordination and coherence, and relational 
trust.  
Throughout the period of the research, I followed Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
recommendation of “interweaving data collection and analysis” (p. 50). I used analytic 
strategies including analytic memo writing during interviews and when observing school 
board meetings to identify and clarify codes and identify initial interpretations. 
Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness “refers to the authenticity and credibility of the data and the 
dependability of the analysis and interpretation of the data” (Beaudry & Miller, 2016, p. 
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50). I provided thick descriptions that included “a description of the setting and 
participants of the study, as well as a detailed description of the findings with adequate 
evidence presented in the form of quotes from participant interviews...and documents” 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 257). As a part of sound qualitative research practice, the 
analysis of the data was iterative and resulted in the data being transformed into 
categories, which were used to identify themes. The descriptions of experiences were 
echoed by other participants and found in documents and other observations, providing a 
means for comparing and cross-checking data. Triangulation of multiple sources of data 
in this way is another strategy to increase the internal validity of this study (Merriman & 
Tisdell, 2016).  
By focusing on a single district for the case study, I was able to engage with 
participants for a substantial amount of time over a period of months. By spending such 
substantial time with the participants in each interview, as well as observing the board 
meetings and reviewing documents, I experienced a saturation of data and emerging 
findings (Merriman & Tisdell, 2016). Member checking for accuracy and interpretive 
validity was conducted with each of the administrators. I shared my interpretations with 
participants, including excerpts that were used in the findings, to verify that these 
interpretations accurately captured their experiences.  
Risk, Protection, Confidentiality 
 Participants provided informed consent prior to the study after reviewing the 
protocols that clarified the study. I maintained the confidentiality and anonymity of 
participants as much as possible throughout the study by using pseudonyms for 
participants, the schools, and the district. The single case study increases risk that a 
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participant’s report could be identified by other participants in the study. To mitigate for 
this, I represented the findings in a manner that reduced identifiability of participants. 
When using the CAQDAS program, respondent data was labeled using the pseudonym or 
naming convention that ensures that the respondent could not be identified in the event of 
a data breach. Zoom recordings were used to generate a transcript of the interview and 
are stored on a secure cloud setting at the University of Southern Maine (USM).  
Although risk to the participants during the interview process was minimal and 
not greater than one encounters in daily living, particularly as the design of the study 
involves video conferencing interviews, it was important to recognize that the size of the 
state and the criteria used to select districts could make the district and leaders more 
identifiable. Care was taken to ensure that descriptive features of the district and schools 
did not include identifiable descriptors. In addition, statements made by participants were 
summarized to reduce the possibility that a participant’s comment could be attributed to 
them. Although there was no direct benefit to the participants in the study, the findings 
from the study may be of benefit to district and building leaders.  
Role of the Researcher 
As a teacher and school administrator in public schools for more than 25 years, 
my experiences have shaped my view of education and what I believe should be the role 
of an educational leader. And while my experiences have informed the questions that I 
have raised in this study, I have been careful to design the study around a “questioning 
stance with regard to [my] work and life context” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 18).  
As a curriculum director who is a part of a small central office administrative 
team, I have been deeply involved in the decision-making processes leading up to the 
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closure of school, and in subsequent decisions since then. I am also an involved member 
of a number of professional organizations around the state, which provides frequent 
communication with other district leaders. My daily work and my frequent interactions 
with colleagues continue to inform my understanding of how decisions in my district are 
being made. This positionality is both an asset as well as a potential deficit as I am aware 
that my experiences can affect the questions I ask in interviews, as well as how I interpret 
data. To address this, I sought multiple sources of data to triangulate and develop 
convergent evidence (Yin, 2014).  
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
 In this study, I sought to understand how district leaders’ actions and decisions led 
to coordination and coherence when implementing and sustaining a change initiated by 
an external policy domain or by a factor outside the district leader’s control. The 
pandemic, which began as an obscure news item from China in January of 2020 and 
exploded in an exponential way leading to the closure of most Maine schools on March 
16, 2020, provided a unique opportunity to examine a commonly experienced, externally-
driven mandate that has resulted in the transformation of schooling in Maine and across 
the United States. Some of the limitations inherent in such a phenomenon is that it shifts 
the focus of the study from implementation and sustaining of a reform to a focus on the 
stages of implementation. In addition, it is not clear how long this change will be in place 
or if the newly acquired instructional approaches will or should persist after the risks of 
the pandemic are reduced. 
The use of a purposive convenience sample of a Maine school district limits the 
generalizability of the outcomes. The single case reflects the experiences of leaders in a 
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smaller district. Because each community’s beliefs about the necessity of mitigation 
strategies to reduce the impact of the virus differed by region of the state and localities, 
communities and their School Boards exerted differing degrees of pressure on the district. 
Differing levels of involvement and pressure from communities and school boards are 
factors that could yield different experiences and approaches by leaders to achieve 
coordination and coherence.  
 This study was delimited by the decisions that I made initially to limit 
participating districts (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Rationale for Participating District Criteria 
Delimitation Rationale 
Superintendent with three 
years of tenure in the same 
district and serving as the 
superintendent during the 
2019-2020 and 2020-2021 
school years. 
District superintendents needed to be in the position for two 
years prior to the 2019-2020 school year to allow for this 
leader to have had time to effect the central office-school 
relationship. It was likely the impact of this school closing 
would continue into the 2020-2021 school year and continuity 
of leadership would be important for the purpose of the 
second interview. 
Districts with more than 1000 
students 
This enrollment number increases the likelihood that there 
will be more than one school at a grade level span, which is 
important when examining how decision-making authority the 
perception of the implementation varied across the district. 
Central office leadership 
structure that includes a 
curriculum director or 
assistant superintendent 
responsible for curriculum. 
Curriculum, instruction, and assessment will be strategic 
priorities that will be examined.  
 
In addition, because the study prioritized understanding the district’s orientation toward 
centralization and decentralization by examining the experiences of two principals from 
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the same level––the elementary level––this study did not explore the experiences of 
leaders from other grade level spans.  
 A single event resulting in state and nation-wide school closures and continuing 
disruption to education is another delimiting factor, as an event of this nature has not 
occurred in modern history of public schooling in the United States. Finally, this study 
was undertaken in Maine, with a particular focus on Maine’s history of locally controlled 
schools, limiting the applicability to other states. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
The purpose of this research was to describe and analyze how school and district 
leaders in one school district collaborated to coordinate their responses to the myriad 
challenges that arose during the COVID-19 pandemic to implement and sustain system-
wide changes. This study examined the experiences, decisions, and actions of district and 
school leaders in the days leading up to the shift to emergency remote learning in the 
spring of 2020, and the subsequent planning and implementation of changes required to 
allow a school system to operate during a pandemic during the 2020-2021 school year. 
As outlined in the previous chapters, implementing and sustaining a single change in a 
school system is complex, and the COVID-19 pandemic required districts and schools to 
adopt numerous changes in operations, leadership, and instruction. The findings of this 
research are organized to explore the actions that the district undertook to achieve 
coordination and coherence and the factors that supported or hindered establishing 
coherence. My findings center on two sets of actions employed by leaders: centralizing 
decisions and the decision-making process, and reorienting the district’s focus. 
Reorienting the district’s focus involved centering the focus on health, safety and 
wellness measures; aligning policies and practices; and allocating resources, including 
human resources, to build capacity to meet the goals. Factors that supported or hindered 
the district’s actions included relational trust throughout the organization, communication 
between stakeholders, and the bridging and buffering work of leaders to connect the 
layered organizational structure of the institution, including external entities.  
I applied a grounded theory methodology (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Saldaña, 
2016; Yin, 2014) to a case study of SAUQ, a district in Maine, because the nature of the 
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impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on schools was unprecedented and the inductive 
nature of a grounded approach allowed me to understand the meaning and significance of 
the data. The first section of this chapter describes the chaotic days and weeks 
immediately preceding and during the shift to emergency remote learning. The second 
section explores how SAUQ’s centralized orientation to decision making evolved 
throughout the pandemic. In the third section, I examine how district leaders 
implemented decisions by reorienting and directing resources to achieve coherence and 
alignment within the system. The role that relational trust plays in instructional leadership 
and the implementation and acceptance of reforms is explored in the fourth section. The 
final section of this chapter summarizes the results of this study.  
Emergency Remote Learning: Spring of 2020 
 Understanding the days and weeks immediately preceding and following the shift 
to emergency remote learning is important because it led district SAUQ to adopt a more 
centralized orientation and because the initial confusion factored into teachers’ sense of 
relational trust in subsequent decisions and communications.  
“This is going to be a bad one.” - Evolving Understanding 
 In the weeks leading up to the shift from in-person classroom instruction to 
emergency remote learning, school district leaders relied on their district leadership 
teams, established regional networks, and the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) 
for guidance and to gain insights and to determine what to do. Although rates of infection 
were relatively low in Maine and other northeastern states, district and building 
administrators in SAUQ, like everyone else in March of 2020, worked to anticipate how 
COVID-19 could affect them and to plan accordingly. The pace of developments and the 
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changing directions in the first weeks of March presaged what would become the “new 
normal” for school district leaders in the coming year. Participants from throughout 
SAUQ recalled their dawning understanding that, while there were no infections in 
Maine, they would nonetheless be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Mr. Jacoby, 
SAUQ’s superintendent, remembered: 
It was kind of early February. I started watching and learning on the news about 
what was going on over in China, and I was looking at the CDC, and the stuff 
coming out of the CDC and so on and so forth. And I said, then, ‘This one is 
going to be a bad one.’  
 
By the end of the first week of March, leaders from the Department of Education 
(DOE) were advising district leaders to review and update their pandemic plans, which 
prior to this crisis were rarely referenced components of districts’ emergency 
preparedness plans. This guidance was initially suggested to administrators in late 
February when few had conceived of the possibility that a virus that had not yet been 
detected in the state could have such a direct impact on their schools. Another district 
leader recalled hearing that district leaders should review their pandemic plans:  
I remember the superintendent came in here and was like, ‘Can you believe it? 
They expect us all to have pandemic plans?!’ And I'm like, ‘That's crazy. How are 
we supposed to know?’ It seems so silly now—the conversations we were having. 
But I was like, ‘What are we supposed to do?’ And the superintendent said, ‘You 
know, we're all going to be in the same boat. None of us have a pandemic plan.’ 
And then like the week later, the DOE was like, ‘You gotta make a pandemic 





As central office leaders worked to make sense of the guidance from the DOE and 
began to plan, there was little agreement about the scale of the expected impact on 
schools, which made planning and messaging about what to expect especially 
challenging. In a March 5, 2020 email to principals, the Assistant Superintendent updated 
them about the current guidance from the DOE and Maine’s Center for Disease Control 
(CDC): 
I have spent some time thinking about how best to continue education should our 
schools need to shut down for a time as a result of an outbreak. Currently risk is 
still extremely low.  There is not an expectation from the MDOE that our school 
be equipped to deliver online education at this time nor do we have the financial 
support to make that a reality in a short amount of time if need be.  In particular, I 
do not feel that continuing via online connectedness is in the best interest of our 
younger learners.  
Based on the latest DOE recommendations in partnership with the CDC, 
they recommend that [lesson] plans be considered for up to 14 days in the 
“unlikely event” (which was their words) that a school needs to close.  At this 
point, I am not considering having teachers spend time developing home plans for 
all content areas in all classes to sustain education.  Instead, I am exploring the 
idea of book lists. 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
77 
On March 6, the very next day, reflecting the quickly-evolving understanding and 
response, the DOE’s guidance was much stronger: district leaders were told to begin to 
develop district continuity of learning plans, which did not need to include online 
learning because few districts were able to provide one-to-one devices for their students 
throughout the system.  
The central office leaders of SAUQ determined that they would require their 
teachers to put together up to two weeks of emergency lesson plans, which they 
announced to the principals on Wednesday, March 11, the same day the World Health 
Organization classified Covid-19 as a global pandemic. At that time, the Superintendent 
announced that the following Monday, March 16 would be an early release day to 
provide time for teachers to be able to plan. 
“It was craziness.” - The Speed of Change 
The first two weeks of March of 2020, were characterized by teachers and school 
leaders as “surreal,” “crazy” and “frantic.” Though some district leaders across the state 
tried to anticipate and plan for a closure of some kind, few predicted how quickly the 
pressure to shut down schools would build. In the first week of March, prior to the first 
wave of school closures around the country (Map Coronavirus School Closures in 2019-
2020, 2020), Superintendent Jacoby collaborated and coordinated with a regional and 
statewide network of Superintendents. Such collaboration allowed district leaders to 
share plans and experiences. In addition to providing personal, logistical, and political 
support, other school districts within the network also acted as external forces that, at 
times, affected decisions and the timing of decisions.  
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Superintendents coordinated with one another in decisions and announcements 
related to closing schools, which were initially considered for later in March. However, 
as individual superintendents encountered growing pressure to close from their 
communities during the week ending on March 13, the timeline was moved up as one 
superintendent after another announced that they would be closing schools to in-person 
instruction. Superintendents around the state joined a video conference call with the 
Commissioner of Education on Saturday, March 14. In a report to the School Board, 
Superintendent Jacoby reported that at that meeting, the Commissioner advised that the 
decision to close schools would be a local one that the DOE would support. In addition, 
the DOE planned to provide waivers for the school attendance, waiving the 175-day 
requirement. On Sunday, March 15, Governor Mills declared a Civil State of Emergency 
effectively ending classroom instruction in public schools through April 17. Mr. Jacoby 
remembered the decision to hold the last in-person school day on March 13, but noted 
that this was earlier than he would have liked. 
I had plans to close, but...we were going to stay open for at least another day so I 
can make sure all the kids have their devices and packets and whatever else they 
need. So that's how that went. And it was the darndest thing I ever saw in my life. 
I mean, it was, it was kind of like people going into panic mode at that point.  
 
The decision to close schools, which was made on the weekend, meant that what 
teachers understood to be the case on Thursday changed within two days. While the 
Assistant Superintendent sent out information on Sunday, March 15, detailing the 
purpose and intended outcomes for the teacher workday on Monday, as well as specifics 
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about how to share their resources so they could be accessible to students through a 
centralized district website, not all teachers and staff members were aware of the changes 
to the plan and expressed confusion that there were different expectations at different 
levels. One teacher recalled the days leading to the shift to emergency remote learning:  
I don't really recall having a lot of notice other than the last I heard, as we might 
do an early release on Monday to prepare for the possibility because it started sort 
of happening in other parts of the world, in the state. But I just remember it being 
a total whirlwind. I do think everybody came together.  
Another teacher remembered, “I don't recall hearing that we were going to go remote 
before it was the actual decision in my school. So, it was just all of a sudden, ‘OK, you're 
going remote.’” 
 The changes in the plan for closing was articulated by one of the principals who 
recalled: 
It was so fast that it's hard to even remember exactly, but we had parent teacher 
conferences—I think it was that Thursday night—and then that Friday ended up 
being our last day with kids in person. So, at that time, at first we had originally 
planned on an early release day on the Monday so that teachers could prepare 
things because we thought there was a possibility that we might have to go home 
for a week or so. And then, when it became pretty clear it was gonna be longer 
than a week or so, that got changed to a full day—so full day on Monday. And 
then once we got to the point where it was just about Monday, I think it was 
sometime over the weekend we found out we actually wouldn't be going back.  
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Confusion and frustration characterized these days because not all teachers around 
the system understood how the Governor’s Executive Order issued over the weekend, 
which declared a Civil State of Emergency, affected their planning because it ended 
classroom instruction in public schools through April 17.  Initially, teachers had been 
asked to compile two weeks of lessons and activities, but when the Governor’s Executive 
Order went into effect on Sunday, March 15, any decision to return to school would 
depend on the Governor’s subsequent orders. Not all teachers understood that this meant 
that emergency remote learning would continue beyond two weeks and that simply 
planning for two weeks of lessons would not suffice. As a result, many teachers were 
frustrated by the changing directions about how much should be compiled and in what 
form. Assistant Superintendent Sampson acknowledged the impact of the changing 
directions.   
The initial guidance was to plan for two weeks’ worth of work. That was what 
initially went out to teachers. We have been updating teachers as much as we can 
to say this could be a multi week [closure]...They know at this point that we don’t 
know and they are planning for the unknown. So, we are sending home what we 
can. 
 
Teachers’ frustration was also related to the directions they received about how to 
prepare these materials. According to the teachers in SAUQ, the elementary teachers 
were directed to assemble packets of work and to have them copied and prepared to be 
picked up. The middle school teachers were directed to create both digital materials and 
paper packets for those students without internet access. At the high school, teachers 
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were asked to compile two weeks of paper copies for each of their students. According to 
one teacher, this was a source of frustration because this was a lot of work, particularly at 
the secondary level where teachers taught multiple courses and a total of six class 
sections. Fewer than half of the packets were picked up, and the teachers were 
subsequently asked to provide the materials digitally. One teacher described the days 
leading to the shift to emergency remote learning, “It was craziness. We had like two 
days to get all these packets ready for kids that we wanted to send home, and so it was 
very crazy.”  
At a School Board meeting on March 16, the Assistant Superintendent reported 
that information for families and students about instruction was available on the district 
website and that the goal was to “send enough home to give them things to do without 
overwhelming them” (School Board Meeting, March, 2020).  
“This is what we’re doing now.” - The First Days: Logistics & Priorities 
 As districts shifted quickly from in-person learning in a traditional school setting, 
where meals were served and a host of services were also delivered, to emergency remote 
learning, district leaders were forced to reorient the organization, redefining nearly every 
function of the organization—instructionally and operationally.  
While for teachers the focus of the first days after the shift to emergency remote 
learning was on getting materials compiled and distributed to students, SAUQ central 
office leaders met with the School Board on the first day of the closure to share their plan 
and to answer questions related to the long-term plans. In his report to the Board, 
Superintendent Jacoby observed that it had been: 
Extremely challenging to keep up with this situation. The guidance and 
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information that we put out—the minute we put it out there, the situation changes 
and now we have to rethink and sort of back up and replan again (School Board 
Meeting, March, 2020). 
 
 During the same meeting, Assistant Superintendent Theresa Sampson shared the 
lessons and learning activities resources website that had been established for families to 
access during emergency remote learning. She also shared a proposed schedule that 
families could use to establish routines at home. Assistant Superintendent Sampson also 
acknowledged that the purpose of these lessons and these instructional resources was to 
“maintain students’ education” and that SAUQ was not “providing all new instruction.” 
And while teachers were not expected to deliver instruction online, the school department 
provided each student access to adaptive online learning programs in reading and math as 
a means to differentiate and personalize student learning during emergency remote 
learning. District leaders acknowledged that one barrier to delivering new instruction to 
students in the first days of emergency remote learning was students’ access to the 
internet. Information about accessing free internet through the local cable company was 
shared in their initial letters to families and again referred to during subsequent School 
Board meetings. These actions addressed what one member of the district administrative 
team called, “instructional insecurity.” 
In addition to addressing instructional insecurity, school leaders as well as state 
and federal agencies recognized that addressing food insecurity had to be a priority, since 
schools, the source of two meals for school-aged children, would be closing. SAUQ, like 
other districts throughout Maine and the country, worked to adapt the organization’s 
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existing resources to provide meals to all children under the age of 18. SAUQ’s 
prioritization of food service reflected the organization’s commitment to address food 
insecurity. Drawing on their experience administering the summer food service, they 
established pick-up locations at the three largest schools and set up a system of food 
deliveries for any families who were unable to go to the pick-up locations. One member 
of the district’s administrative team commented to the School Board, “Any student that 
needs and wants a meal has access to that. That’s the underlying principle. We have staff 
available. We have busing available and we are going to utilize them.” Operational staff, 
including food service personnel, worked with the initial health and safety guidance 
provided through the CDC to institute new procedures for working together while 
following distancing, masking and other mitigation strategies when preparing meals on 
such a large scale.   
Another organizational challenge districts had to address in the first days of 
building closures was whether or not all members of the staff would continue to be 
employed, given the shift to emergency remote learning and the closure of buildings. 
SAUQ administrative leaders addressed this early, identifying such a concern as “salary 
insecurity” and noting that more than 400 staff members throughout the district wondered 
if they would maintain their jobs and paychecks.  SAUQ’s business manager explained to 
the School Board,  
We just want to be very clear that the intent and our underlying principle is that 
all of our staff will be paid. That's how we’re operating. That’s been how the 
federal government has addressed this. That’s been how the state government has 
addressed this. That’s how we have been addressing that. 
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Local decisions related to the business side of school systems, including sick time and 
providing paid family medical leave, were eased as the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Securities Act was moving through Congress (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, n.d.). Though it was not signed into law until March 27, the provisions that 
were outlined in the House version of the bill provided direction for local and state level 
leaders. In an email to hourly employees, SAUQ leaders reassured employees and 
encouraged them to follow established health and safety guidance, saying, “There are no 
financial reasons nor should there be any pressure to be at work when you can’t or 
shouldn’t.”  
 In a meeting with the School Board immediately following the shift to emergency 
remote learning, Superintendent Jacoby anticipated the work to reorient the district, 
stating,  
This is what we’re doing now. This is what we are doing now...we are going to be 
involved in this from here on out and we are going to explore whatever we can do 
to support the community in whatever way we can; and we will be open for new 
ideas; and we will adapt.  
This statement reflected Superintendent Jacoby’s understanding that the work of the 
district and the roles that leaders played had and would continue to change as the district 
reoriented its organizational structures and processes to meet the challenges of providing 
education—and other services—during the global COVID-19 pandemic.  
Actions to Establish a More Coherent and Coordinated District 
 Achieving coherence in a complex system like a school district is complicated and 
the frequent changes in guidance from federal, state, and local entities throughout the 
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pandemic added to the complexity. SAUQ acted to achieve some measure of coherence 
and coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic when they centralized decisions and 
the decision-making process and reoriented the district’s focus. When reorienting the 
district, leaders articulated a clear, unifying message, “Stay safe. Stay open.” and 
allocated resources and adjusted policies and practices to meet this mission.  
District Centralization of Decisions and the Decision-Making Process 
 Johnson et al. (2015) described the relationship between school leadership and 
central office management, stating: 
A basic tension exists between the priorities of administrators in central office and 
those in the schools....Principals and local school communities push for greater 
freedom to set their own priorities and allocate resources in response to their 
school’s identified needs, while district administrators, who bear responsibility for 
maintaining equity across schools and ensuring that the public’s money is well 
spent, are reluctant to relinquish their formal authority to make key decisions (p. 
6).  
The question about what decisions should be more autonomous, or made at the school 
level, and what decisions should be more centralized, or made at the central office level, 
continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Ultimately, the scale of the changes 
required by the COVID-19 pandemic, both in the spring of 2020 and throughout the 
2020-2021 school year, drove the district toward a more centralized orientation. 
“We don’t all need the same thing at the same time.” - Balancing Demands 
Between Consistency and Independence. SAUQ’s organizational structure is like that 
of many other districts in Maine. The district spans multiple towns, each with its own 
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history, traditions, industry, and economic health. The elementary schools are located 
throughout the district in different towns and, as a result, the students attending each 
elementary school reflect their community and its needs and priorities. After the fifth 
grade, all of the students feed into one middle school and then one high school. Prior to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, SAUQ centralized decisions related to academic programming, 
including curriculum, instruction, and assessment. The district also required each school 
to identify annual goals and objectives for school improvement that were aligned with the 
district goals. Though academic programming was the same across grade levels in the 
district, the district recognized each school’s differences and allowed schools to set 
school-specific goals and objectives aligned with district goals. During the pandemic, 
SAUQ continued to direct academic programming decisions.  
The assistant superintendent described what the district required and what each 
school was able to determine in the first days of emergency remote learning:  
We required every teacher to put together a high-tech and a low-tech plan...The 
building choices were scheduling, how often to—how to schedule those meetings 
because it needed to look different for high school than it did at the middle school, 
of course, and certainly at the elementary school, where you have one teacher and 
specials versus teachers that rotate. 
 
District leaders in SAUQ recognized the differences that exist across the different 
elementary schools, and between the three grade-level groups, and worked to balance the 
needs of all when making decisions. An elementary principal summarized the challenge 
of balancing consistency between schools with different demographics: 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
87 
Our schools are different . . . One of our schools only has about 80 kids and 
another one has 320 and a vice principal . . . We also have a higher rate of special 
ed in my building. So, you know, some of those things create some differences 
across the buildings. 
Another administrator observed:  
I think there are some places where we're not going to be quite on the same page 
and that's really due to the nature of our individual communities and individual 
schools and our needs so you can't always be exactly the same. 
Because the schools are different, school leaders have long been accustomed to having 
some autonomy in decision making and setting priorities for their schools. District 
leaders recognized these differences and worked to honor these differences while also 
maintaining a focus on common goals. One district leader described this balance:  
We decided each building has different needs. So, let's allow each building to pick 
a goal and select the objective or objectives that best meets the needs of their 
building. That way, we're all working toward—we have the same framework, but 
it doesn't mean we're all working on the same thing at the same time, because we 
don't all need the same thing at the same time. 
 
 Superintendent Jacoby described the organizational structure of the administrative 
team as being composed of the central office leadership team, which includes the 
superintendent, assistant superintendent, business manager, the technology director, the 
special education director, and the special projects manager, and the full administrative 
team, which also includes the building principals and assistant principals. Prior to the 
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COVID-19 pandemic, the full administrative team met once a month. According to 
Assistant Superintendent Sampson, these monthly administrative team meetings were 
divided between logistical and instructional leadership, ensuring that their time together 
was not entirely consumed by logistical, managerial topics. The instructional leadership 
meeting time included learning walks in schools, which is the practice of visiting 
classrooms for short observations, and meetings with principals to review their schools’ 
goals and objectives. 
Once the district shifted into emergency remote learning in the spring, the full 
administrative team and the smaller central office team each met weekly to discuss issues 
as they arose. One central office leader explained that the regular meetings of the smaller 
central office team “allow us to really be on the same page with what we want to 
accomplish in the full admin team [meetings].” These weekly meetings continued 
through the summer and throughout the 2020-2021 school year, though Assistant 
Superintendent Sampson acknowledged that they had shifted away from the prior 
logistical and instructional meetings model because they were now meeting to share 
information, answer questions, and address issues. In the fall, she reflected that the 
purpose of their meetings was to address problems or “put out fires,” but she lamented 
that the focus of their work shifted away from instructional leadership:  
[We’re] doing a good job putting out fires, but we’re not leading. And there is a 
huge part of me...That just really struck me because we're doing a great job right 
now. We are doing a great job surviving. And that's sort of our goal for the year. 
But we're not leading. We're not focusing on our long-term goals.  
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Leaders expressed their awareness of the need to think beyond the present crisis 
and to consider bigger, long-term issues. While leaders felt the need to address these 
areas, they were aware that administrators and teachers were experiencing high levels of 
stress and lacked capacity to engage in this kind of work. A central office leader 
reflected:  
I have to think about the mental health of our administrators. I saw more tears this 
summer than I ever have. And I know when they're stressed out, and they're very 
stressed out. So I don't think that we can pull in that leading piece until they're 
ready. Otherwise, I think it's, again, just going to be that one. One more thing. I 
don't want to be the straw that broke the camel's back. 
 
While the district leaders’ focus shifted from broader improvement efforts to 
managing the decisions and situational changes necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
SAUQ’s organizational structure and institutional history of centrally-driven decisions 
resulted in a centralized orientation as a means to align and direct decisions and 
resources. 
“Instructionally, we've tried to be on the same page.” - District Orientation 
Toward Centralization. The distributed nature of a school district, characterized by a 
district central office separate from numerous different schools in the organization, 
results in a number of organizational leadership challenges, including the locus of 
decision-making and other bureaucratic controls (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Murphy, 
1989). Supovitz (as cited in Johnson et al., 2015) identified the tension that exists 
between establishing a unifying vision for the district and allowing for some level of 
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flexibility and autonomy of the schools in the system. The tension between centralization 
and autonomy was complicated by other stakeholders, including instructional support 
staff who provided and oversaw special education services across all buildings, and 
district operations, including food service and transportation. These groups figured into 
determinations of the extent to which decisions could be made at the building level, and 
what needed to be overseen and directed from central office.  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, SAUQ centralized decision making, placing 
value in and expecting consistency across the schools in the district. However, when 
decisions needed to be made, the process was generally collaborative and reciprocal in 
nature because the decisions, though made by central office, were not directed to the rest 
of the organization in a top-down manner. Instead, they were the result of collaboration 
and input from all levels of the organization. Assistant Superintendent Sampson 
described this collaboration:  
We're not making decisions in such a top-down way that it's like, ‘This is what 
you guys are doing.’ We're trying to get input on everything because we always 
say we're all we are collectively the expert. There's no single one of us that knows 
the full picture. We really need everybody's input. And so when we make 
decisions, we try to make the best decision based on that collective input. And 
oftentimes we try to do it in a way that there's consensus. 
In a subsequent interview, she elaborated on the importance of a clear decision-making 
process: 
It makes it all the more important to have a process in place so that people know 
how that decision is going to be made and it's very helpful if you made that 
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process up front. There are times in our admin meetings where I will say, 'You're 
making a determination, but [the superintendent] is going to make the final 
decision.' if I think it might be something that we might not all agree on. 
 
  And while collaboration and consensus characterized the decision-making 
process, the resulting decisions governed all units in the system, providing consistency 
across schools. Academic programming related to the entire system was also centralized, 
with consistent adoption of programs and adherence to the same standards and 
performance indicators at each grade level. Assistant Superintendent Sampson explained 
this: 
Instructionally, we've tried to be on the same page. I have worked with all of the 
teachers and every single grade level to develop ‘I can…’ statements for all of 
their subject areas. So we have that commonality and we have rubrics that match 
up with every single one of those ‘I can…’ statements. So, that's consistent. 
 
Such consistency in academic programs and expectations allowed Ms. Sampson 
to work with teams of teachers and administrators to examine which targets would be 
prioritized in the 2020-2021 school year, following emergency remote learning from the 
spring. While the “I can…” statements would be consistent across all schools, Ms. 
Sampson reflected that she loosened the district requirement outlining the amount of time 
spent in each of the content areas, allowing principals to make adjustments based on the 
changes in the school day schedule necessitated by the COVID health and safety 
mitigation strategies and based on the needs of the students in each building. Assistant 
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Superintendent Sampson remembered:   
We are not going to say, ‘You must have 90 minutes in reading; you must have 75 
minutes in math’ because we don't know what the kids might need. And maybe 
we'll have to come back to that at some point if we see big disparities, but we 
didn't feel comfortable and we want to make sure that teachers feel like they can 
have an interdisciplinary approach as well. So, we didn't feel comfortable 
blocking up a schedule without knowing some of the unknowns. 
 
In research examining districts’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic conducted 
from April to August, 2020, Hubbard, Mackey, & Supovitz (2020) found that “districts 
that were more successful operating with strong central guidance tended to have pre-
existing infrastructure in place that allowed for a more streamlined crisis response” (p. 2). 
Such strong central guidance from the central office of SAUQ was a part of the district 
culture prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and when the COVID-19 pandemic occurred 
and the district had to pivot to emergency remote learning, stakeholders in the system 
were accustomed to centralized procedures and decision making. 
“Give us a directive so we can all be on the same page.” - Uncertainty Leads 
to Increased Centralization & Uniformity. As leaders became more aware that 
schooling during the COVID-19 pandemic would require changes to nearly every aspect 
of the institution, the uncertainty about what to do led building leaders to seek guidance 
from district leaders and led district leaders to seek guidance from other districts and 
from the DOE. With so much uncertainty, SAUQ was adopted an even more centralized 
decision-making process, and decisions across schools, particularly the elementary 
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schools, prioritized consistency and uniformity in procedures.  
The leaders and teachers throughout SAUQ were accustomed to a centralized 
approach, particularly as it related to the instructional core. They were less familiar with a 
centralized approach to the more day-to-day operations of schools. From the moment 
schools shifted to emergency remote learning and continuing throughout the COVID-19 
pandemic, district and school leaders faced operational challenges and questions that 
were entirely novel and for which they had neither the experience nor organizational 
structures in place to address. Principals, including very experienced administrators, were 
also navigating frequent, unfamiliar and diverse questions from their staffs. Recalling the 
first days in emergency remote learning, one principal recounted the challenge of 
establishing consistent expectations while recognizing the differences between the 
positions required some flexibility in these expectations:  
When we first broke, it was kind of like, ‘OK. Make sure to maybe run a zoom 
link, zoom morning meet to make sure that there are morning meetings with their 
class,’ but there was no new teaching involved. That was tricky. And people had 
to let go of the fact that what you do as a second grade teacher for your class isn't 
the same as what the gym teacher is doing. It's the reality of the situation. 
Another principal described the challenge of having so many questions she could not 
answer: 
I was just trying to field people's questions. People were good because I said, ‘I'm 
not going to know.’ It's just a lot of these questions—‘I'll do my best to figure 
them out for you.’ So people were really, really patient with that. I thought every 
meeting or every conversation I had with someone, I just got into questions and 
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then a lot of them that we just didn't have answers to. 
 
The frequency and intensity of the complex questions that district and school 
leaders had never before needed to confront led to a sense of decision fatigue, or the 
sense that they lacked the capacity to make such significant and weighty decisions. An 
elementary principal observed: “I think we have the same sort of ‘Just tell us what to—
somebody tell us what to do’ you know. But I think that's been the problem. I think 
nobody's really known what to do.” Assistant Superintendent Sampson echoed this when 
she said:  
Our building administrators are looking for answers, just like we are, as districts, 
looking for answers from the DOE.  Like, ‘Tell us what you want us to do or, you 
know, give us a directive so we can all be on the same page.’ That sort of has 
been the demand and we have shifted to a little bit of a top-down.  
District leaders recognized the need to provide support to leaders throughout the district 
by providing answers to these questions and sought to do this through an articulated 
decision-making process, as well as a plan to collaborate with administrators and teachers 
to create the return to school plans throughout the summer of 2020.  
“This isn't any one person's decision.” - A Decision Making Process 
Characterized by Collaboration. Decision making is at the heart of how Johnson et al. 
(2015) defined centralization. Their author research examined decision making in a 
district on a continuum, with central office on one end and schools on the other end. 
Though SAUQ’s orientation could be characterized as centralized based on the required 
consistency of curriculum and pedagogy, the district prioritized collaboration and 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
95 
reciprocal feedback when establishing these consistent procedures and expectations. 
Superintendent Jacoby characterized his leadership and decision-making process with the 
administrative team as collaborative in nature, noting that when it came to decision 
making:  
I don't mind making tough decisions. I absolutely don't mind that. And I don't 
mind giving direction when I feel that direction is needed, but I would much 
prefer to be in a group and share ideas and reach some kind of consensus in terms 
of direction and decisions.  
 
Both the assistant superintendent and the superintendent outlined their decision-
making process with the administrative team. Superintendent Jacoby described using an 
A, B, C decision-making framework. “A-level decisions that affect the whole district; B-
level decisions that may affect a unit like the elementary unit or the high school/middle 
school unit, and C-level decisions are building based decisions.” They explained that 
while this decision-making process was in place prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it 
became more formalized throughout the pandemic. He emphasized the value he placed 
on collaborative decision making, recognizing that information he gleaned from his 
network of superintendents in the region was not germane to all members of the team and 
that some issues required different voices and perspectives at the table:  
I constantly update my principals and directors with that 
information...communication with the principals, and the whole admin team. And 
then we do middle school, high school, and elementary principals in separate 
meetings whenever we need to—that ends up about once a week—And those are 
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very collaborative meetings. I'm very transparent in terms of what I share with 
them, and they're not shy about letting me know how things are going. 
 
From those first chaotic weeks leading up to the shift to emergency remote 
learning to the subsequent weeks and months, the sheer number of decisions confronting 
educational leaders—at all levels—was described by one of SAUQ’s principals as 
“overwhelming.” Nearly every decision fell into the three key sets of decisions on which 
districts focused: decisions about academics, including curriculum, instruction, and 
assessment; budgeting and resource allocation; and staffing (Johnson et al., 2015).  
Frequently these decisions affected everyone in the district and, as such, were what Mr. 
Jacoby described as “A-decisions.” In addition, these decisions needed to be made in the 
context of a global pandemic, when districts were asked to pivot to be able to provide 
education from a distance. In this context, few of the established systems and procedures, 
including attendance, grading, and the school-day schedule, could be applied. In addition, 
in the spring, there were few structures in place that allowed central office administrators 
to incorporate teacher voice and, at times, other administrators’ perspectives in decision 
making. The superintendent acknowledged how the sheer number of issues affected this 
established decision-making process:  
I have been pretty clear with all the administrators that this situation is kind of 
unusual and I think it calls for a little bit more of a different leadership style than I 
might normally exhibit. So, if I'm making decisions that seem to be a little less 
than my normal, thoughtful, slow-paced, collaborative self, it's out of necessity.  
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The administrative team also revisited the decision-making process within the 
administrative team, refining it and creating a more clearly articulated division of 
decision-making responsibility (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Decision Making within District Leadership Team 
Superintendent 
● Ultimate approval of ad hoc committee recommendations and/or final decision 
when/if consensus is not made through the administrative team. 
● Establishes, with team input, the re-entry scenario that will be followed (in 
person, hybrid, online) 
● Determines, with team input, the safety protocols that will be used 
● Determines staffing levels and finances 
Principals / Directors 
● Determine daily schedules aligned to instructional requirements  
● Develop a plan to use existing resources to comply with strategic decisions 
● Establish and apply procedures complying with strategic decisions 
Community Input 
● Re-Opening Survey—We want to gauge perceptions and comfort levels of both 
families and employees 
● Board Meetings—Families may attend board meetings to provide input 
● Once developed, a plan will be shared with families and the community 
 
While some decisions, particularly during the first months of the COVID-19 
pandemic, required less collaboration, the district and school administrators recognized 
the need to include more people in the decision-making process. To address these 
decision-making challenges, district leaders in SAUQ gathered information from 
teachers, principals and other administrators to identify what needed to be done in the 
fall, 2020 to address the shortcomings of the spring, 2020. Assistant Superintendent 
Sampson held a series of Zoom meetings to solicit teachers’ ideas as a “critical 
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component of helping to shape our collective thinking in necessary next steps.” Teacher 
feedback during these sessions was shared with administrators and used for subsequent 
planning. One district leader noted: 
Starting in May, we worked with the admin team to develop a list of the major 
priority areas that we need to make sure that we have cohesion around [social-
emotional learning] (SEL), instruction, attendance, grading procedures - those 
types of things. 
Once these major priority areas were identified, ad hoc committees were formed (see 
Table 4). 




SAUQ Ad Hoc Committees 
Ad Hoc Committee Task Chair(s) 
Health Protocols *Develop protocols for staff, students, and 
families/visitors entering and working in our 
buildings 
Head Nurse 
Technology *Designate common platforms that can be used 
across the district  
*List common expectations of a “one stop 
shop” website at schools 
*Suggest and develop professional 
development 
Director of 
Technology &  
MS Principal 
Accountability *Re-assess applicability of grade level 
performance indicators for grades K-8  
*Develop expectations for student participation 
digitally as well as face to face if hybrid (hours 
per day depending on grade span….what 
parents can expect for work load and how 
parents can support their child) 
*Recommendations for student grading and use 











*Revision of assessment calendar  
*Provide recommendations of specific 
assessments if any may need to change 











*Criteria for tracking attendance (in-person and 
virtual) 
*Develop suggestions to increase engagement 
*Expectations for student participation digitally 
(in-person and virtual) 
Superintendent 
 







*Suggestions for engagement of staff and staff 
wellness 
*Guidelines for substitute teachers entering the 
building 
*Guidance for use of ed techs in virtual 
learning 
*Clarity of work plan expectations for staff  
*Ensure more inclusive role of allied arts 
HS Principal 
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Ad Hoc Committee Task Chair(s) 
SEL *Recommendations for how we will use the tools 
we already have in place for SEL programming 
*Recommendations for how we will identify new 
resources, supports, or partners that schools may 
need to access in the fall 
*Recommendations for how we will assess and 
screen students for what they need in regards to 
Social/Emotional supports How will we use that 
information  
*Recommendations for how we might use a 
district emergency support system/response for 
any school that may need it 
*Establish what longer-term SEL responses might 
need to be considered 
2 ES Principals 
Special Ed  *Develop processes and protocols to ensure 
requirements and IEPs are followed in all three 
scenarios 
*Ensure there is a plan to support students’ needs 
Director of Special 
Education 
 
These ad hoc committees comprised administrators and teachers and were chaired 
by different administrators and principals from throughout the district. When considering 
the composition of these groups, Assistant Superintendent Sampson recalled:  
This isn't any one person's decision. It's not even just an admin decision or central 
office decision. We really need to have teacher input on these. So we actually had 
teachers on these ad hoc committees, meeting throughout the summer. Most of the 
meetings ended in mid-July, so that we could vet all of the recommendations as 
an admin team, but teachers helped to develop these recommendations. 
Teachers recalled their involvement in these ad hoc committees: 
We did end up getting a good voice at that table, but we had to push for it. And I 
think all of those committees, because there was so much to consider - So 
breaking them down into small cohorts of teachers and administrators willing to 
do the work, it let them tackle a large variety of topics in depth. And that was one 
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great thing I thought they did, was establish a bunch of committees that each sort 
of took a little sliver so they could go deep into each sliver because there's so 
much - you know, attendance, engagement, curriculum, health and safety 
protocols - I could go on and on, but that was one nice thing. 
 
The ad hoc committees worked together throughout the summer to produce 
recommendations that were included in the district’s return to school plan. Because 
teachers and administrators drafted the recommendations that were the basis of the 
district’s return to school plan, the plan was largely accepted by administrators and 
teachers even before it was adopted by the Board.  
The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic meant that it was difficult for groups of 
teachers and administrators to gather. Leaders of SAUQ nevertheless sought teacher, 
student, and family feedback through the use of surveys that were administered in the 
spring, summer, fall, and winter. The survey feedback was used to inform decisions 
related to meals, transportation, schedules and instructional planning. Assistant 
Superintendent Sampson described their use of staff surveys and other forms of feedback: 
We try to give people an avenue to provide feedback when we give surveys and 
try to take that into account and make the decisions, the best that we can that way, 
and then they certainly can always let their leadership team know or even talk to 
their building principal and let them know their concerns. 
Surveys were administered to teachers, families, and, at times, students throughout the 
COVID-19 pandemic to gather their feedback about their experiences and their needs. A 
survey was administered to families and staff in early January to get their feedback to 
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help determine whether and how changes to programming and scheduling would occur in 
the winter. A teacher described how this survey was used:  
Administration did do a survey to see how we felt about being back in school, so I 
do think they were asking for input and you know seemed to listen and take our 
advice or the majority of the people's advice. I would assume that's how they 
made their decision. So we have had the opportunity to at least reflect on how we 
thought things were going, what we would like to see for schedules moving 
forward. And they did involve all levels and the parents and community in those 
decisions. 
 
In addition to surveys, each school in SAUQ also had leadership teams made up 
of teachers that met regularly. One principal described these meetings as a place where 
teachers could share their questions and concerns: 
I think they just wanted to be able to share their concerns. I feel like we have lots 
of platforms to do that though, like team leaders meet twice a month. And that's 
pretty much what we do—we talk about what people are concerned about, what 
are they worried about, what questions people have. 
 The district’s use of ad hoc committees, surveys, and leadership teams in schools 
encouraged collaboration and contributed to coherence in the system.  
“They were kind of my people.” - Navigating Complex Decisions: The Role of 
Networks  
While the recommendations of the ad hoc committees allowed for greater clarity 
and consistency of expectations, as outlined in the district’s reopening plan, there was 
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broad understanding that the reopening plan would evolve as Maine’s Framework for 
Reopening Schools was updated and as they received additional guidance from the Maine 
Centers for Disease Control (MCDC), the Maine Department of Education (MDOE), and 
other external policy domains as circumstances changed related to the COVID-19 
pandemic. When asked how he managed the myriad changes in guidance from these 
agencies, Superintendent Jacoby described his connections to other superintendents in the 
region, to the Commissioner, and to other educational organizations that allowed him to 
ask questions and collaborate.  
I get a lot of information, and I make sure that I've got it. So, I share that with the 
board, and I share with my administrators on a regular basis, so they feel like 
they're pretty well in touch with what's going on, so there... there aren't many 
questions that come up that they don't know the answer. 
The frequent administrative meetings acted as a venue for the dissemination of this 
information, and also as a platform for questions and additional discussion.  
Nevertheless, immediately following the release of the reopening schools plan 
and continuing throughout the fall, principals and other school leaders still found 
themselves fielding specific questions related to details not explicitly outlined in the 
school reopening plan. While central office leaders were seen as supportive, the 
principals of the elementary schools in SAUQ reported that they worked more closely 
with one another because they had shared experiences and were seen as a supportive 
network of colleagues. One principal reported: “I feel like lately the K-5 administrators—
we've been looking to each other a lot because some of us are like, ‘Have you had this 
question? Did you already have this figured out at your school?’” 
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Another principal reported:  
I met with elementary principals—we met a lot since March and it was good. We 
actually—this whole thing has made us kind of closer as a team, which has been 
cool. We haven't always agreed, and some things are specific to our buildings...So 
they were kind of my people. 
 
By the start of the school year, the K-5 principals were working closely and had 
very consistent plans for how they would implement some of the decisions, particularly 
those related to health and safety. Assistant Superintendent Sampson reflected on the start 
of the year, saying:  
In terms of how we're responding to staff and safety and putting our plans in 
place, [the K-5 principals] are lockstep with each other. And I think that that's 
great. I think that part of that is also that they're nervous that if they do anything 
different in their building than another school is doing, they're going to hear about 
it from their teachers. But I think they've done a tremendous job working together. 
 Such close collaboration allowed principals to establish consistent expectations 
across their buildings. Principals who valued autonomy struggled with this tendency 
toward uniformity because as they adopted strict consistency, they had less flexibility to 
adapt to meet the needs in their individual buildings. One principal described the tension 
they experienced as another colleague wanted everyone to do the same thing. “[They] 
want to be consistent with what we are doing, and sometimes I don't. I don't feel like 
that's really necessary. I feel that’s something buildings work out with their team.” 
Despite such discomfort, decisions that affected the elementary schools were generally 
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made when the principals reached consensus.  
 While there was not perfect agreement about when the schools would do the same 
thing, networking allowed the district and schools to be “on the same page,” as one 
administrator noted. The principals acknowledged that because teachers in different 
schools talked with one another and “compared notes,” it was important to be consistent. 
Not only is consistency helpful when addressing questions related to the day-to-day 
operations of the school, consistent expectations and shared understanding of the roles 
that each person plays are important hallmarks of a highly coherent district.  
Reorienting the Organization to Achieve Coordination and Coherence 
Fullan & Quinn (2016) defined coherence as “what is in the minds and actions of 
people individually and especially collectively” (p. 2). Honig & Hatch (2004) define 
coherence as “a dynamic process, which involves schools and school district central 
offices working together to craft or continually negotiate the fit between external 
demands and schools’ own goals and strategies” (p. 16). Ultimately, a coherent district is 
one in which there is a common understanding of what needs to be done and why. SAUQ 
was a highly coherent system as seen in their communications and planning documents. 
Yet while there was significant evidence of coherence, teachers’ experiences of being 
excluded from decision-making processes highlights the importance of conceiving of 
coherence as a dynamic process that demands ongoing attention and scrutiny. It also 
underscores the importance of maintaining a reciprocal relationship between teachers and 
school and district leaders, characterized by all stakeholders having a meaningful voice in 
policies and decisions.  
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“Stay safe. Stay open.” - Policy Alignment: Focused Work Toward Common 
Goals. Coherence refers to a high degree of alignment within a system, allowing focused 
work toward common goals. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, Superintendent Jacoby 
focused the health and safety efforts of SAUQ and the broader community around the 
mantra, “Stay safe. Stay open.” He stated this phrase in School Board meetings and in 
meetings with the central office and administrative teams. And this mantra was soon 
echoed by others in and associated with the district, including Board members. This 
continued to be at the heart of the work around which other plans were made. By the 
beginning of July, the district, drawing on the initial considerations of the ad hoc 
committees, administered surveys to staff and families to learn more about their thoughts 
on returning to school in the fall. At that time, they also released their “Re-entry Planning 
Document,” which was a framework that articulated the district’s priorities for reopening. 
The priorities were divided between “pre-established priorities” and “additional priorities 
given the COVID-19 situation” (see Table 5). These priorities were maintained 
throughout the planning process and were reflected in the district’s final reopening plan.  




SAUQ’s Re-Entry Planning Framework: Priorities 
SAUQ’s Pre-Established Priorities 
● Provide social and emotional support to all students, specifically building 
connections with students and fostering students’ connections with each other 
● Provide sound academic instruction through proficiency-based education 
Additional Priorities Given the COVID-19 Situation 
● Ensure health and safety of students, staff, and community 
● Ensure that we have a system in place to respond to an anticipated increase in 
student mental health  
● Ensure equity for students 
 
The re-entry planning document also outlined the process for re-entry decisions 
(see Figure 2), the timeline for the process of establishing locally-controlled—rather than 
state mandated—decisions, listed the ad hoc committees, and listed the team members’ 
roles and responsibilities.  
Figure 2 
Process for Establishing Locally Controlled Re-Entry Decisions 
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In the outline of the team roles and composition, the framework identified the 
members of the central office team and the full administrative team and outlined the 
responsibilities of each group. This comprehensive planning document was shared with 
district personnel on July 1, 2020 a day before it was shared with the broader community. 
In the letter introducing the planning process, Superintendent Jacoby identified the 
overarching goal, stating, “Though our primary goal remains to open the schools for in-
person instruction, we are also looking at different scenarios given the changing nature of 
the COVID-19 pandemic situation.” In that same community letter, Superintendent 
Jacoby included the results of the survey administered to families at the end of the school 
year, asking about their return to school plans. The framework and associated documents 
clearly articulated the districts common priorities and goals.  
“Get them here. Get them fed. Get them home safely” - Aligning Resources 
and District Structures. As described above, to achieve coordination and coherence 
throughout SAUQ, district leaders had to reorient the focus of the organization on 
common district priorities and expectations. Once the priorities and expectations were 
established, district and school leaders aligned resources to support them. Reorienting the 
district involves shifting the structures and resources in an organization to support 
systemic reform (Rorrer et al., 2008). During the COVID-19 pandemic, SAUQ focused 
its attention and resources on health and safety measures to decrease the likelihood of in-
school transmission of the virus, address social-emotional needs of students and staff, in 
order to provide as much in-person learning to students as possible. In the first days of 
emergency remote learning, the focus was on getting resources into students’ hands and 
ensuring teachers had what they needed to provide instruction.  
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  In the first weeks of emergency remote learning, central office administrators 
assumed different responsibilities and functions, including obtaining resources. SAUQ, 
like other districts, scrambled to ensure that they had the right resources in place to carry 
out emergency remote learning. Assistant Superintendent Sampson described how she 
organized resources that families could access. When the district made the initial shift to 
emergency remote learning, she created a centralized clearing house where teachers could 
organize learning materials. She explained: 
I put together a whole framework for online instruction all linked to every grade 
level. They've got a folder. They've got a framework of what teachers need to 
prepare to put together, set that up for teachers and then that Monday—there was 
no school for anybody. So, our teachers came in, they prepped for two days. We 
got materials out—hard copy materials out to families that Wednesday, and then 
we were emergency learning virtual. 
 
Another participant who was also a parent of a student in the system remembered 
their child coming home with adequate resources for emergency remote learning: “My 
kid came home with a binder full of stuff and with a schedule and ideas of what to do 
every day. And their math book came home, their iPad came home, everything.” 
Teachers recalled their primary focus of their time and resources in the first weeks of 
emergency remote learning was on connecting with students. One teacher explained, “So 
after we started, my focus was actually getting in contact with the kids, making sure that 
they're responding somehow, whether it's phone calls or email, some type of response.” 
Another teacher remembered, “I focused mostly on just trying to get my kids on to Zoom. 
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And we did a lot of games and morning meetings sort of things and just getting 
everybody...back together.” 
 As the district’s focus shifted from emergency remote learning to preparations for 
reopening in the fall, Superintendent Jacoby reoriented the focus of the district by 
establishing, “Stay safe. Stay open.” as the mantra for the district and the broader 
community. These words effectively prioritized the district's work to include health, 
safety and wellness protocols at the heart of the work the district undertook. Reorienting 
the organization and establishing policy coherence necessary for implementing and 
sustaining change both require the alignment of organizational structures, redefining 
roles, and coordinating resources (Cobb et al., 2018; Johnson et al., 2015; Forman et al., 
2017; Honig, 2009; Coburn, 2003). During a pandemic, reorienting the organization 
meant that teachers and administrators focused on safety, health and wellness protocols 
as they thought about instructional practices.  
Priorities for the new school year were different during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
When asked about the priorities for the start of the school year, one principal reported,  
Just get them here. Get them here. Get them fed. Get them home safely...I guess 
getting here and getting settled is priority number one. Priority number two is 
figuring out what kids need and what staff need because it's going to be stressful 
when we start. And priority three is developing routines - brand new routines. 
While health and safety were paramount, leaders also recognized the need to attend to the 
social-emotional learning needs of students and staff. Another principal repeated the 
concerns about health and safety and added: 
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Safety is the number one priority. I want everybody to be safe. I'm worried about 
morale... This is a big adjustment to their teaching. It's a big adjustment to life 
here at school—their ability to gather with colleagues, you know, all of that is just 
really impacted. So, I'm worried about the morale of staff. And I'm really worried 
about the impact on kids...about the social-emotional impact and academic impact 
on being gone so long. 
 
To prepare for the reopening of schools, district leaders worked with the MDOE 
to secure personal protective equipment (PPE), and principals worked with central office 
leaders to acquire resources for students and additional personnel for their schools. A 
principal recalled: 
The kids got what they need, for sure. The staff? Yes. I mean, you have materials; 
you have things - we've ordered a ton of stuff with the funding resources like 
consumables, glue sticks, markers. And so, from a material standpoint, the 
teachers have what they need. We've added one new teacher as well...we finally 
were able to get somebody on board to officially separate that class, which has 
been good. 
 
 Reorienting the district and realigning resources was seen when the district 
determined that from November until the winter break, Wednesdays would be workshop 
days. After the first quarter, SAUQ noted that between already scheduled workshop days, 
parent-teacher conferences, Veteran’s Day, and Thanksgiving, there would be five 
Wednesdays when the normal school schedule would be interrupted. District leaders were 
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also hearing from association leaders and administrators that teachers, particularly at the 
elementary level, felt they needed more time and that the impact of the health and safety 
protocols was having a wearing effect on teachers. The district determined that they 
would hold teacher workshop days on Wednesdays in the district as a means of 
addressing the concerns of teachers and attending to cleaning protocols in buildings, as 
this time would also allow for there to be a deeper cleaning in the buildings and time for 
teachers to meet and work together. One principal described these Wednesdays and their 
impact on teachers:  
I do think actually having those Wednesdays has helped morale quite a bit. I think 
teachers were—not having that time—were extremely overwhelmed and fearful 
and tired and it's just a tough year for everybody. I think them having that ability 
to have that time on Wednesday - to prepare, to decompress, to be unmasked, to 
breathe—has I think that's helped teachers to feel less stressed.  
Another principal explained how the time was used to prepare and to collaborate with 
other colleagues, particularly the educational technicians that worked with their students 
and with whom collaboration rarely took place: 
It has given the gift of time which we—no one has ever had—we have never had 
this much time to talk and meet and have ed techs—like everybody is here today! 
And you know I see and I hear ed techs talking with teachers about students and 
about interventions they can do. It just seems like we're all in sync. And I mean 
they're just—they're doing they're really knocking it out...I think, we're doing 
better with the four days than we would with five days. 
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In addition to the Wednesdays providing valuable time for collaboration, it also 
allowed teachers to plan lessons and give student feedback, which led to a greater sense 
of efficacy and competence. A teacher reported:  
I feel like with only having four days instead of teaching five mediocre days, I 
really feel like I can give four good, solid days. I feel like that Wednesday really 
helps me. It lets me really plan, really dive deep, really think about where I'm 
going and a lot better planning than just on the fly or at home or at night or after 
school. I can really get a lot done on those Wednesdays. 
Prioritizing the resource of time for teachers contributed to a perception among teachers 
that the district and building leaders recognized them as professionals who required time 
to attend to their craft. This was reflected in a teacher’s remark: 
Four days a week is an incredible model for elementary. How incredible it is to 
feel like a true professional and be able to just do deep, rich planning, studying 
your content, not feeling like you're flying by the seat of your pants? It has been 
absolutely amazing to feel like a professional and do my work at my workplace, 
not feeling like it's after school, rushing, home, or on the weekends. 
 
Making the initial shift from five in-person days for students to four was 
supported by members of the School Board, in part because reports from administrators 
indicated that these workshop days were an important way to address staff morale and 
thus consistent with their work to address the health, safety and wellness of students and 
staff. When the superintendent proposed continuing four in-person days beyond January, 
he was able to advocate for this based on the results from family and staff surveys that 
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indicated support for this schedule. In addition, the district leaders recognized that while 
their original reopening plan imagined seamless pivots between full in-person, to hybrid, 
to full-distance, they realized that such changes would have been extraordinarily difficult 
for families to manage. Though the rationale could be articulated, the superintendent and 
other district leaders had to manage questions and concerns raised by external 
stakeholders, including parents and some individual members of the School Board.  
Factors that Supported or Hindered District Coherence 
 District and building leaders undertook actions—including increasing 
centralization and coordination of decisions, articulating decision-making processes, and 
reorienting the district to direct resources and align policies—in an effort to achieve 
coherence across the district. While these actions established the conditions necessary for 
a coherent and coordinated implementation of the changes brought on by the COVID-19 
pandemic, there were a number of factors that impacted the effectiveness of these actions. 
These factors included the bridging and buffering roles between layers of the 
organization played by building and district leaders, clear and consistent communication, 
and the presence of relational trust in leaders and the organization. 
“You're my person right now.” - Bridging and Buffering: Spanning the Layers 
Like those of other bureaucracies, school districts’ organizational structures 
comprise nested layers, with the leaders of the organization in the outermost layer—
closest to external entities, including federal and state governments—and classroom 
teachers and school staff in the most central—or nested—layer. Within the same 
organization, the layers between central office and the schools can lead to breakdowns in 
communication and can challenge shared understanding related to a change. In addition, 
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the School Board, which has oversight and authority over the district, sits apart from the 
organization. The Superintendent acts as the bridging—and sometimes buffering—agent 
between the Board and the district. Similarly, the unions or associations are made up of 
employees and yet the associations are entities that sit apart from the school district as an 
organization. The Superintendent and other central office leaders have the responsibility 
to interact with and respond to questions and address requests from these organizations, 
acting either as a bridge that connects the entity to the district or as a buffer that mediates 
the effect of the outside entity on the district. While the effects of the nested structure are 
somewhat ameliorated by the relatively small size of the district and the proximity of 
district leaders to schools, the layered nature of the district nonetheless posed a challenge 
to coherence and coordination.  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, district leaders sometimes perceived the 
MDOE as an external policy domain whose directives needed to be buffered or mitigated 
to ensure they were consistent with the district’s established priorities. Historically, the 
district leaders in SAUQ were ambivalent about the role of the MDOE. Shortly before the 
shift to emergency remote learning, one district leader remembered hearing MDOE’s 
preparation recommendations:  
‘You've got to have two weeks’ worth of sub plans. And you've got to have this; 
you've got to have that; and plan for remote’—whatever they were saying at the 
time. And even then...it was sort of like, ‘We don't always trust the DOE.’ And to 
what extent do we need to do that? ...Are we local control? Do we get to figure 
that out, or do we have to do this? 
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In their work to reorient the school system and to mediate the effects of external 
entities and policy domains, central office leaders must evaluate the impact these external 
entities’ demands could have on the district. When bridging, leaders communicate 
requirements, or build capacity of building-level leaders by providing resources (Honig, 
2009; Rorrer et al., 2008). When navigating the guidance from the Maine CDC and the 
MDOE, superintendents turned to the leaders at the MDOE to understand the guidance 
and to get questions answered, thus acting as a bridge between the school district and the 
state agencies. This collaboration was seen in July when the Maine CDC and MDOE 
recommended that school districts plan for three opening scenarios: full in-person 
instruction, hybrid instruction, and fully remote or distance learning. SAUQ, whose 
leaders had been communicating with regional superintendents, had already begun this 
work. Nevertheless, they followed the recommendation and developed their school 
reopening plan with all three scenarios and consistent districtwide procedures outlined in 
it.   
Superintendent Jacoby also reflected that, while it was challenging to manage the 
changing guidance and information coming from the state and federal governments, he 
found the leaders from the Department of Education to be valuable and helpful resources 
that allowed him to support his staff. He explained:  
I'm very impressed with [them] too and what they’ve built for their team in terms 
of their ability to communicate. They don't always have the answers. I don't 
always expect them to have answers, but they don't make it up. They’re honest. 
‘We don't know that. This is what's going on, and we'll let you know when we 
have further information.’ So that's been great. I don't feel like I'm three steps 
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removed from things that are going on at the State. I'm right in it. And I'm glad. 
It's a lot of work. It's a lot of work to stay on top of all that and stay up with all of 
that meeting schedule, but it's really paid off. 
Because the leaders of SAUQ perceived the guidance from MDOE as helpful and 
relevant, leaders shared information coming from the Department and consistently made 
plans based on that guidance.  
 While such sharing reflects bridging actions relative to the relationship between 
the state and the school district, the superintendent also acts as a bridge between the 
district and the School Board, which has the responsibility to oversee and direct the 
district, to ask questions of the superintendent and to represent the voices of its 
constituents. At a School Board meeting the summer prior to reopening school, members 
of the School Board did not adopt the reopening plan, which was the product of the ad 
hoc committee meetings that had been occurring throughout the summer. An additional 
School Board meeting was scheduled for two days later. Superintendent Jacoby had 
anticipated the need for a second meeting, saying, “We'll give them the draft at least a 
week prior to the meeting where we discuss it and I wouldn't be surprised if it takes two 
meetings [to adopt it]. A lot of them have opinions.” Between the first meeting and the 
meeting two days later, Mr. Jacoby talked with members of the Board, answering their 
questions. He also arranged to have an epidemiologist report out for the first part of the 
meeting to address the members’ concerns. When asked about his plan for the meeting, 
Mr. Jacoby explained his thinking: 
I'm hoping we can get over that and keep the focus on the kids. So that's where 
I'm going to drive every time is that we need to keep the focus on the kids. And 
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we know really that these kids need to be in school. They do. And that if we can 
do it safely, they can be in school and if we can't do it safely, we'll do it virtually 
but they need to be in school. 
The superintendent acted as a bridge between the district and the Board, conveying the 
need for the plan, emphasizing the importance of passing the plan, and answering 
questions. While the Board did not approve the plan on the first night of their meeting, 
they approved the plan two days later in a subsequent meeting.  
 Bridging occurs in a system when a leader at one level of the organization is 
linked to another level and uses that connection to communicate and build capacity by 
securing resources or information (Honig, 2009). Because SAUQ is a small district, 
district leaders frequently served as bridge leaders for different layers in the organization, 
linking to building principals and to building and district leadership teams of teachers, 
rather than bridging only to adjacent layers as often happens in larger districts. For 
instance, while Ms. Sampson was perceived as a bridge leader for principals, she was 
also able to act as a resource for teachers to address their questions. She talked about a 
time when she was able to meet with members of a leadership team to answer questions 
about why the district was asking schools to identify goals and objectives this year 
though the teachers felt that “surviving the year” should be enough of a goal. Ms. 
Sampson was able to provide the rationale for the work: 
And that was such an important moment to talk through with your team leaders 
and just be really candid and be able to say, ‘We're not asking you to do this 
because it's a mandate or another thing to put on the plate. It's to really think about 
why we are here, what is it that we actually want to accomplish? Because we've 
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done all this work, but it's not just to get kids in school because we're childcare. 
We were doing it because we have a purpose for why we're getting them in 
school, and I think that was really good for them to hear from me. 
Principals reported that they see Ms. Sampson as their primary bridge to central office 
and to resolving questions. One principal said:  
[Ms. Sampson] was a wonderful resource. She was kind of a catch-all. I told her, 
‘Unfortunately for you, you're my person right now’ by way of kind of access to 
the central office type level because I have a lot of concerns and things like that. 
Another principal reported, “For most of my questions, usually my go-to is [Ms. 
Sampson.] Sometimes it might be [Ms. Jacoby] or it might be...our business manager.” 
Ms. Sampson recognized her role, as well:  
I guess I've always sort of felt this is a part of my role, but it's really increased 
right now - It's to help support everybody. I need to support my superintendent 
wholly because he needs that. And I also need to support all of my building 
administrators. I need to support our special education director. So, they all need a 
level of support and it's pretty intense right now - being that support - and they 
recognize it, too. 
 
 By acting as bridge leaders, district leaders are able to span the layers of the 
district. Bridging allows leaders to communicate and interact directly with stakeholders in 
different layers. Such bridging—and buffering when necessary—supports coherence and 
coordination. Throughout the pandemic, in particular, district leaders in SAUQ assumed 
different responsibilities, which entailed increased bridging between layers of the district. 
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Because it is a smaller district, where the central office and administrative teams meet 
regularly and are accessible, principals and members of the central office team were able 
to act as bridges between central office and schools.  
“We're going to communicate with one voice.” - Coherence Through Communication 
and Challenges in Common Understanding 
 Recognizing that multiple and often different messages from different leaders 
throughout the district would lead to confusion, inefficiencies, and frustration, district 
leaders centralized their procedures for communicating information. Superintendent 
Jacoby recalled:  
One of the things that we decided kind of early on, I think, you know, I said what 
we don't want to do is to have mixed messages out there for folks. That's going to 
be important. So, we're going to communicate with one voice, and it's going to be 
coming out of [the Assistant Superintendent’s] office or my office. 
The Assistant Superintendent also remembered the decision to centralize communication: 
So, I became the district communication - so sort of the PR piece. I've actually got 
a document - I've kept everything I've sent out to all employees and it's about a 
60-page document - with every email that I sent out. It was - at one point - 2 to 
three times per week that I would send out district-wide emails, keeping 
everybody up to date on what we were doing - even through the summer. We've 
never communicated this much. 
Teachers recalled that the teachers’ association got involved to ask that communication 
be streamlined. One teacher said, “The [association] got involved and said, ‘Whoa, we're 
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getting this. Can one person step up and do it?’ And [Ms. Sampson] stepped up and that's 
where the big messages started coming from.” 
District messaging in emails and in other resources provided to staff and to 
members of the community, including the Reopening Plan, were very detailed and 
comprehensive. The intention of this clear communication plan was to be transparent and 
to ensure that teachers, staff, students, and parents knew where to get information and 
what was expected. Though the plans were complicated, the intention behind the district 
messaging was to ensure clarity and consistency in the implementation of plans. But 
despite the plans and communication, there was inconsistency in how these plans were 
implemented. Teachers observed that this was, in part because of the way that building 
leaders interpreted different plans. One teacher explained: 
Historically, there is a breakdown at the administrative team level.  I think our 
superintendent and [assistant superintendent] deliver a certain message to a larger 
group of building principals and expect or depend on them to deliver that 
information. And that's where the breakdown is in our district because every 
principal does things very differently.  
Another teacher observed that each principal’s leadership style affected how they 
interpreted the message relative to how it should be implemented in the building they led: 
All the elementary principals have very different styles, so I think sometimes that 
creates a little bit of difficulty if you're talking to a teacher from another building 
where they have to do this, this and this, and you're like, ‘Oh, really? I don't have 
to do that or that.’ 
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These different interpretations and subsequent different implementations led to different 
expectations for teachers across the buildings. As teachers from different buildings shared 
their experiences, they recognized that the expectations were not uniform, which caused 
confusion and frustration. One teacher explained: 
Every elementary principal seems to have a very different spin on what is coming 
down the pike...you know, teachers talk...We do a lot of grade level work together 
and you talk and you sit in the meeting and talk about something that you're 
doing, which really should be the same thing but it just really isn't. 
 
Assistant Superintendent Sampson observed that because the issues under 
consideration were often complicated and the decisions happened quickly, administrators 
sometimes left meetings with different understandings of the decisions that had been 
agreed upon in the meeting. Administrators would also leave a meeting and have second 
thoughts about the decision. Ms. Sampson remembered:  
It was a lot of information and we voted and everybody in that meeting voted for 
the plan. I went through...every person, they all agreed. And then, the 
superintendent and I get phone calls... And I think that's one of the really 
interesting dynamics that this might be something to dig into a little bit further: 
What's decided in a full admin team meeting versus what happens after when you 
get the ear of somebody in a private meeting? 
Superintendent Jacoby observed the same tendency towards varying interpretations of 
decisions, observing, “I think we have to revisit the decision-making fairly frequently to 
make sure that we're all on the same page.” 
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 The process of revisiting decisions to ensure that stakeholders share a common 
understanding of the decision and how it is to be carried out ensures the reciprocal 
collaboration necessary for building coherence in the institution. During the pandemic, 
however, it was not always possible to take the time to return to the decision.  
“Everybody had a different expectation.” - Changes in Plans and “Understanding 
Drift” as Challenges to Coherence 
 As reforms are adopted and implemented in a complex organization, like a school 
system, they are shaped by the circumstances of their implementation and by the way that 
those carrying them out understand them (Cuban, 1998). Starting with the abrupt shift to 
emergency remote learning, teachers and administrators worked to carry out instruction 
in an entirely different context.  
District leaders used email to communicate regularly with the teachers and staff in 
the district. In the first weeks of emergency remote learning, they sent two to three emails 
each week, answering questions and outlining myriad details related to district operations 
taking place remotely. As the weeks progressed, the frequency of these communications 
decreased, though the messages continued to focus on district updates and responses to 
questions, as well as explanations of information coming from the MDOE.  
In the spring when the district moved into emergency remote learning, the district 
leaders in SAUQ communicated their plans. In April, they presented the district’s 
Emergency Learning Plan to the School Board. The Emergency Learning Plan outlined 
the district’s systemic and instructional leadership work, and the expectations for learners 
and instructional staff. The plan was broken into three phases: the first weeks in 
emergency remote learning, the weeks before spring break, and from spring break until 
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the end of the school year. This plan reflected the evolving expectations about teaching 
new material. In the first days of the shift to emergency remote learning, the SAUQ 
administrative team recognized that not all students had internet access and not all 
teachers were able to equitably deliver instruction. With that in mind, they announced 
that the goal for instruction during emergency remote learning was to maintain education 
without introducing new learning. In an email message from district administration to 
school staff, they explained: 
A reminder that we are not grading our students, we are not taking attendance, 
and we are not providing new instruction. Families are still adjusting to helping 
oversee their child’s learning, and we want to ensure we are a support for them as 
opposed to the wave that buries them. The current goal and guidance is to 
maintain learning through our continued learning plans. In addition, we want to 
try to maintain contact with students and families as much as possible as stated in 
the previous section. This can certainly come in the form of feedback and support 
for students and families, but should not result in a grade. 
In a subsequent email less than a week later following a priority notice from the MDOE 
that seemed to suggest schools should be providing new instruction, district leaders 
reiterated their expectation and clarified the district’s position: 
Special education and [free and appropriate public education] (FAPE) are not the 
primary reason we are holding off on new instruction. While we have one to one 
iPads across our district, not all students have internet access, creating a level of 
inequity. In addition, not all students have the same level of support at home in 
order to access their education, which goes well beyond special education. 
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Finally, we are being incredibly sensitive to families and their needs during this 
time. Parents and students have only had access to the continued learning 
materials that we’ve provided for a week now, and it takes time to adjust to new 
routines.  Some households will struggle to develop a new routine, particularly 
with working parents at home trying to juggle it all. 
These statements had the effect of clarifying what was expected, while also providing the 
rationale for the decision. By repeating the message—often using exactly the same 
language—district leaders emphasized the importance and focus of the work at that time. 
While the message and the rationale were clear, it was nevertheless challenging for 
teachers who were frustrated that the expectations changed. One teacher observed that, 
even prior to the expectations changing, teachers were doing different things: 
I definitely saw [inconsistencies between teachers] in our building in terms of 
teachers having different expectations because...part of what we're doing is 
helping our parents and students navigate and sometimes we couldn't even figure 
out what somebody was thinking...Some people were like introducing brand new 
materials and just rocketing and some were giving them like the option to do it. 
She went on to say that once the decision was made to allow new learning to take place 
and for that to be graded, that many students were disadvantaged because they believed 
the work was optional:  
So then you saw this disparity because the kids you had who were the go-getters 
or the kids who were in a family situation where the parents were on them to do 
the optional learning, had been doing it for five weeks. And then there was a large 
group of kids that hadn’t done any of it because it was optional. 
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Principals were the primary conduit through which the information about the change 
traveled. Each principal’s interpretation was affected by what they understood the 
directions to be, by their ideologies, and by what they believed made sense for their 
building. Assistant superintendent explained how each principal’s leadership approach 
affected how decisions that had been agreed upon were diffused to each building: 
[Some] of our K-5 administrators would say, ‘I'm a rule follower and I'm going to 
do what I'm told to do and I'm going to make sure that I'm implementing what I'm 
told to do.’ And [some] of the others would... admit to not being a rule follower 
and being more likely to apologize after the fact, but doing what they know is 
right—not purposely, not following what we're asking them to do, but, you know, 
trying to adjust to what their group needs. 
Different interpretations led to different implementations, leading to some confusion 
about what was really expected for all teachers and staff across schools.  
 In addition, there was also confusion about what implementation should entail. 
While district and building leaders in SAUQ worked to provide clear direction to staff 
through regular and detailed communications, teachers reported not knowing exactly 
what was expected. One teacher remembered trying to navigate the expectations:  
The challenge I had personally was our interpretation of what was expected, so 
everybody had a different expectation. Like one teacher just said, ‘Oh, I'm just 
going to give all these things for kids to do and they can pick and choose.’ 
Whereas my interpretation was to—as best as I could—continue to conduct class 
and assignments, and that's what was frustrating for me. 
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While teachers reported understanding the changing directions, they continued to be 
frustrated because they saw inconsistencies in how these changes were carried out—in 
their buildings and throughout the district.  
Relational Trust and Organizational Trust 
 The COVID-19 pandemic led districts to adopt situational reforms—short-term 
changes enacted to address a crisis or critical need. SAUQ adopted a number of 
situational reforms, including different schedules for each of the grade level spans, food 
services equipped to provide meal pick-ups, distance learning programs for students who 
could not attend school on an in-person basis, revised attendance and grading procedures, 
newly-adopted social-emotional learning programs, and myriad other operational 
reforms. Each of these changes required significant planning and, for those involved in 
these reforms, trust in the leaders who crafted the plans and implementation. In the 
extreme circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic—as is the case in other systemic 
reforms—stakeholders in the organization experience a sense of perceived risk and 
vulnerability as they encounter the unfamiliarity of the reforms. The presence of 
relational trust reduces the sense of risk, enabling stakeholders to engage in the reforms 
(Rousseau, 1998; McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995; Bryk & Schneider, 2002). A 
leader’s actions and dispositions are interpreted and associated with trustworthiness or a 
lack thereof.  
In their relational trust framework, Bryk & Schneider (2002) theorized that 
relational trust between all stakeholders in a district is created as a result of daily social 
exchanges. And regardless of one’s formal position in a school community, each person 
in the community maintains an understanding of their responsibilities in carrying out their 
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role and to others in the school community, referred to by the authors as “role 
obligations.” Through these social exchanges and interactions, individuals assess or 
discern the intentions of others based on different factors that contribute to 
trustworthiness including respect, personal regard for others (Bryk & Schneider, 2002), 
competence (Bryke & Schneider, 2002; Pirson & Mahotra, 2007; Handford & 
Leithwood, 2013; Hoppes & Holley, 2013; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015), 
benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995; Pirson & Mahotra, 2007; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 
2015),  openness or transparency, and consistency (Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015; 
Handford & Leithwood, 2013; Hoppes & Holley, 2013). In my analysis, I focused on 
competence, respect, integrity, and benevolence, which is similar to personal regard for 
others (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). While their research focused on the relational trust 
between major adult role sets in a school—between teachers, parents, and building 
leaders—the same factors define relational trust between the subjects in my research—
principals, teachers, and central office leaders.  District leaders in SAUQ frequently 
interacted directly with teachers and staff who discerned the actions of the leaders as a 
reflection of their trustworthiness. Relational trust factored into participants’ sense of 
coherence and coordination of the district’s situational reforms during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
“You will get action.” - Relational Trust: Competence. Teachers, staff, 
principals, and leaders navigate their school community, analyzing, interpreting, and 
discerning others’ intentions using social exchanges, previous experiences and others’ 
reputations to inform their analyses and discernments. One’s competence, their ability to 
carry out the responsibilities of their formal role, is an area of discernment and is a 
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necessary component of relational trust. Of all the factors that are attributed to school and 
district leaders, competence affected teachers’ perceptions of leader trustworthiness more 
than any other factor (Pirson & Malhotra, 2006; Handford & Leithwood, 2013). The role 
obligation that is characterized by competence is the expectation that the leader will be 
able to effectively address the concern or answer the question. One teacher characterized 
Assistant Superintendent Sampson’s competence,  
If you take anything to [Theresa], you will get action. One hundred—I mean, I 
shouldn't say 100 percent of the time because I know that she apologized a couple 
times through this process just in general, because she just couldn't respond to 
every single person's email, so she was trying to maybe respond through the 
education association—But for me, for most things, she's very responsive or can 
push you in the right direction. 
Another teacher added to this teacher’s assessment of the assistant superintendent, “But I 
will tell you that whenever I had a concern during this entire thing, starting from day one, 
she was all over it.” Each of these teacher’s experiences with the assistant superintendent 
resulted in their concern being addressed, reflecting her functional competence, which is 
to have the skills to address the more technical aspects of managing a complex 
organization (Handford & Leithwood, 2013). Functional competence is also 
demonstrated through a leader’s problem-solving skills. A teacher described their 
principal’s action-oriented approach to solving problems: 
I feel like any time I have a question about things that are happening or if there's 
something new that comes down the pipe, he is always really great at being, 
‘Alright, here's what we have to do and here's why.’ He's kind of like no nonsense 
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and he doesn't fluff it up and make it this big - It's like, ‘OK, here's what we're 
doing and this is why we're doing it.’ 
In this case, the principal’s decisiveness, coupled with his openness about what could be 
expected, conveyed competence and, thus, contributed to relational trust. 
In addition to attending to the task dimensions of functional competence, leaders 
must also cultivate interpersonal competence and relational trust (Tschannen-Moran & 
Gareis, 2015). When a teacher raised a question about a district decision related to 
reopening school, one principal recognized other teachers probably had the same 
question. The principal recalled: 
I had a teacher reach out to me and say, ‘What does this mean for us at Pine Tree 
Elementary?’ And so, it made me realize that if she has that question, I bet just 
about every other teacher has the same one. And so, what I wrote was not a 
terribly...you know, two-thousand-word email, but just putting down what it 
would mean for staff. I mean, this is what it could look like here at Pine Tree 
Elementary. You know, kids coming in through the doors and not having a 
morning recess and going straight to their classrooms. That's brand new. 
In this case the principal sent the email because he anticipated that others would have the 
same question, and by sending a clear explanation about how this change would affect 
teachers—even those who had not raised the concern—this leader demonstrated his care 
and concern for their staff. This care, coupled with the functional solution—the way that 
students would arrive at school and report to their classroom—was additional evidence of 
competence. 
 While stakeholders observe leaders’ actions and dispositions to discern their 
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trustworthiness as individual leaders, a leader’s role-specific actions on behalf of the 
district leads to attributions of trustworthiness extended to the organization. In his role as 
superintendent, Mr. Jacoby reflected on the kinds of concerns that the representatives 
from the school education association (SEA) raised in the first weeks of school:  
I think their biggest concern in the first two weeks was PPE [personal protective 
equipment]...I got complaints from the SEA about the hand sanitizer dispenser 
and hall number two at River Bend Elementary is empty. And so, for a 
superintendent that's really not my level. I really solve big picture things. So that 
was a little hard to deal with. I realized that those kinds of complaints went to 
morale. So, I really did kind of dig into that more and talk more with the 
maintenance and custodial director and said…’Don't get mad; don’t get defensive. 
Let's work together to try to make this work and try to keep these people happy so 
they can do their jobs.’ 
In this instance, Mr. Jacoby recognized that by working with other leaders to attend to an 
aspect of daily operations—one to which he would not normally be asked to attend—he 
demonstrated both functional and interpersonal competencies of the organization. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, trust in a leader’s competence was also 
perceived when a leader put into place expectations that were maintained and with which 
they followed through. One teacher talked about the principal’s expectation that teachers 
follow a set schedule for Zoom meetings with students during emergency remote learning 
and that the principal sometimes joined these meetings. When asked what she thought 
about the expectations, she said: 
I think it pushed some of the teachers who probably wouldn't have done that, you 
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know. And then some of us teachers that would have done it anyway. So, I think 
it kind of leveled the playing field a little bit because it kept us all on the same 
page so I wasn't too opposed to it. 
Not all teachers, however, felt that expectations were clear.  Moreover, some teachers 
were hesitant about additional expectations. Reflecting on the work plans that they 
submitted to administrators during emergency remote learning, one teacher explained: 
I just want to know that if I'm going to put in all this work, because it was added 
work that we had to do, which I don't mind doing, I want comments. I want my 
principals to say, ‘Hey, that sounds like a good idea.’ or, ‘Why did you do that? 
But if there's no feedback, if you get nothing, then I just feel like it's wasted, 
wasted time. 
 
 While some teachers expressed frustration that leaders did not have expectations 
or provide feedback, some leaders expressed feeling less competent because they could 
not address teachers’ questions as promptly during the COVID-19 pandemic. One 
principal stated: 
I'm having to ask - again, I feel it's a little less than it was - but I'm still having to 
ask [the assistant superintendent] more than I would like. You know, I really 
would prefer to very rarely have to ask a question. 
Principals and other leaders throughout SAUQ reported feeling pressure to be able to 
answer questions as quickly as possible. The addition of the new procedures and 
expectations at the start of the 2020-2021 school year meant that people throughout the 
organization had questions, and it took time to get the questions answered, which caused 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
133 
frustration echoed in a teacher’s comment, “If I asked a question, they wouldn't have an 
answer right off and then they’d say, ‘I'll go get an answer’ but then it's days before you 
get the answer.” 
 When a leader’s competence was in question, teachers tended to rely more on 
colleagues and other bridge leaders for support. One teacher described her response when 
she did not feel that her principal was responsive or supportive. “We were just kind of 
like on our own and we relied heavily on our teams.” 
 A leader’s competence is a necessary component of relational trust. Leaders were 
perceived as competent when they were responsive to questions and concerns, solved 
problems, and set clear expectations. When a leader’s competence is in question, 
relational trust is adversely affected.  
“It really matters to him what we think about things.” - Relational Trust: 
Respect. “Relational trust is grounded in the social respect that comes from the 
kinds of social discourse that take place across the school community” (Bryk & 
Schneider, 2003, p. 41). Social respect is interpersonal in nature and involves real, 
genuine listening in order to understand others’ experiences. Leaders, and by association 
the organization, demonstrate respect when their actions and words acknowledge the vital 
role that teachers and others in the district play (Handford & Leithwood, 2013). Such 
respectful exchanges throughout SAUQ were described by participants. The 
superintendent described the importance of genuinely listening to people throughout the 
system, particularly when he first began in his position: 
So, I just go right in the school and plop myself down in the teachers' room and 
say ‘What's going on? Tell me what's happening. What's right, what's wrong, 
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what would you see from your perspective?’ And I made a lot of contacts that 
way and got to know who people were and who the sort of movers and shakers 
were, and who would be willing to pitch in and help.  
In this case, Mr. Jacoby, recognizing the asymmetrical relationship resulting from the 
hierarchical nature of their formal roles, went out of his way to meet with people where 
they work (Tschannen-Moran, 2014). When he listened to principals, teachers, and staff 
share their experiences, the superintendent acknowledges the vital role that all members 
of the district play in carrying out the mission of the district. In the context of the district, 
a superintendent’s respectful behaviors are a reflection of the organization; when a 
stakeholder associates respect with the leader, they are more likely to associate respect 
with the organization, as well (Handford & Leithwood, 2013).  
Similarly, principals established relational trust in their building through regular 
meetings and interactions with teachers. One principal described his efforts to ground his 
leadership and his interactions with the teachers in his building by listening from the 
perspective of a teacher:  
I see myself as a teacher first. And the one thing I kind of promised myself when I 
left the classroom is, as I said, I'm never going to forget what it was like being a 
classroom teacher...But I think thinking through it through that lens has been 
incredibly helpful.  
Exercising empathy allows this principal to listen to the perspectives of the teachers in his 
school, and teachers report that this listening feels genuine. One teacher described her 
principal’s efforts to listen and gather their feedback:  
I also think that he's good at making the rounds, maybe not with everybody, but 
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certainly with team leaders and maybe a few teachers when he knows something's 
coming up at an admin meeting just to sort of get the lay of the land, get the feel 
of the building...it really matters to him what we think about things.  
Such informal exchanges allow for ease of communication and the flow of information 
throughout the school, particularly between the principal and the staff, which has been 
found to be related to teachers’ perceptions of organizational effectiveness (Ellis et al., 
2001 as cited in Handford & Leithwood, 2013).  
While the social distancing requirement posed a challenge for informal social 
discourse in schools and throughout the district, leaders continued to meet with staff and 
teachers to listen to their perspectives. Superintendent Jacoby explained that, whenever 
possible, he still met in-person with colleagues, particularly when establishing new 
relationships: 
And I really think there's a lot more power to sitting across the table with people 
and looking in their eyes and understanding what they're feeling and thinking and 
whatnot. It's much tougher—it's really difficult over email because you don't 
know what the person's tone is. 
By prioritizing meeting in person during the pandemic in order to increase the likelihood 
of effective communication, Mr. Jacoby conveyed the respect for and value that he 
placed on the relationship with this staff member. He observed that when such in-person, 
face-to-face conversations were not possible during the COVID-19 pandemic, he made it 
a priority to engage with principals outside of the normally-scheduled administrative 
meetings:   
I started making time to just call people or have a Zoom just to talk—not about 
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anything in particular, just like, ‘How's it going? How are you doing, you know? 
Anything special happening at the school?’ that kind of thing. So that seems to 
have helped quite a bit. Just trying to keep that human connection. 
Respect is fundamental to interpersonal relational trust because when social exchanges 
are not respectful, the likelihood of subsequent interactions declines, particularly during a 
pandemic when social distancing requirements mean that there are fewer informal social 
interactions. 
“We just continue to be honest and open with each other.” - Relational 
Trust: Personal Integrity. When discerning relational trust, a person’s perceived 
personal integrity is another important factor. One is perceived to have personal integrity 
when their actions reflect a moral and ethical core (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Mayer et al., 
1995; Handford & Leithwood, 2013). Integrity is also perceived when a person's actions 
are consistent with their beliefs. In schools, a leader’s integrity is reflected in their work 
to balance meeting the needs of staff and students.  
Relational trust also exists in the context of the organization—the school district. 
Organizational trust exists when the organization is seen as honest and open, and that it 
will honor commitments to all its stakeholders (Pirson & Malhotra, 2006).  
Superintendent Jacoby reflected on his efforts to demonstrate respect and personal 
integrity in his interactions with a new colleague from the school education association 
(SEA) who questioned whether or not the district was acting fairly and carrying out 
agreements, “[They] can see that I'm trying to be supportive and trying to listen and 
trying to understand their points of view. So that's definitely helpful.” Superintendent 
Jacoby met with this stakeholder in person, as a demonstration of respect and in an effort 
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to establish trust. In a subsequent interview, he reflected that their relationship had 
improved, noting, “I think I've finally gotten to the point where they understand that I 
want what's best for the whole system and the teachers.” When asked how they reached 
this understanding, he explained that he emphasized their shared beliefs, saying: 
I think just stating and restating that I was a teacher. I still consider myself to be a 
teacher—I may not have children anymore, but I'm first and foremost an educator 
and I have the best interest of the teachers at heart. So, if you need something, if 
you're fearful of something, if you think I can help, then I need to know what that 
is. Tell me how I can help. And understand that I look after the interest of the 
board. But you're all my employees and I want you to be successful. I want you to 
be safe. I want you to be happy to the extent possible, and I will do what I can to 
help to do that. 
This statement reflected Mr. Jacoby’s moral and ethical core and his actions were 
consistent with his words, leading to greater relational trust. The work to build 
interpersonal trust with this colleague points to an important aspect of the factors that are 
associated with relational trust: they often overlap or evolve. In this case, the 
superintendent demonstrated respect in their exchanges and, over time, through these 
social exchanges, the colleague was able to discern his integrity as well as the integrity of 
the organization.  
 Finally, transparency in the values and ethics that guides one’s leadership 
practices reflects personal integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Bryk & Schneider; 2002; 
Handford & Leithwood, 2013). A principal explained their values and priorities as a 
school leader: 
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I'm really passionate about some things. I'm really passionate about kids being in 
school and social-emotional learning is school. It's not “Second Step.” It's - well it 
is, but it's not - it’s something separate. It is how the culture and atmosphere of 
your building is, how your staff interact with kids, parents and it's all tied 
together. And so, I value that and I admire so much what everyone here does 
every day.  
This leader’s openness about their values and priorities, which are a reflection of their 
moral-ethical purpose, is indicative of personal integrity. They went on to explain how 
that moral-ethical core—that all decisions must be made based on what is best for 
students—allows them to navigate difficult decisions with their staff by focusing on the 
needs of the students while attending to the concerns of the staff: 
We just continue to be honest and open with each other. We don't have staff 
meetings, but I do get together with the teams and I get together with groups of 
people like ed techs and things like that. We talk about it. We think of ways to 
make things better. And we keep it positive and, at the end of the day, we're all 
talking about kids first and how we accommodate kids while not losing our minds 
in the process. 
Integrity is perceived when there is consistency between a leaders’ values, words, and 
actions, and this consistency lends itself to relational trust.  
“People are taking care of each other more.” - Relational Trust: Benevolence 
& Personal Regard for Others. While a leader’s integrity is a crucial factor in a 
stakeholder’s perception of trustworthiness, for there to be organizational trust, 
stakeholders must see evidence that the organization’s policies and procedures reflect 
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concern for the well-being of those in it—that it is a benevolent organization (Pirson & 
Mahotra, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). When an organization acts in the best interest of its 
stakeholders, even when this action is unpopular or comes at a cost, it is demonstrating 
benevolence. During the COVID-19 pandemic, organizational benevolence was reflected 
in myriad newly-adopted practices that established health, safety and wellness protocols 
that focused on the needs of students while not ignoring the needs of the staff serving 
those students.  
 While perceived benevolence of the organization is a factor leading to 
organizational trust, interpersonally, the leader’s integrity and their personal regard for 
others are necessary factors associated with relational trust. Personal regard for others is 
present when “individuals perceive that others care about them and are willing to extend 
themselves beyond what their role might formally require in any given situation” (Bryk 
& Schneider, 2002, p. 25). The COVID-19 pandemic placed significant stress on teachers 
and administrators, as they worked to chart a course of action in such an unfamiliar 
context and with frequently changing and evolving circumstances. In such stressful 
conditions, instances when colleagues went above and beyond expectations to support the 
functioning of the school or organization were worthy of note. Ms. Sampson relayed an 
instance where such personal regard for others was observed. She explained that, as a part 
of their administrative meeting norms, members of the team began every meeting with 
“commendations and concerns” to share the good things occurring in the different 
schools, as well as to identify issues to be addressed. She recalled that in their first 
administrative meeting following the county’s “yellow” designation in the COVID-19 
School Health Advisory System, that resulted in the district’s shift to a hybrid model, one 
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principal commended their building and the staff for being “flexible and accommodating 
and positive.”  Ms. Sampson continued, noting that this flexible, accommodating and 
positive experience was not shared throughout the district. She said, “And hearing that, I 
was sort of like, ‘That's so great—wonderful!’ because that's not really the sense that I've 
been getting here at central office, especially hearing from some other building 
administrators.” A school or a district where members are willing to go beyond what is 
expected of them reflects personal regard for others, which is associated with relational 
trust throughout the school.  
 When a leader and other members of a school community demonstrate genuine 
care for others and a willingness to help, particularly in high-stress situations, the sense of 
risk and vulnerability is reduced and collaboration and affiliation to the organization 
increases (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). A principal’s description of the collaborative culture 
in their school reflected personal regard demonstrated by staff during the COVID-19 
pandemic:  
I feel people are taking care of each other more. I know, even though we can't get 
together as a staff so much I feel I can see it happening. I can see it happening in 
other places. I see, I've had teachers come to me and say, ‘I'm willing to do this so 
they can get that.’ I've seen teachers say, you know, ‘I'll take this duty, so that this 
person can go and take care of, you know, whatever it is that comes up.’ I've seen 
teachers step up and say, ‘I'll teach the library class. Don't worry about it. I got 
this.’ Or I don't know, I'd have to create a list. I just, it feels like they're taking 
care of one another. 
Another leader in the district observed staff members’ willingness to be flexible in the 
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changing circumstances. “The staff is cohesive enough where they're willing to give a 
little to somebody else, even though that means they might lose a little.” When people in 
a school community sense that others care about them, it contributes to a culture where 
people feel connected, and relational trust in and throughout the organization increases.   
“Your darkest hour is your finest hour.” - Benefits of Relational Trust. When 
relational trust is present in a school or organization’s culture researchers have identified 
benefits, including improved student achievement. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
existence of relational trust was associated with broad buy-in of changes. This buy-in was 
evident in a principal’s comment: 
And so with anything, it's give and take. It’s balance. All in all, I think at the end 
of the day that you're never going to have 100% consensus on everything. And so 
you kind of got to make the decision and do it for the right reasons. 
As more people in the organization adopt the changes, the perceived risk of doing 
something different and new is reduced and collaboration increases. One teacher 
explained: 
This year has really kind of put us on a level playing field and we're both like, 
‘Oh, my goodness! What do we do?’ And so that's really strengthened my 
relationship with the other teacher in my grade level because we have been 
forced...to work together a lot and figure this out and both just be like, ‘I don't 
know, what are we going to do? OK, here's how we're going to do this.’ And 
we're going to do this the best we can. And so for me personally, I've seen—it's 
been nice to just kind of have this feeling with the colleagues around me that, you 
know, this is really hard and there's no easy way around it, but we are just going 
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to do the best we can and work together to help each other do the best we can. 
In this comment, the teacher referred to doing the best they can three times. This 
comment was echoed by other teachers, as well, and reflects a culture of trust among 
members of this school community. When teachers believe that not only are they doing 
the best they can, but that others around them are also doing the best they can, it is a 
reflection of trust in one another and a sense that everyone is working towards the same 
goal.  
Another teacher described a sense of collective responsibility for a common 
goal—maintaining the health, safety, and well-being of the school community. “I 
definitely think colleagues are doing their part...But with the mask-wearing and the 
ability for everybody to feel safe, I think for COVID we've come together in that way and 
in a way that we haven't before.” The members of a school district are bound together 
through interconnected mutual dependencies, each member depending on another to 
carry out their responsibilities. People in the organization had a visible reminder of their 
collective responsibility to one another’s health and safety, as seen in masking and 
hygiene procedures, and they could also see people throughout the district following the 
same procedures. By adhering to all of the health and safety procedures, the anxiety and 
vulnerability that people in schools experienced as they worried about contracting the 
virus were reduced.  
In addition to collaborating to carry out health and safety measures, collaboration 
also occurred across schools in SAUQ. A teacher remarked on the recent collaboration 
with colleagues to plan for instruction, using a new and unfamiliar program.  
I've been reaching out to other third grade teachers that are piloting the math 
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program like I am. And again, like we don't get to see each other, but we'll Zoom 
together on our Wednesdays and plan together. So I agree, I think it really has 
kind of put us all—we're all—all of our kids are lower and all of our kids need the 
same kind of things and let's just work together the best we can to help. 
Collaboration during a time when in-person meetings had to be limited is especially 
challenging. Teachers’ willingness to collaborate with other teachers with whom regular 
social exchanges are limited, particularly during the pandemic, is an indication that the 
sense of vulnerability and risk has been reduced and that trust exists between teachers.  
Principals also reported greater collaboration, which is indicative of the presence 
of relational trust. One K-5 principal described their meetings: 
We always reconnect. We have fun with one another and then we also work to try 
to make those difficult decisions. We don't always necessarily agree, I mean, in 
the end we make a decision, but it's not like we always first agree right away. 
Sometimes we don't always agree, but we usually will and we'll work it out to the 
point where we can come to a decision that we all are willing to move forward 
with. 
Superintendent Jacoby also observed greater collaboration between the elementary 
principals, who had previously been less trusting of one another: 
That group has kind of coalesced to be a much more solid, higher functioning 
group of principals than it was. So whereas before we had poker players, right? 
Sitting in the meeting, waiting to see who was going to give up one…’Because 
I'm not losing my PE teacher this year!’ They're much more collaborative... in 
terms of ‘Let's work together on a budget, and then we'll make a joint proposal.’ 
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So instead of a singleton asking for things, hoping they'll get to keep 
them...they're much more like, ‘Okay, we're going to make our proposal jointly on 
the way we'd like things to go.’  
Throughout the pandemic, the K-5 team of principals worked together and, as trust grew 
between the members of the team, members experienced a greater social affiliation with 
one another in the group, as seen in their willingness to submit a budget proposal as a 
group, leading to a willingness to put the needs of the organizational team—the K-5 
team—ahead of school-based needs.  
 Finally, when relational trust is present, “the myriad social exchanges that make 
up daily life in a school community fuse into distinct social patterns that can generate 
organization-wide resources” (Bryk & Schneider, 2003, p. 42). Superintendent Jacoby 
expressed his belief that such collective trust can result in organization-wide resources, 
when he observed: 
You can do a lot more than you think you can, and you can put up with and 
withstand a lot more than you think you can. And I think when we're all trying 
sometimes you discover that your darkest hour is your finest hour. And I think we 
found out this year that even though we've had this impossible set of 
circumstances imposed upon us, people have risen to the challenge. And you can 
do it; you can do a lot more than you think you can. 
“Are we doing what's best for kids?” - When Relational Trust is Diminished. 
Relational trust requires attention and can be fragile, particularly during periods of crisis 
and quickly evolving circumstances. Reflecting on her work with principals in the fall 
follow a period of decisions and changing guidance, the assistant superintendent observed 
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the fragility of relational trust in the administrative leadership team:  
It's sort of like that whole relationship piece that I mentioned—it's like you build 
it and then you know you get focused on moving things forward, but you lose 
sight of that for a minute or you forget the impact of what one decision could do 
and that can crumble in an instant. 
 
Personal regard for others leads to a stronger sense of a school community, 
characterized by people willing to extend themselves beyond expectations. Conversely, 
when personal regard for others or any of the other considerations are not discerned in the 
intentions of people in the organization, relational trust is diminished or absent. Leaders, 
particularly principals, play a vital role in establishing relational trust because they set the 
tone by consistently demonstrating respect and positive regard for others. When a leader's 
expressions of respect or positive regard are perceived as insincere, trust is inhibited. One 
teacher observed, “You get kind of this blanket email of, ‘You all are great.’ That really 
sort of actually makes me feel worse...Somehow, that feels very hollow.” Another teacher 
added: 
I think as teachers, we all know that if we can find one special thing in every one 
of our students and we will say something to that child about, ‘Oh, I like the way 
you do this…’  so, it feels special to them, an administrator can easily do that to 
their teachers, but they don't. What we get is, ‘Thanks for all you do.’ I hate that 
term because it's like, ‘Well, what am I doing? You tell me what I'm doing and 
maybe I'll feel better from that.’ But.. I don't know...normally doesn't bother me, 
but this year it does. This year is like the morale is pretty low and we just need 
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something - a little something. 
 
 In the absence of relational trust, particularly when a leader’s integrity and 
competence are questioned, there is greater resistance to change and a diminished 
willingness to engage in collective decision making or to buy-in to subsequent changes. 
This was observed in teachers’ observations. One teacher noted: 
It seems like the decisions that are being made are based on one person's belief 
and whoever our principal wants to listen to for that day. And I don't feel like 
there's a whole lot of deep thinking about how it's going to impact the students, 
especially the families and the teachers. And I worry more about the families than 
anything because things are constantly changing and no thought to what the 
families are going through. 
Another teacher added, “I think sometimes the reason a decision gets made is because the 
loudest voice didn't like the other decision and that that's just like, come on, what are we 
doing? Are we doing what's best for kids?” As teachers question the rationale behind a 
decision, they are less inclined to accept and implement the decision.  
In the absence of clear expectations, trust in the leader and in the larger system is 
also eroded. Without clear expectations for how teachers should manage their virtual 
students, teachers began to establish their own expectations and collaborate less with 
colleagues. One teacher reflected:  
I used to—when we had our virtual days, I Zoomed with all my students. And I 
found out nobody else was. And I was like, ‘Well, shoot! If nobody else was 
Zooming with their kids…’ So...I have an open zoom link, so if kids need 
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help...but...when we get to the expectation piece, this is a problem. 
Another teacher explained, “Within my department, we handle remote days four different 
ways.” A teacher concluded the discussion by noting:  
Expectations are always nice, especially when it comes to [expectations in a 
virtual setting], because when you have some teachers that do one thing and other 
teachers that do another, it does create gossip among parents. It creates trouble 
amongst teams.  
 
 Relational trust is built through day-to-day social exchanges (Bryk & Schneider, 
2002). The COVID-19 pandemic and the social distancing requirements changed how 
these day-to-day exchanges took place, but such exchanges still occurred and through 
these exchanges, a leader’s integrity, respect, benevolence, and competence were 
discerned. When any of these considerations were lacking or perceived to be absent, 
relational trust was diminished. When relational trust was absent or adversely affected, 
stakeholders questioned the leader’s decision-making motives and felt uncertain about 
decisions. 
Summary 
My research examined the actions that leaders in a complex system—a school 
district—undertook to achieve coordination and coherence throughout the district as they 
navigated new and changing circumstances resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
study examined the actions, perceptions, and experiences of leaders and teachers in a 
small district in Maine. 
My research suggests that, while district leaders acted to achieve coordination and 
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coherence by centralizing decisions and establishing a decision-making process, and 
reorienting the resources and policies to achieve coherence, there were factors that acted 
to facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of these actions. I have organized the summary of 
my findings by examining how these factors affected the district’s actions. 
Relational trust was the most consequential factor. When it was present at high 
levels, members reported a common purpose and a willingness to go beyond what was 
expected to support colleagues or the school. Conversely, when relational trust was 
diminished, members of the organization experienced greater anxiety, frustration, and 
vulnerability. Consequently, members who trusted neither their leader nor the 
organization experienced isolation and a sense of being disconnected from the school or 
district.  
When examining the role that relational trust played on centralization and 
decision making, a key finding was that when trust in the principal and district leaders 
was high, those affected by the decisions and changes—including principals, teachers and 
staff—were better able to accept decisions, including decisions that were made outside of 
their immediate school community. In these cases, the trust that members of the 
organization had in the leader allowed them to ask clarifying questions and raise concerns 
directly to the leader. In schools, the principals often acted as bridge leaders for teachers 
to the central office, as they conveyed teachers’ concerns and questions and also were 
able to provide explanations reflecting the district’s position or rationale for the decision. 
This two-way communication contributed to a sense of trust that teachers had in 
principals because in having their concerns conveyed, teachers believed their concerns 
were heard and taken seriously. The two-way communication also flowed from the 
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district office back to the building, reinforcing those centralized decisions. When trust in 
leaders and in the organization was present, generating the will to implement the change 
was improved, as this two-way communication across the layers of the organization 
contributed to the likelihood that stakeholders understood what the change entailed and 
accepted the rationale for the change.  
In schools where trust in the principal was not as strong, the findings suggest that 
teachers were more likely to question both the leader’s decisions and the leader’s 
intention. Weak relational trust prior to the COVID-19 pandemic was found to remain 
weak throughout the pandemic. In these cases, the teachers discerned the leader’s actions 
as a reflection of a lack of competence or integrity, which diminished their willingness to 
accept decisions and directions from the leader. This led to inconsistencies between 
teachers and a lower sense of coherence.  
Interpersonal relational trust was found to be related to organizational trust. When 
members of the organization expressed trust in a leader, that trust was more likely to 
extend to the larger organization. As the district worked to reorient the organization to 
better align resources, trust played a role in how stakeholders perceived and interpreted 
these changes. While central office leaders were able to interact more regularly with 
principals, the social distancing requirements meant that they were less visible than prior 
to the pandemic. The absence of the day-to-day social exchanges between central office 
leaders and building-level teachers contributed to an initial sense of “us and them” 
articulated by some participants. As the year progressed, however, and more exchanges 
occurred - in person and virtually - and as there were fewer unknowns related to the virus 
and the operation of schools, the impact of the diminished social exchanges was greatly 




With each passing week, different questions arose associated with those normal 
events of a school year, including parent/teacher conferences, grading, and kindergarten 
screening. At the same time, the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and guidance from 
external policy domains affected school operations and the decisions affecting all aspects 
of school.  The existence or absence of relational trust was found to be associated with 
how teachers understood the stream of changes in practice or procedure. In low-trust 
settings, the changes in direction were met with frustration, confusion, and exasperation 
and were sometimes attributed to what they perceived as the leader’s low competence. In 
high-trust settings, changes in directions were met with less resistance. Questions and 
concerns were relayed to the principal or to the assistant superintendent because there 
was the perception that these questions would be heard and responded to. In these cases, 
these leaders acted as bridges between the layers of the district.  
 When schools suddenly were forced to close their doors and pivot to emergency 
remote learning within a week, district leaders found themselves confronting issues and 
answering questions that were entirely novel. As district and school leaders made 
decisions and adopted procedures, they had to navigate the complex organizational 
structure of a school district. A district’s nested layers meant that as decisions and 
messages crossed each layer, there was an opportunity for interpretation, adaptation, and, 
in some cases, misconstruing.  
Leaders acted to bridge the layers, aiding in clarifying messages and expectations, 
and ensuring consistency. And, in other cases, leaders acted to buffer the impact of a 
directive or a mandate. During the pandemic, the superintendent of SAUQ served as a 
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bridge and a buffer, depending on the origin of the demand. However, his bridging 
leadership was seen most prominently in his work with those entities on the outermost 
layers of the organization, including the School Board, the representatives of the 
association, and state agencies, including the Maine Department of Education. The 
assistant superintendent acted as a bridge leader, spanning the layers between central 
office and buildings, often working most closely with principals, but also working 
directly with teachers. In her role as a bridge leader, Ms. Sampson addressed issues, 
answered questions, and facilitated collaborative work, particularly with groups of 
principals. The support that bridge leaders provide runs from central office to the schools 
and throughout the district, and it also aids in the flow of information from schools and 
the district back to central office. Such efficient flow of information is associated with 
coherence in school districts (Chrispeels et al., 2008; Honig, 2009; Elmore, 2014).  
Bridge leaders served a vital role in both centralizing decisions and in the 
decision-making process. Bridge leaders were able to cross the layers of the organization 
to meet with colleagues to answer questions and problem solve. During the pandemic, 
building leaders confronted new challenges continually and the bridge leader was able to 
act as a sounding board and thought partner, while also maintaining the decision-making 
authority of central office. Bridge leaders also acted to interpret and clarify decisions that 
were made. These leaders were considered highly accessible to principals, allowing the 
bridge leader to support the principal while also providing clarification and reinforcement 
of those decisions that had been made, ensuring greater consistency of implementation. 
Finally, the consistency of the district’s communication to members of the system 
was found to reinforce the decisions by providing a reliable and predictable avenue for 
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the flow of information. Centralized communication contributed to a sense of coherence 
because it was used to generate will.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 The purpose of this research was to describe and analyze how school and district 
leaders in a small school district collaborated to coordinate their responses to the myriad 
challenges that arose during the COVID-19 pandemic and to implement and sustain 
system-wide changes. This study examined the experiences, decisions, and actions of 
district and school leaders in the days leading up to the shift to emergency remote 
learning in the spring, 2020, and the subsequent planning and implementation of changes 
required to allow a school system to operate during a pandemic during the 2020-2021 
school year. Using a grounded theory approach, this research identified actions that 
leaders took to achieve coordination and coherence in the district, including centralizing 
decisions, establishing a decision-making process, and reorienting the district’s focus to 
meet the necessary health, safety and wellness protocols and to allocate resources to align 
with this focus. The study also examined the factors that contributed to or hindered 
coordination and coherence, including relational trust, communication, and the work of 
leaders to bridge the layers of the district. To understand the district’s role in educational 
reform, this study examined how the district acted as an institutional actor in carrying out 
systemic reform (Rorrer et al., 2008). The research also examined the connections 
between central office and schools to elucidate the tension between centralized and 
decentralized controls and decision making (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Johnson et al., 
2015). The role that relational trust (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Tschannen-Moran & 
Gareis, 2015; Handford & Leithwood, 2013) played in the effective implementation of 
the changes necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic was also explored. This research 
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was situated in a small district in Maine, a state where educational decision-making is 
locally controlled.  
 The data for the study were collected from interviews with four administrators—
two district-level and two building-level—and a group of teacher leaders. The district met 
the study criteria, as it enrolled more than 1,000 students, had a central office leadership 
structure that included an assistant superintendent or curriculum director, and had a 
superintendent with three years of tenure in the district. The building-level leaders were 
principals from two of the elementary schools in the district. The administrators and 
teacher leaders participated in three in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place 
in summer, 2020, late fall, 2020, and winter, 2021. The participants provided thoughtful 
and insightful reflections on their experiences in the district during the COVID-19 
pandemic. In addition to interviews, school board meetings were observed, and relevant 
documents were reviewed. These multiple sources of data lend validity to the discussion 
of the key findings presented below.  
Discussion of Key Findings 
 Key findings from the study were identified by analyzing participants’ reports of 
their experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic relative to their role in the district to 
understand how the actions of leaders contributed to a sense of coherence and 
coordination during this period of significant educational upheaval. This study sought to 
answer the overarching question: how do district leaders achieve coordination and 
coherence in complicated systems comprising many schools, each with its own culture, in 
order to implement and sustain change. The findings address the research questions in the 
context of the actions taken by leaders to achieve coordination and coherence, and the 
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factors that affected coordination and coherence. The key findings also draw connections 
to the literature to deepen the interpretation of the findings in an effort to ground the 
findings in a larger body of research.  
Actions that Enhance Coordination and Coherence 
Reorienting the District. Reorienting the district involves refining structures and 
processes to align with the reform goals (Rorrer et al., 2008). The initial shift to 
emergency remote learning forced SAUQ to examine existing practices and resources, 
redirecting them to address needs of families and students. The closing of schools to in-
person learning meant that schools’ initial priorities shifted from education to addressing 
basic needs of students, families, and staff. In the first days following the closure of 
schools, districts, including SAUQ, redirected human and physical resources to redesign 
food service programs to accommodate food deliveries and community food pick-up 
locations. Teachers and administrators in SAUQ reported the challenge of finding and 
connecting with students, expressing growing concern for those students who could not 
be located. Kaul and her colleagues (2020) found that from April through August, 
building and district leaders across the United States reported similar experiences and 
also sought to prioritize addressing the basic needs of students, families and staff. 
Administrators in SAUQ recognized that, for many students, school was a stable place 
where they could get their basic, as well as their social and emotional, needs met. 
According to research by Hoffman and Miller (2020), in addition to addressing food 
insecurity, schools facilitate access and provide basic health care to students by 
administering medications, conducting screenings, administering vaccinations, and 
managing chronic health conditions, like asthma. These researchers found that schools 
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also provide a continuum of mental health services to children, including prevention and 
intervention. In the absence of access to these resources in the school building, districts 
were forced to try to create new structures and to realign resources to try to address these 
needs.  
 In addition to addressing students’ basic needs, schools also directed resources to 
address technical needs necessary to allow emergency remote learning to take place. 
While students in SAUQ each had their own internet-enabled device, consistent access to 
the internet was less certain. The state provided hotspots that districts could distribute to 
families, but it took time to acquire and distribute these resources and, according to 
administrators in SAUQ, there were areas in the district where the hot spots were not 
effective in establishing connectivity. According to an April, 2020 Pew survey, 20% of 
parents with a student at home at this time reported that access to education was limited 
because of lack of reliable internet (Vogels et al., 2020). Another challenge for districts, 
including SAUQ, was consistent internet access for teachers from their homes, as well as 
deficits in the technical expertise necessary to carry out remote instruction.  
Districts also adjusted expectations, reflecting their understanding that teachers 
and staff were also managing work, caring for their own children, caring for sick family 
members, and learning new ways of teaching in an online context (Kaul et al., 2020). 
Administrators in SAUQ acknowledged these limitations on human resources in the first 
days following the shift to emergency remote learning and modified expectations for 
staff, requiring them to hold office hours but not requiring them to deliver learning 
content.  
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 In the early days of the pandemic, SAUQ reoriented the organization to attend to 
the basic needs of staff members, students, and families. As the initial shock of school 
closures abated and systems for addressing basic needs were established, the district 
again reoriented its focus back to an educational one. During this time, SAUQ leaders 
increased the frequency of their administrative team meetings, clarified decision-making 
procedures, and identified issues that would need to be addressed to plan for the return to 
school in the fall. The small size of the district’s central office led district leaders to adopt 
different and sometimes overlapping responsibilities. Responding to the changing needs 
throughout the organization, the district’s assistant superintendent assumed primary 
communication responsibilities, as well as addressing questions related to personnel 
matters, which were usually addressed by the human resources director. In addition, the 
superintendent engaged in more “hands-on” tasks, including directly addressing concerns 
about school operations, which had typically been handled by principals or the facilities 
director. By assuming these different roles and responsibilities, district leaders strengthen 
resource linkages between the district and the schools by providing material, technology, 
and human capital to schools (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010; Hubbard et al., 2020; Honig, 
2009).  
 District leaders also acted to achieve coherence by clarifying the district’s goals, 
aligning resources to meet these goals, and managing external entities that could distract 
or interfere with the focus on the goals. As SAUQ planned to reopen, the superintendent 
and members of the central office team adopted a mantra, “Stay safe. Stay open,” that 
became the focus for the year. This motto captures the essence of the underlying health 
and safety protocols, mandated by the state, and adopted by the district, and served as the 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
158 
rationale for subsequent decisions related to in-person learning and the plan for co-
curricular sports. In addition to the “Stay safe. Stay open.” mantra, the administrative 
leadership in SAUQ—in collaboration with participants on the ad hoc committees—
established the Re-Entry Planning Framework: Priorities. These reflected the district’s 
established priorities, as well as additional priorities necessitated by the COVID-19 
pandemic. These priorities guided decisions about resource allocation and contributed to 
coherence (Honig & Hatch, 2004). By attending to what Johnson and her colleagues 
(2015) referred to as the organizational elements, including resources, systems, and 
structures, that operate in the relationship between central offices and their schools, 
districts are able to meet goals more consistently and are more likely to operate 
coherently. By reorienting the district’s systems, such as their leadership team meetings, 
and structures, including the roles and responsibilities that leaders assumed, and 
realigning resources, including physical and human resources, SAUQ was able to work 
more coherently toward realizing the district’s goals.  
District Orientation Toward Centralization Before Pandemic; Centralization 
During Pandemic. In a study of five large urban districts, Johnson et al. (2015) analyzed 
the relationships between central offices and their schools. Johnson and her colleagues 
found that the relationship between a district’s central office and its schools was more 
important to achieving coherence than a district’s orientation toward centralization or 
decentralization, or school-based autonomy. Because Johnson et al.’s research (2015) 
examined large districts, with enrollments ranging from 70,000 to 160,000 students, some 
of the challenges to coherence they cited were not observed in SAUQ, a district serving 
fewer than 2,000 students. Nevertheless, even in the smaller district, the role of 
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centralized decision-making was less directly associated with coherence than the 
relationship between the district and schools. Prior to the pandemic, the relationship 
between central office and schools was characterized by collaboration and regular 
communication. The full administrative team met regularly to address logistical 
considerations, and individual building leaders met with the central office administrators 
to review school-based goals and progress toward these goals. These structures and 
established practices of collaborative problem solving allowed the members of the 
administrative team to meet frequently throughout the pandemic to ask questions and 
resolve issues. In their study of 120 principals in 19 states between April and August of 
2020, Hubbard et al. (2020) found that during the COVID-19 pandemic, collaboration 
between the district and its schools was essential and district and building leaders 
“recognized which services were more effectively planned and delivered centrally and 
those that needed more nuanced and individualized attention and took advantage of both 
of these system strengths” (p. 9).  
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders in SAUQ maintained their 
centralized strategy of decision making and resource allocation. This centralized 
orientation was already established, as observed in centrally-directed academic 
programming that was consistent across grade levels throughout the system. During the 
pandemic, the district established a decision-making process for the administrative team 
that articulated the levels at which decisions were made. As the district began its planning 
for the fall, they invited groups of administrators and teachers to serve on ad hoc 
committees to examine some of the issues that arose during emergency remote learning 
in the spring and to propose procedures and expectations for the fall. These committees 
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weighed a range of issues, including identifying common technology platforms, 
establishing staff work expectations, examining grade-level performance indicators, 
assessment, attendance, and engagement criteria. These committees made 
recommendations for the superintendent to approve. Throughout the 2020-2021 school 
year, members of SAUQ’s administrative team engaged in collaborative decision making. 
The frequency of the meetings of the full administrative team, composed of central office 
and school-based leaders, led to increased opportunities to discuss and collaborate on 
decisions that needed to be made. While the superintendent maintained decision-making 
authority, many decisions—including whether the K-5 schools should return to five days 
of in-person learning class time following the winter break—were made in consultation 
with and through reaching consensus between the building-level leaders. By 
incorporating the voices of school administrators as well as different stakeholders 
throughout the district, district leaders were able to generate will (Rorrer, 2008), 
individual buy-in and commitment (Johnson & Chrispeels, 2010) for establishing 
consistent expectations across the district.  
The Role of Networks and System Coherence. The pace, scope and novelty of 
decisions related to the COVID-19 pandemic drove building and district leaders to access 
networks of colleagues, in and out of the district, to collaborate and share experiences and 
ideas. Research examining leadership in extreme contexts identifies the importance of 
social resources, including social networks and boundary spanners, to connect networks 
to external resources (Hannah et al., 2009). Within SAUQ, principals from the K-5 
schools began meeting weekly, in addition to the full-district administrative team 
meetings. Principals reported that this network—this team of colleagues—was 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
161 
instrumental in answering questions, solving problems, and sharing experiences. District 
leaders observed the collaboration between these administrators, noting that they were a 
cohesive group that had really come together during this time. 
District leaders also sought a network of colleagues for support and to gain insight 
into others’ experiences. Whereas the K-5 principals in SAUQ gained insights and 
information, as well as a sense of group affiliation from one another, the superintendent 
reported accessing networks of other superintendents and leaders from Maine DOE for 
information and organizational resources, including technical guidance. The 
superintendent’s description of his contact with these networks is consistent with 
bridging leadership, or boundary spanning, as he worked with the members of these 
external entities in order to bring information back into the district (Honig, 2006; Hannah 
et al., 2009).  
Members in these networks collaborated to answer questions and share 
experiences and plans. Coburn and Russell (2008) used the term tie span as a dimension 
of the structure of social networks that crosses social, subgroup, and organizational 
boundaries in order to access information that is not readily accessible in a system. As 
members in networks shared ideas, experiences, and plans, the tendency to conform or 
adopt greater homogeneity increased. This was consistent with reports from the K-5 
principals, who identified the need to have consistency across schools or to be “on the 
same page.” Such a driver toward homogeneity or uniformity limited an individual’s 
principal’s ability to act independently of the group. The superintendent in SAUQ also 
noted the pressure to coordinate decision making across districts in the region, 
particularly related to the decision to close to in-person schooling in March, 2020.  
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Summarizing the Actions that Enhance Coordination and Coherence. The 
district’s orientation toward centralization was not a strong determinant of a district 
achieving coordination or coherence. While SAUQ adopted strategies and procedures 
that originated centrally and were diffused out to the system, centralization was not 
synonymous with top-down decision making. Instead, the small size of the district 
allowed for increased collaboration between members of the administrative team. This 
team worked together to reach consensus on decisions, and in cases when consensus 
could not be reached, the superintendent made the final decision. Such collaborative 
decision making that incorporates the voices of other members of the organization is not 
consistent with the definition of centralization or radical decentralization (Johnson et al., 
2015). While the district’s authority over budgeting, staffing, and academic programming 
was consistent with a centralized orientation, centralization does not sufficiently describe 
how decisions were made during the pandemic. Throughout this period, when there was 
increased uncertainty, decision makers were driven toward consistency and uniformity 
across the district and throughout the region. Collaboration with colleagues within the 
system and in other districts to examine issues and reach agreement characterized the 
decision-making process during the pandemic. Consistency between schools and districts 
reduced risk for leaders who reported being overwhelmed by the volume, range, and 
scale of novel decisions (Brackett et al., 2020). This drive toward homogeneity and 
consistency imposed similar limitations on school decision-making autonomy as seen in 
centrally oriented districts. 
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Factors that Enhanced or Hindered Coordination and Coherence 
 Relational Trust. The COVID-19 pandemic placed extraordinary stress on 
school systems and the administrators, teachers, and staff working in them (Kurtz, 2020; 
Kaul, 2020; Hoffman & Miller, 2020). In addition, though schools in SAUQ provided in-
person learning four days each week for the K-5 students, and every other day for 
students at the secondary level, the altered school schedule also imposed a significant 
disruption to students and families. Many decisions resulted in changes that affected 
stakeholders throughout the organization. According to Rorrer et al. (2008), one of the 
roles that a district, as an institutional actor, plays is to provide instructional leadership. 
In its role of instructional leadership, districts must generate the will to reform, which 
involves conveying the rationale for the change, and build the capacity to carry out the 
reform. During the crisis of the pandemic, there was no question that changes needed to 
be made. Thus, generating will in this situation involved persuading stakeholders, 
including teachers and members of the community, that any particular decision was the 
most appropriate given the changing circumstances. SAUQ used a collaborative problem-
solving process in the ad hoc committees to produce the return to school plan. According 
to participants, this was a productive process where participants understood the changes 
and felt engaged in the final recommendations. In the fall, as these plans were carried out, 
the focus shifted to capacity building and ensuring that resources were in place to enable 
teachers and staff to carry out the reform.  
 Teachers’ willingness or commitment to adopt the changes and their sense of 
capacity or efficacy—the knowledge and the skills to carry out the change—was related 
to their trust in the leader and the organization. While relational trust applies to the 
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organization, it begins with interpretations and discernments that an individual leader's 
actions or words are indicative of trustworthiness (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). During the 
COVID-19 pandemic when there was increased uncertainty, stakeholders looked to 
leaders’ actions to assess a number of characteristics, including competence, which was 
discerned by the leader’s ability to get the task done as expected. Leaders in SAUQ 
demonstrated functional competence in the planning and implementation of the health 
and safety measures and myriad new day-to-day school operations that allowed students 
and staff to attend school in-person as safely as possible. Interpersonal relational trust 
was established and strengthened by the day-to-day social exchanges. Participants 
described casual interactions—between colleagues, between principals and teachers, 
between building and district leaders, and between teachers and district leaders—that led 
to increased understanding of why a decision was made and how to carry out change. In 
cases where the leader’s actions were perceived as respectful, sincere, competent, and 
reflective of concerns for others, participants expressed increased trust in the leader. This 
was evident in teachers’ descriptions of their principal, in principals’ descriptions of 
district leaders, and in principals’ reports of parent feedback. Relational trust was also 
observed in the interactions between the members of the school board and the 
superintendent.  
 While relational trust has been associated with increased student achievement 
(Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015), it also serves as the 
“‘lubricant’ for most interactions in the organization” (Fukuyama, 1995, as cited in 
Handford & Leithwood, 2013). In instances where participants’ reports reflected 
relational trust, participants also reported more collaboration with colleagues, a sense of a 
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common purpose, and increased efficacy. This is consistent with the research about 
outcomes associated with relational trust, which indicates that relational trust leads to 
broad diffusion of the reform across the system, as well as a commitment or will to carry 
out the reform. Relational trust is also associated with a sense of affiliation with the 
group, leading to a willingness of stakeholders to extend themselves beyond the 
expectations (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Coburn & Russell, 2008; Leithwood et al., 2019). 
Evidence of such affiliation and prosocial behavior was found in participants’ reports of 
helping others and an increased sense of closeness with colleagues arising from a sense of 
sharing a common, challenging experience. 
 Conversely, in cases where a leader’s competence, integrity, or genuine concern 
for students or teachers was in doubt, participants expressed frustration about the leader 
or about the policies and practices. Participants who expressed such frustrations were also 
more likely to report that they did not have confidence that the leaders were acting in the 
best interest of the staff or the students. Whereas participants in high-trust environments 
reported collaborating with colleagues and a willingness to extend themselves to support 
colleagues, those participants who experienced less trust were more likely to report 
working in isolation and arriving at their own interpretation of the expectation or change 
after talking to colleagues. Collaboration is associated with dense social networks, which 
facilitate the diffusion of information and capacity to carry out the reform across a system 
(Coburn & Russell, 2008). Relational trust is a vital precursor for a district to achieve 
coordination and coherence. It is also necessary to enable a leader and an organization to 
generate the will to reform and to build the capacity to carry out the reform. “The extent 
to which teachers are willing to authentically further their districts’ goals and vision may 
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depend as much on the perceived trustworthiness and support of central office leaders as 
on the forms of control and coordination enacted by those leaders” (Leithwood, 2019, p. 
533). 
 Bridge Leaders and Communication. Two other factors that contributed to 
district coordination and coherence were the effectiveness of bridge leadership and 
communication throughout the nested layers of the system. Moreover, there is a 
compounding effect, as the impact of bridge leadership and communication is directly 
affected by the presence or absence of relational trust. School districts, even smaller 
districts, are complex organizations made up of nested layers arranged hierarchically. 
These nested layers include classroom teachers in the deepest layer, with radiating layers 
including grade level or departments, principals and schools, district entities—including 
special education, English Language Learner programs, and food service—and central 
office at the outermost layer. Organizationally, the role responsibilities at each layer are 
defined, but the layers themselves act as a barrier to coordination and coherence, as they 
insulate one layer from the effects of the other. Nevertheless, each layer is dependent on 
and affected by the others and the system, as a whole (Weick, 1976).  
This organizational structure of a district, which is situated in a larger state and 
federal organization, poses a challenge to coordination and coherence, as each layer acts 
as a barrier to communicating complex information and diffusing resources—human, 
social, and physical—across the system. In addition to insulating, each layer also acts as a 
filter where information could be interpreted, modified, or blocked. Reeves (2009) 
described a “telephone” effect, named after the children’s game, to describe the problem 
of communicating a change across the layers of a school system: 
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In the adult version of the game, the superintendent whispers to the deputy, who 
then whispers the same—or almost the same—story to the assistant 
superintendent. The story—or a pretty close variation of it—is repeated to 
principals who pass it along—or something fairly close—to the assistant 
principals, who, if they have time, will attempt to recall what they heard to 
department heads and grade-level leaders who may share it with faculty members. 
Months later, the superintendent is shocked to learn that the change initiative that 
was crystal clear when they first announced it is, at the classroom level, shrouded 
in mystery or wildly distorted. (p. 50) 
This characterization reflects the structural and interpersonal challenge to communicating 
information—even simple information—across the layers of the system.  
 SAUQ established an articulated communication strategy, identifying the assistant 
superintendent as the “one voice” that would convey messages from the district office to 
the staff. In addition, the frequent administrative team meetings—made up of all building 
and district administrators—provided another avenue for ensuring consistent 
communication by essentially reducing the number of layers through which the message 
would pass. Nevertheless, participants reported that building-level leaders interpreted the 
same messages differently. The effect that an individual’s understanding of the change 
initiative has on implementation is well documented by established research (Glennan, 
2004; Spillane, 2004; Cuban, 1998). During the pandemic, accurate messaging of 
changes was also affected by the dynamic nature of the pandemic, the complexity of the 
information, and the social distancing guidelines that limited the nature of social 
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exchanges. While each of these posed a real and substantial challenge to communication, 
the existence of relational trust acted as the first layer through which the message passed.  
 Trusting interpersonal relationships, based on prior social interactions, reduce risk 
and vulnerability among stakeholders and may also increase the frequency and depth of 
social exchanges, leading to an increased willingness in members to engage (Daly & 
Finnigan, 2012; Tschannen-Moran & Gareis, 2015). During the pandemic, the sense of 
risk was heightened, as members throughout the district reported a decreased sense of 
efficacy and an increased sense of uncertainty, leading to anxiety. In such conditions, 
establishing the relational trust necessary to engage in new social exchanges necessary 
for establishing the social networks across which a message could be conveyed was 
especially challenging. As a result, bridge leaders became especially important. Bridge 
leaders, when perceived as trustworthy, were able to span layers, addressing questions 
and, in essence, providing stakeholders with another avenue to ask questions, thus 
reducing risk and vulnerability. 
 Even when trust was present, however, leaders were still required to consider how 
messages would be conveyed. An intervening problem arose when leaders in SAUQ 
observed that the volume, scale, and scope of the decisions sometimes resulted in 
members of the same administrative team leaving a meeting where a decision had been 
made, only to interpret it differently, change their mind about whether or not they could 
support the decision, or have questions that slowed the implementation. Once this 
problem was identified, district leaders worked to revisit decisions to check for 
understanding and to give people time to raise concerns or to talk about how their 
thinking may have changed. The superintendent reflected that, while this was the 
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intention, the volume of the decisions, and the immediacy of some of them, often did not 
allow time for this feedback loop. In these cases, participants reported seeking out bridge 
leaders to continue to process the decision or to ask clarifying questions. Such a feedback 
loop, facilitated by bridge leaders, enhanced coherence as information and decisions were 
clarified, allowing for greater consistency across the system. 
When decisions were made but not consistently applied across schools in the 
same organization, this inconsistency was interpreted differently, depending on whether 
or not relational trust was present. Those participants in high-trust schools and parts of 
the organization, reported greater capacity to tolerate uncertainty, attributing the changes 
to the pandemic, whereas those in low-trust schools or parts of the organization were 
more likely to attribute the changes and uncertainty to a leader’s perceived lack of 
competence.  
 Summarizing the Factors that Enhanced or Hindered Coordination and 
Coherence. While district SAUQ established procedures and structures during the 
COVID-19 pandemic to coordinate decision making and communicate decisions 
throughout the district, certain factors, particularly the presence or absence of relational 
trust, worked to enhance or hinder coordination and coherence. While the nested nature 
of districts’ organizational structures posed a challenge to effectively conveying complex 
information through each of the layers of the organization, the existence or absence of 
relational trust throughout the organization affected these efforts to achieve a coherent 
and coordinated district response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This finding is consistent 
with Johnson and Chrispeels (2010) assertion that the relational and communication 
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linkages between the district’s central office and schools are essential to the successful 
implementation of reforms.  
Summary of Key Findings 
 Throughout this period of unprecedented educational disruption and 
transformation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, districts worked to manage the 
volume, scope, and scale of information and decisions. School district’s organizational 
structures, characterized by nested, interrelated layers, arranged hierarchically and 
situated within a broader educational context of local, state and federal policy domains, 
posed a challenge to achieving coordination and coherence throughout the district during 
this critical period. This study found that while a district can adopt a centralized 
orientation to decision making and resource allocation, such an orientation alone does not 
ensure coordination and coherence across a system. 
 Relational trust in the organization and its leaders is a necessary feature of 
districts or schools where coordination and coherence was achieved. As the actions of the 
leader and the district are discerned to be trustworthy because they reflect competence, 
respect, integrity, and regard for the well-being of all in the organization, the sense of 
vulnerability and risk—particularly during this period of increased uncertainty—is 
reduced and stakeholders are better able to engage in new practices and tolerate 
uncertainty. Relational trust throughout the district also fosters social exchanges that, 
when characterized by respect and concern for the well-being of others, are experienced 
as productive and rewarding, thus reinforcing ongoing social exchanges. These 
exchanges and the resulting relational trust serve as the basis for collaborative problem 
solving, innovation, affiliation with the organization and the people in it, a common sense 
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of purpose, and increased efficacy. Coupled with effective communication and allocation 
of resources, districts are more likely to achieve coordination and coherence across a 
complex school system.  
Recommendations for District and School Leaders  
Achieving coherence in a complex system is a dynamic process between the 
district and its schools, requiring collaboration to manage the demands driving the 
district, balanced with the needs, goals, and strategies of each school (Honig & Hatch, 
2004). Coherence is experienced by members of an organization as “being on the same 
page” or working together toward a common purpose. As an institutional actor, the 
district is made up of an organized collective linked by interrelated and interdependent 
roles, responsibilities, and relationships that promote reforms (Rorrer et al., 2008). Even 
in a small district, the organizational structure is still characterized by hierarchical layers 
and interdependent, loosely-coupled entities, including the schools and departments in the 
district.  
As this research indicates, achieving and maintaining a sense of coherence 
requires an understanding of the district’s complex organizational structure in order to 
purposefully communicate and direct resources and information throughout the district. 
This was especially necessary throughout the COVID-19 pandemic when districts 
managed a series of changing and sometimes contradictory guidance as they shifted to 
emergency remote learning and a return to school in the fall. The changing guidance and, 
as the year wore on, the increasing public pressure to return to in-person learning full 
time, contributed to frequently changing directions from districts, leading to confusion, 
frustration, and anxiety. Relational trust acted as a both a lubricant between entities 
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within the system, and a bulwark against external demands. Throughout the pandemic, 
community members and school boards, in looking to district leaders, have discerned the 
actions and words of leaders as reflecting trustworthiness. Looking ahead, there are a 
number of potential recommendations for leaders interested in achieving coherence 
throughout the district, while being responsive to external demands. I draw from my 
analysis of the case study in the context of extant research to form my recommendations. 
Recommendation #1: Attend to the Relational Trust Throughout the Organization 
 Given the importance of relational trust to the effective functioning of the system, 
leaders would benefit from a purposeful examination of those factors and actions that 
enhance relational trust. Participants cited numerous instances when small actions by a 
leader reflected the existence or absence of competence, integrity, respect, and genuine 
concern for the well-being of others. In cases where trustworthiness was perceived, 
participants also indicated an overall sense of satisfaction in their work—even during this 
challenging year. To that end, it is important for leaders to identify opportunities to 
improve and build relational trust in their district or school.  
 Leaders play a central role in establishing and maintaining relational trust through 
their actions as leaders, but leaders must first be aware of how relational trust is 
established and how it is diminished. Improving leaders’ understanding of relational trust 
and its effect on carrying out initiatives would better situate them to attend to their 
actions such that they exhibit trustworthiness more consistently. As principals direct and 
support new teachers to build their capacity to be effective in their positions, so must 
district leaders purposefully support building level leaders by providing information and 
resources to examine how they can build relational trust throughout their schools. Trust is 
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characterized in part by a leaders’ listening to stakeholders and addressing concerns. 
Leaders, particularly those in small schools and districts, can capitalize on the advantages 
of scale and engage with stakeholders in face-to-face interactions. These interactions 
provide an opportunity for the leader to have meaningful exchanges where they can 
understand the stakeholders’ experiences. Participants identified a leader’s visibility and 
engagement as an indicator that they were aware of and understood the stakeholders’ 
experiences, particularly during the pandemic. While listening in small-group and 
individual exchanges allows a leader to demonstrate respect and concern, soliciting 
feedback from the stakeholders in the organization—the school or district—is another 
action that can provide evidence of trustworthiness. Such an action will provide evidence 
of trustworthiness only if the leader acts upon the feedback, incorporating it into their 
practice. In the absence of a perceptible response to the feedback, however, trust is 
eroded.  
 Leaders can also attend to trust by establishing professional learning networks 
focused on explicit and manageable goals. These learning networks collaborate around a 
common goal or purpose, simultaneously building capacity to meet the goal and 
establishing social networks. Participants stated that experiences collaborating with 
colleagues reduced stress and provided a sense of sharing in the challenges they were 
managing. Professional learning networks are also an effective vehicle to institute and 
reinforce common norms and behaviors, including a focus on student achievement and 
the value placed on collaboration. Increasing opportunities for social exchanges that 
focus on the organization’s common purpose enhance relational trust.  
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
174 
 Finally, leaders must be able to balance advancing the core mission of the district 
and school—meeting the needs of students in order to improve student achievement—
with concern for teachers’ well-being. This tension was expressed by participants in the 
study who reported that some decisions that were clearly in the best interest of the 
students, including returning to school in the fall, caused stress and anxiety for teachers 
who expressed concern about increased risk of exposure to the virus. Principals that 
engendered trust were able to strike a balance by responding to the needs of teachers 
while also maintaining a clear and transparent commitment to their moral-ethical core of 
improving outcomes for students.  
Recommendation #2: Drawing on the Benefits of Social Networks 
 The novelty, volume, and scope of many of the issues that arose during the 
pandemic led leaders to seek support from colleagues in and out of the district to build 
understanding and to engage in collaborative problem solving. Through these frequent 
collaborations, new social networks were established, and existing ones were 
strengthened. Participants reflected on the benefits of such collaborations, noting that 
they provided ideas as well as a community of colleagues engaged in a shared 
experience: leading during a global pandemic. Social networks often span organizational 
entities, like schools or the district, linking people and providing a forum for participants 
to exchange ideas and learn from each other. These networks reflect new connections that 
can be used to more efficiently convey information. In schools, teachers frequently 
organize professional learning networks around a new academic program or to examine 
students’ progress. Attending to the relational linkages that connect people in an 
organization while also building members’ capacity by providing technical assistance to 
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implement a change can be done through social and professional networks where the 
exchange of ideas is associated with improved student achievement (Leithwood et al., 
2019; Coburn & Russell, 2008; Daly et al., 2009).  
 The networking that occurred between district superintendents during the 
COVID-19 pandemic was exceptional because, in a local-control state such as Maine, 
districts are accustomed to acting independently of other districts. During the pandemic, 
however, superintendents from regional districts worked together to coordinate individual 
districts’ planning. This was seen in the initial discussions about whether and when 
districts closed in the spring, 2020; how districts were planning for and reopening 
schools; how districts were grading and reporting during the spring, 2020; and how to 
respond to growing calls to return to full-time in-person classes in the spring, 2021. Other 
leaders throughout the state, including principals and curriculum leaders, also formed 
networks and began to meet regularly throughout the pandemic. While these different 
leaders in Maine regularly met in county or regional groups prior to the pandemic, the 
frequency and purpose of the meetings during the pandemic were markedly different, as 
leaders collaborated and shared resources. 
 When the crisis of the pandemic abates, maintaining these networks in order to 
share resources and promote connections across districts throughout the state will 
continue to be important and could be expanded to include regionalizing some programs 
and services for students.  
Recommendation #3: Maintaining an Equity Focus 
 There is little question that the pandemic has affected communities and students 
differently. Nationally and in Maine, there is evidence that the pandemic has 
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disproportionately affected communities of color, which have experienced higher rates of 
infection and death. In schools, students living low-income homes were more likely to 
have higher rates of truancy and reduced access to internet or devices, and less likely to 
be offered synchronous or live classes while engaging in remote learning (Herold, 2020; 
Hoffman & Miller, 2020). Participants’ concerns about student learning and the adverse 
effects of the pandemic echoed throughout the study. Even prior to the pandemic, the 
achievement gap experienced by economically-disadvantaged students, English 
Language Learners, and students of color was a persistent problem facing districts 
throughout the United States. Based on the initial findings since the beginning of the 
pandemic, it is likely that, for the students in these subgroups, the gap has only grown 
wider. District leaders will need to target federally allocated resources to provide 
programming that supports the varied needs of those students most profoundly affected. 
Drawing upon the resources of the social networks, leaders are in a position to explore 
innovative ways to address and meet the needs of students by partnering with other 
districts to provide regional programming for students.  
Recommendations for Further Research and Policy Implications 
 This study adds to the body of research related to the role of the district and its 
leaders in implementing and sustaining changes. By examining the roles played by 
leaders in the context of the district organization during the COVID-19 pandemic, this 
research provides distinctive insights about the factors that enhance and hinder achieving 
coherence in the implementation of reform. Research demonstrates that trust in the 
district and its leaders is a crucial component in successfully carrying out changes, 
particularly during a crisis characterized by increased and prolonged uncertainty, but 
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additional research is needed to better understand how trust in an individual leader 
extends to the organization.  
 One additional area of future research is the effect of the newly-strengthened 
social networks connecting educators across Maine on decision making and the 
development and delivery of programs. While the pandemic drove schools and districts to 
align and homogenize policies to present a “unified front” to the public, it is unclear to 
what extent some of these practices will endure beyond the pandemic. Though district 
leaders may experience reduced pressure to compare as many operational practices as 
they have throughout the pandemic, the collaboration and resource sharing that has 
occurred will likely continue as relational trust has been established throughout these 
networks. Such collaboration spanning districts and policy domains offers the promise of 
economies of scale enjoyed by large districts and rarely experienced by the small, locally 
controlled districts in Maine. In the event that such collaboration continues, examining 
how these linkages between districts affect policies and instruction practices may be an 
interesting area of future study.  
 Although relational trust is difficult to measure, a leader’s ability to cultivate 
relational trust, interpersonally and organizationally, is a skill that is consequential to 
their effectiveness as a leader. While the state has limited authority to dictate the specifics 
of a district’s performance evaluation and professional growth (PEPG) system, 
consideration should be given to how this quality can be incorporated into the leadership 
standards that are used to assess administrative leadership.  




 The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze how school and district 
leaders collaborated to coordinate their responses to the many challenges that arose 
during the COVID-19 pandemic amid the need to implement and sustain coherent 
system-wide changes. The findings indicated that a district’s strong centralized 
orientation to decision making and resource allocation was not as strongly related to 
coherence as was the presence of relational trust in the district and its leader. Bryk and 
Schneider (2003) summarized the role of trust in schools, “Good schools depend heavily 
on cooperative endeavors. Relational trust is the connective tissue that binds individuals 
together to advance the education and welfare of students” (p. 44). The existence of trust 
enhanced communication and collaboration, which contributed to broad diffusions of 
knowledge across the system. When members of a school or district find the organization 
trustworthy, they are more likely to adopt a reform as the right thing to do. And in a high-
trust district, the district, as an institutional actor, is able to provide instructional 
leadership, reorient the organization, establish policy coherence, and maintain an equity 
focus to implement and sustain a reform with greater coherence across the system. 
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Semi-Structured Interviews Protocol #1 
All Participants 
Introductions 
Explanation of the structure of the interview 
This interview is focused on your leadership in SAU Q prior to and after the shift to 
emergency remote learning, necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While schools 
have remained open for emergency remote learning, we will use the term “school 
closure” synonymously with emergency remote learning. 
 
In my research, I am particularly interested in how leaders carry out system-wide 
changes, including external mandates, navigating the layers of education—federal, 
state, regional, district, school, and classroom. The research will also examine how 
decisions are made within and throughout the district, and how resources are 
coordinated to carry out the change and establish coherence. 
Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader Focus 
Group 
Tell me about 
yourself and your 
background, 
including how you 
came to be the 
Superintendent in 
SAUQ. 
Tell me about 
yourself and your 
background. How 
long have you 
worked in SAUQ? 
What was your path 
to this position? 
Tell me about 
yourself and your 
background. How 
long have you been 
principal at ___ 
school. 
Introduce yourself 
and tell me where you 
work, what you teach, 
and how long you 
have been in the 
district. 
What do you take pride in as an administrator? In what ways do you 
share or promote these things? 
 
Not Asked 
What do you struggle with as an administrator and leader? How do 
you navigate these challenges? 
 
Not Asked 
Looking at the organizational structure of your 
central office, it appears your team includes 
the [list those in central office]. Are there 
other people you would include in a 
description of your CO team?  
● How do the members of this team 
work together?  
● How do they work with the principals 
of the schools? 
Not Asked Not Asked 
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Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader Focus 
Group 
How was the decision 
to close back in 
March made? 
Describe the days 
leading up to and 
immediately 
following the 
decision to shift to 
emergency remote 
learning. How have 
your responsibilities 
changed? 
Describe the days 
leading up to and 
immediately 
following the 
decision to shift to 
emergency remote 
learning (ERL). What 
did you focus on? 
What were your 
priorities? 
Describe the days 
leading up to and 
immediately 
following the 
decision to shift to 
emergency remote 
learning (ERL). What 
did you focus on? 
What were your 
priorities? 
In the initial days following the closure, how 
did the members of your leadership team—in 
CO and in buildings—work together to make 
decisions?  
How did you and 
have you led your 
staff? Talk about your 
leadership style in 
this time—what about 
your leadership style 
worked and what was 
difficult? 
In the first weeks in 
ERL, what were the 
biggest challenges? 
How did the 
challenges change (or 
stay the same) as the 
spring went on? 
Not Asked 
Who are some of the people you look to for 
support? Are these the same people who act as 
thought partners for you? 
 
Not Asked 
Thinking about your 
role in the district, 
what were some of 
your responsibilities? 
How did these 
responsibilities 
compare with your 
responsibilities prior 
to the pandemic? 
Thinking about your 
role in the district, 
what were some of 
your responsibilities? 
How did these 
responsibilities 
compare with your 
responsibilities prior 
to the pandemic? 
What were some of 
the structures or 
practices that your 
principal put into 
place that you found 
particularly helpful? 
Why were they 
helpful?  
 
What were some of 
the structures or 
practices that district 
leaders put into place 
that you found 
particularly helpful? 
Why were they 
helpful?particularly 
helpful? Why were 
they helpful? 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
196 
Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 




How would you 
describe your 
relationship with 
other Central Office 
leaders? Principals? 
Teacher leaders? 
How have these 
relationships been 
affected by the shift 
to ERL? 






leaders? How have 
these relationships 
been affected by the 
shift to ERL? 
How would you 
describe your 
relationship between 
the teaching staff in 




leaders? How have 
these relationships 
been affected by the 
shift to ERL? 
 
 
In these first weeks of emergency remote 
learning, what kinds of decisions did you 
leave to schools and what decisions were 
made at the district level? How was this 
similar to and different from how decisions 
were made before the shift to ERL? 
In these first weeks of 
emergency remote 
learning, what kinds 
of decisions were left 
to schools and what 
decisions were made 
at the district level? 
How was this similar 
to and different from 
how decisions were 
made before the shift 
to ERL? 
 
Looking back, do you 
wish that your 
building and district 
leaders had provided 
something different? 
If so, what?  
Addressed in 
previous question 
Given that your district has more than one 
school serving the same grade level students, 
how much continuity or sameness is expected 
across your schools? How has this been 
affected by the pandemic? 
How different were 
the elementary 
schools in the district 
(including 
instructional 
strategies, use of 
curriculum resources, 
and assessment 
practices) prior to the 
shift to emergency 
remote learning? Did 
this change following 
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Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader 
Focus Group 
How have you and the other leaders in SAU Q 
worked with members of the community and 
the Board in your decision-making processes 
over the last month or two? 
Not Asked 
Thinking about some 
of the more 
complicated decisions 
last spring or this 
summer. Who was 
involved in the 
decisions? How were 
these decisions made? 
How do you think it 
all worked out? 
Talk about some of 
the more complicated 
decisions. Who was 
involved in these 
decisions? How were 
these decisions made? 
How do you think it 
all worked out? 
Thinking about some 
of the more 
complicated decisions 
last spring or this 
summer. Who was 
involved in the 
decisions? How were 
these decisions made? 
How do you think it 
all worked out? 
Thinking about some 
of the more 
complicated decisions 
last spring or this 
summer. Who was 
involved in the 
decisions? How were 
these decisions made? 
How do you think it 
all worked out? 
What do you see as the 3 biggest priorities for the next 6 weeks? For 
the fall? How would you describe the work of your leadership team in 
realizing these priorities? 
Not Asked 
Is there anything else I haven’t asked that you think is important for us to know about your 
district and your work as a leader? 
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     APPENDIX B 
Semi-Structured Interview of Administrators Protocol #2 
Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principal A Principal B 
Explanation of the structure of the interview 
The question I’m trying to answer is what are some of the things district leaders do to bridge the layers 
of our education system so that the district achieves coherence or alignment between all the 
stakeholders. 
 
The purpose of this second interview is to build on our last meeting, focusing on a few areas:  
 
The story of the start of the 2020-2021 school year: How is the plan you drafted going? 
 
How are all of the stakeholders at the different levels interacting and getting along? 
 
How are decisions made now? (top-down vs bottom-up) 
● How much sameness is needed?  
● How much difference between schools/levels is acceptable?  
 
Tell me about the start 
of school. How did the 
decisions that were 
made and the systems 
you put into place last 
spring prepare you 
and your staff? 
Lots of committees this 
summer worked to 
develop plans. How 




Tell me about the start 
of school. How did the 
decisions that were 
made and the systems 
you put into place last 
spring contribute to 
the opening of school 




Tell me about the start 
of school.  
 
When we last talked, 
you identified three 
priorities:  
Safety of students & 
staff; Teacher morale; 
& concern about 
impact on students 
 
How have you 
addressed each of 
these priorities? 
Tell me about the start 
of school.  
 
When we last talked, 
you identified three 
priorities: 
Get them here, fed, & 
home safely; Meeting 
needs of kids & staff;  
& new routines 
 
How have you 
addressed each of 
these priorities? 
What has been the biggest success thus far this year? What contributed to this success? 
Thinking about the layers in any educational 
system in the US, how are those at those 
different layers interacting with each other 
and how are they influencing your work as a 
district leader? 
● The Board 
● Your CO admin team 
● Larger admin team 
● Parents/community 
● Teachers’ Association 
● other 
Not Asked Not Asked 
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In our last interview, 




Central Office. Have 
you continued to do 
this? Compared with 
last spring, what is 
the same and what is 
different? 
 
Last time we spoke, you talked about the 
pride you felt in your school and teachers’ 
comfort coming to you with concerns. How 
are those relationships the same? How are 
they different?  
Describe the way the admin team has changed 
or stayed the same since the start of the 
pandemic.  
Thinking about the K-5 admin meetings and the 
bigger admin meetings, how are they the same? 
How have they changed? To what extent to they 
serve the following purposes: 
● Connection 
● Decision making/information 
flow/getting questions answered 
● Communication—getting information 
out 
 
How has your thinking about what should be 
consistent between schools changed and stayed 
the same? 
In our last meeting, you talked about the tension 
between making sure that all K-5 schools were 
on the same page, while also recognizing that 
the schools were different. Describe an example 
of a decision that was driven at the school level 
and another decision that was more “top-down” 
in nature or driven by the will of the K-5 team. 
● How are they going? 
● How do the decisions that are made at 




Impact of the pandemic—limited 
opportunities to meet in-person (forced to 
Zoom). Has this affected the way members of 
the team interact? 
How have you 
managed the 
challenges of 
meeting with staff 
on Zoom? What is 
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Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader 
Focus Group 
In our first interview 
you described your 
preference for 
consensus-building, 
as opposed to top-
down mandates. 
Given the demands of 
running a school 
district during a 
pandemic, how would 




In our first interview 
you talked about the 
importance of 
allowing processing 
to occur to build 
consensus. Is that still 
as important? Why or 
why not? Given the 
demands of leading a 
school district during 
a pandemic, how 
would you describe 
the role of consensus-
building in your 
decision-making 
process? 
In our first interview 
you talked about the 
work that was done 
on the work 
expectations and 
accountability 
committees. How is 
the work done by the 
committees serving 
everyone—across the 
schools—in the first 
12 weeks of the year? 
Clear expectations for 
teachers—you talked 
about some of the 
inconsistencies you 
observed between 
what you saw at your 
school and what was 
happening around the 
district. Have 
expectations become 
clearer & are they 
enforced? How’s it 
going? Is that work 
group (from this 
summer) still 
meeting? 
Describe an example of a decision that was 
driven at the school level and another decision 
that was more “top-down” in nature. How are 
they going? 
When you have a problem to figure out—
covering classrooms when a teacher is found 
to be a close contact, for example—how did 
you figure that out? Who do you talk to? 
Have any decisions been met with 
resistance? How did Central Office admin 
address this resistance? How did building-
level leaders address the resistance?  
Have any decision been met with 
resistance? Where was this resistance felt? 
How was it addressed? 
Not Asked 
Can you think of a 
decision or an aspect 
of the return to school 
plan that you didn’t 
agree with? How did 
you deal with that? 
How has decision 
making or the flow 
of information 
changed or stayed 
the same? Who is 
your go-to person in 
CO? 
Not Asked 
Describe your role in 
directing resources to 
PD and staff support. 
Not Asked Not Asked 
What do you see as the biggest challenges 
SAUQ will confront in the coming months? 
What do you see as the biggest challenges 
your school will confront in the coming 
months? Are they the same as those facing 
SAUQ? 




Semi-Structured Interview of Administrators Protocol #3 
Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principal A Principal B 
 
Explanation of the structure of the interview 
Thanks to our conversations, a few themes have emerged: 
- Instructional leadership & the role of relational trust  
- District orientation: Continuum of Centralization to Decentralization 
- Coordinating & Coherence: Holding the District Together 
 
The purpose of this last interview is to build on our first meetings and to tie it all up and look ahead. 
 
What is the story of the winter?  
 
What are your priorities at this moment?  
 
Going into the spring?  
 
This summer, teachers were key players on the 
committees that worked on parts of the 
reopening plan. What are some of the avenues 
for getting feedback from teachers related to the 
reopening plan and subsequent decisions that 
have been made? 
 
Not Asked Not Asked 
Not Asked 
Tell me about the most 
recent survey you 
conducted with your 
community, focusing 
on off-site learning and 
people’s sense of 
safety. What did you 
learn from those 
surveys? How has that 
affected your planning 
and work? 
 
How have your 
meetings with your 
teachers (i.e., staff 
meetings) or your 
teacher leaders been 
structured?  
How often do you 
meet with your 
teams/groups (i.e., 
PK2, 3-5, ed techs)? 
What is the purpose of 
those meetings? 
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Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader 
Focus Group 
In our last 
conversation you 
talked about how the 
sense of camaraderie 
among the members of 
the Leadership Team 
has been affected, as 
has the sense of 
fellowship. What is 
your sense now? 
 
How would you 
characterize how your 
relationship with the 
teachers’ association 
(and their leadership) 
has changed or stayed 
the same since last 
March? 
In our last 
conversation you 
talked about that 
feeling some 
uncertainty and worry 
about communicating 
information and how it 
was interpreted. How 
is that now? Has it 
improved? 
In our meeting in 
November, you talked 
about trying to balance 
your time in staff 
meetings and with our 
leadership team 
addressing problems. 
How have you 
balanced the 
“responsive services” 




How are the K-5 
schools balancing the 
need for consistency 
with doing what makes 
sense for each school? 
Have other issues 
come up that have 
pushed you and the K-
5 principals to do 
things “the same”?  
If so, how did you 
bring it back to your 
staff? 
You have described 
your leadership style 
as one grounded in 
collaboration and 
consensus-building. In 
our first two meetings, 
you reflected that the 
pace of decision 
making and the 
limitations of meeting 
online affected 
collaboration. Is that 
still the case? 
When we last met, you 
talked about the 
challenge of moving 
from surviving to 
leading. How is that 
challenge now? 
How have Wednesdays been used? Have they 
helped staff morale? 
How have you kept all of the leaders and schools 
on the same page? How do you decide when 
each school can do their own thing? 
 
How did you arrive at the decision to increase 
in-person time at the MS & HS?  
 
Do you think there is a 
sense at your school 
that everyone is on the 
same page? Do you 
think that people feel 
that the district is “on 
the same page”? 
Not Asked 
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Superintendent Assistant Superintendent Principals 
Teacher Leader 
Focus Group 
How is that decision-making process like the 
original decision this summer to start the year in 
hybrid at MS and HS, but in-person for K-5?  
Not Asked Not Asked 
Can you think of any practice or procedure that 
had not been consistent across the schools, 
particularly the elementary schools, that you and 
the Central Office team realized would have to 
be consistent?  
How is the sense of 
consistency between 
school going? 
Improved? Do you feel 
like you are still 
reaching out to your 
principal colleagues 
and CO administrators 
as often to get 
answers? 
Can you think of a 
decision that was made 
by the district that 
folks in your building 
struggled to accept? 
What did you do to 
support them or meet 
their needs? 
How has your job/work and focus changed? 
How do you think these changes will affect how 
you lead in the future?  
Prior to COVID, what was the focus of your 
school improvement plan? Where is that work 
now? Are there new/different goals for this year? 
How have you 
managed the many 
changes from the 
DOE, CDC, and now 
federal government?  
Not Asked Not Asked Not Asked 
Looking ahead to the summer and new year, what pandemic lessons have you learned and is there 
anything you will try to keep in place? 
What has this unprecedented year taught you 
about leading your district?  
What has this unprecedented year taught you 
about leading your school?  
  




Semi-Structured Teacher Leader Focus Group Interview Protocols #2 and #3 
Interview Protocol #2 
 
Explanation of the structure of the interview 
The question I’m trying to answer is what are some of the things district leaders do to bridge the 
layers of our education system so that the district achieves coherence or alignment between all 
the stakeholders. 
 
Initially, I intended to study how some kind of a state or federally mandated policy was enacted 
by district leaders. And while the changes necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic aren’t 
exactly a policy mandate, the pandemic has resulted in significant changes to SAUQ.  
 
Framing Protocol #2 
When we last met, a few themes emerged: 
● Committee work this summer, that included teachers, was important and meaningful; 
● Leaders (of the buildings) have different styles & approaches. Each leader’s style drives 
how decisions (from CO) are not only interpreted, but how they are implemented; 
○ The difference between between schools and teachers’ experiences can be 
frustrating 
● It was hard not knowing or having clear expectations because people did their own 
things; 
○ Attempted to have expectations, but there was not always follow-through 
 
The purpose of this second interview is to build on our last meeting, focusing on a few areas:  
● The story of the start of the 2020-2021 school year: How are the plans going? 
● How are decisions made now? (top-down vs bottom-up) 
○ How are the voices of all stakeholders expressed and heard? 
○ How much difference between schools/levels is acceptable?  
 
Tell me about the start of school. 
○ What went well? 
○ What was something that was difficult? 
 
SLIDES - Peardeck (formative feedback tool; drop the flag along the continuum; we 
will go through all 8 slides and then we’ll talk about them) 
 
Using the participants’ feedback on slides, the following questions were posed on each slide: 
● What do you notice? 
● Please share why you placed your flag where you did? 
 
What do you see as the biggest challenges SAUQ will confront in the coming months? 
 
Interview Protocol #3 
Explanation of the structure of the interview 
AN EXAMINATION OF DISTRICT LEADERSHIP DURING THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
 
205 
A few themes have emerged from our conversations: 
- Instructional leadership & the role of relational trust  
- District orientation: Continuum of Centralization to Decentralization 
- Coordinating & Coherence: Holding the District Together 
 
The purpose of this last interview is to build on our first meetings and to tie it all up and look 
ahead. 
 
Framing Protocol #3 
When we last met, a few themes emerged: 
● The start of the school year went a little better than expected as the anticipated SEL 
needs were not as intense, and there were relatively few issues with students’ masking. 
For MS folks, felt that the smaller class sizes allowed for better relationships and for 
you to cover more material; 
● Strong sense of “togetherness” and support with immediate colleagues (in hall or on 
team); that sense of connectedness and support from principal and central office was 
not as strong; 
● Frustration and sense that teachers’ voices are not as valued as they have been in the 
past and that their input is not sincerely sought; 
● Anticipated challenges:  
○ Remote teaching and keeping kids involved and engaged; 
○ Concern that students are not ready for next year 
○ Keeping staff healthy, safe, sane, and positive 
 
What is the story of winter?  
○ What went well? 
○ What was something that was difficult? 
 
SLIDES - Peardeck (formative feedback tool; drop the flag along the continuum; we 
will go through all 8 slides and then we’ll talk about them) 
 
Using the participants’ feedback on slides, the following questions were posed on each slide: 
● What do you notice? 
● Please share why you placed your flag where you did? 
 
Looking ahead to the summer and new year, what pandemic lessons have you learned and is 
there anything you will try to keep in place? 
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Teacher Leader Focus Group Interview 
#2 
November of 2020 
Teacher Leader Focus Group Interview 
#3 


































Analytic Codes Used 
Name Description Files References 
Autonomy vs. 
Centrally-directed 
Decision-making authority 1 2 
Decision-making 
process 




Differences between schools & grade 





Inconsistent interpretation & 
implementation of decisions & expectations 
3 13 





Leaders provide some autonomy of 




Decisions made by leader(s) and directed 




Acts to work together; Including 
reorienting the organization and 




Resources, including human, shifted to 




Leaders connect or insulate one layer 





Policy domains working together to 






Buffering impact of an external organization 
on district/school 
8 34 
Role of Bridge 
Leaders 
Leader as resource connecting one layer 
with another 
13 47 
Role of network Impact of affinity group on information 
sharing and decision making 
9 20 
Structure of the 
organization 













Impact of changing information, directions, 
and expectations 
14 110 
Communication Actions & organizational structures that 
direct and articulate information 
2 8 
As a means to 
stay connected 
Communication and social exchanges 
necessary for trust 
7 12 










Communication between school and 
district and the community 
11 27 
Focus on students Prioritizing needs of students in decision 




Things the district leaders do to refine and 
align the organizational structures and 
processes 
5 11 
Role of the 
teachers’ 
association 
Role of external teacher association on 
decision making and communication 
9 19 




Formal leadership structures in a district 10 87 
Sense of a 
common 
purpose 
Coherence and alignment of belief and 












Role of leader directing a learning 
organization and the importance of 
interpersonal relational trust 
0 0 
Building Capacity Capacity to enact the collective will; build 
skills and knowledge to enact change 
7 13 
Buy-in Shared belief in the importance of change 8 16 
Generating Will Agreement that this is what should be 
done; aligned with beliefs and values 
 
11 20 








Demonstrations of resistance to change 6 9 





Shifting the focus from managing and 
surviving to mission-directed leadership 
5 15 
Qualities of a 
leader 
Actions and dispositions of a leader 8 36 
Responding to 
needs of staff 















Teachers’ experience and feeling as they 
do their work 
6 16 
Sense of school 
community 
Sense that those in a school are a united 
group working together 
7 38 
Role of Trust & 
Relationships 
Impact of interpersonal relational trust 




Execution of someone’s formal role 










Expressing concern 7 23 
Discernment - 
Respect 





Situations and decisions occurring 
because of COVID 
1 13 
Health & safety 
concerns 
Attending to real and perceived issues of 
safety and maintaining healthy schools 
6 28 
Initial response & 
planning 
Decision making and planning in spring, 




Decision making priorities when planning 
on school reopening in Fall, 2020 
3 4 
Return to School 
in the Fall 
Situations and issues arising before and in 
first days of school in fall, 2020 
9 28 













Teachers’ experiences and perceptions of 




Challenge of catching students up while 
keeping up with existing instructional 
scope and sequence 
10 31 
Frustration 
about not being 
able to teach 
Experience and response to expectation 
that no new learning be introduced in first 





Impact of teaching during ERL and in 
pandemic on teachers’ parenting and 
family life 
6 9 
New Normal Adjusting to teaching using new routines, 







Initial Coding Retired codes that have already 
been merged 
0 0 
Becoming a leader   3 9 
Building a high-
functioning team 
  3 12 
Challenges as a leader   3 9 
Change resulting from 
COVID 
  9 28 
Changing Roles & 
Expectations 
  12 81 
Characteristics of the 
Team 
  3 15 
Collaboration   3 14 
Common expectations   10 35 
Communication between 
school & home 
  3 4 
Comparing schools   5 13 
Competence   3 12 
Connecting with 
Students 
  6 24 






Connection to local 
community 
Connection to community lends 





  10 73 
Decision making   5 28 
Feedback loop   1 3 
Differing messages 
between schools 
  3 9 
Distributive Leadership   4 9 
Equity concerns   3 7 
Experience in the spring 
affects plans for the fall 
  6 15 
Feelings of isolation   2 2 
Getting resources to 
students 
  1 1 
Leading controversy   6 15 
Perceptions of leaders   1 15 
Pressure to teach in 
impossible 
circumstances 
  3 17 
Relearning how to teach   2 2 
Role of Relationships   4 28 
Setting & holding clear 
expectations 
  11 47 
Structures that support 
team 
  6 11 
Student disengagement   9 35 
Teachers collaborate 
with teachers 
  2 9 
Teachers' Changing 
Practices 
  5 21 
Dependence on 
parents to support 
learning 
  1 3 
Obstacles related to 
technology 
 
  1 2 






Tension between policy 
domains 
  2 2 
Time needed for 
processing 
  1 1 
Understanding of 
direction from another 
layer 
  3 21 
Worry that they're not 
preparing kids 
  7 18 
Worry that they're not 
preparing kids 
  7 18 




Informed Consent Form 
University of Southern Maine 
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
Project Title: Leadership in the Time of COVID-19 
 
Principal Investigator(s):  
Megan Welter, Principal Investigator 
Anita Stewart-McCafferty, Associate Professor, Dissertation chair - USM 
 
Introduction: 
I am studying how leaders in a district work together to carry out system-wide 
changes, particularly those necessitated by the coronavirus pandemic.  
 
Please read this form. You may also request that the form is read to you. You are 
encouraged to ask any questions that you may have about this study, now, 
during or after the project is complete. Your participation is voluntary.  
 
Why is this study being done?  
Districts are complex organizations, subject to external demands from federal 
and state policies, as well as by the district’s local community. Because Maine is 
composed of school administrative units, many which span large geographic 
areas, leaders have to contend with demands from different communities within 
their district. These competing demands challenge leaders’ capacity to coordinate 
responses that lead to enacted policies and practices within the same district. 
These challenges are especially apparent as districts navigate educational and 
organizational changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
Who will be in this study?  
Your SAU was chosen as a case study because it was large enough to include 
district leaders other than the superintendent and it also has multiple elementary 
schools in more than one community, both of which allow for the examination of 
how district leaders coordinate and manage varying demands throughout the 
system. 
 
This study is a case study of the leaders and teachers in one district. The district 
was selected based on the following criteria: 
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o Superintendent has been in the position for three years (as of the 2019-
2020 school year); 
o At least one Assistant Superintendent or a Director of Curriculum in 
Central Office; 
o SAUs with enrollments of more than 1,200 students; and 
o SAUS serving more than one community or town. 
 
Participants selected for interviews will include the Superintendent, Assistant 
Superintendent or Curriculum Director, two principals, and teachers in the 
participating principals’ schools. Teachers will be interviewed in two focus 
groups, comprising 4-5 teachers, one group from each of the schools. 
  
What will I be asked to do?  
You will be asked to participate in 3 interviews over approximately 6 months. 
The first interview will take place in the summer, 2020, while the second will 
take place late in the fall, early winter, 2020. These first two interviews will take 
45-60 minutes each. The third interview will take place in late winter/early 
spring, 2021 and will be based on the first two interviews. The third interview 
will take 30-45 minutes. 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured, which means that while some of the 
questions will be scripted, your answers and observations will also direct 
subsequent questions. The initial interviews will be held through a video 
conferencing application (i.e., Zoom) and the interviews will be transcribed. The 
hope is that the second and third interviews will be able to be in-person, but this 
will be guided by health and safety recommendations from the district, as well as 
the Maine CDC. You may opt to participate in-person or remotely.  
 
What are the possible risks of taking part in this study? 
There are no reasonably foreseeable risks associated with participation. Your 
overall level of risk is minimal, and is comparable to everyday living. Many of 
the questions that will be asked will involve your experience of your work 
throughout the spring, 2020, when school buildings first closed and schooling 
shifted to emergency remote learning. Depending on your experiences 
throughout this time, including during the Governor’s “stay at home” order, you 
could experience some discomfort related to thinking about this time.  
 
If you experience discomfort, you will be invited to take a break from the 
interview and determine if you would like to continue at another time or 
discontinue altogether.  




What are the possible benefits of taking part in this study?  
A benefit of participation is the opportunity to reflect on experiences and 
consider how the larger school system is working.  
 
The pandemic represents a singular event that has led to a common, 
transformative experience for schools at the same time. Understanding how 
leaders navigated these changes will contribute to our understanding of effective 
leadership, organizational change, and changing instructional practices. 
 
What will it cost me?  
Participants will incur no costs or expenses to participate in the study. 
 
How will my privacy be protected?  
Care will be given to ensure that your privacy is maintained. No information 
obtained in this study will identify an individual and the district will be 
described demographically and by its regional location. I will use pseudonyms 
for the district and subjects, referring to them in the transcript of the interviews 
by this pseudonym.  
 
Member checks will also be used and you will be able to review the transcript of 
the interviews to ensure that it accurately reflects what you intended to convey.  
 
The records of this study will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law.  
 
Please note that regulatory agencies and the Institutional Review Board may 
review the research records. 
 
Members of focus groups will be asked not to repeat what is discussed, but the 
researcher cannot ensure that they will respect other participants’ privacy.  
 
Results of this project will be shared with the dissertation committee, and will be 
presented during the dissertation defense.  
 
The video and audio recordings, and transcripts will be maintained throughout 
the study and the subsequent writing of the dissertation. Following the 
completion of the dissertation and the closing of my USM account, these 
documents and recordings will be maintained in a private secure, cloud-based 
server, which is password protected, for 3 years following the completion of the 
dissertation. 




I will maintain a separate file with information connecting each pseudonym to 
the subject’s actual identity. This file will be stored separate from the other files, 
using a secured cloud-based server (e.g. Box).  
 
What are my rights as a research participant?  
As a research participant, your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to 
participate, it will not affect your current or future relations with the University.  
 
You may skip or refuse to answer any question for any reason. 
 
You are free to withdraw from this research study at any time, for any reason. If 
you choose to withdraw from the research there will be no penalty to you and 
you will not lose any benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.  
 
If you choose not to participate there is no penalty to you and you will not lose 
any benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.  
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects at the 
University of Southern Maine has approved the use of human subjects in this 
research. This approval is indicated by the IRB date-stamp on this consent form. 
The IRB is responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of people involved in 
research. 
 
Whom may I contact with questions?  
The researcher and principal investigator conducting this study is Megan Welter. 
For questions or more information concerning this research you may contact her 
at 207-318-4602 and megan.welter@maine.edu. You may also contact Anita 
Stewart-McCafferty, Associate Professor and faculty advisor, at 207-780-5479 and 
anita.stewart@maine.edu.  
 
If you choose to participate in this research study and believe you may have 
suffered a research related injury, please contact Anita Stewart-McCafferty, 
Associate Professor and faculty advisor, at 207-780-5479 and 
anita.stewart@maine.edu. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, 
you may call the USM Office of Research Integrity and Outreach at (207) 780-
4517 and/or email usmorio@maine.edu. 
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Will I receive a copy of this consent form? 
You may print a copy of this consent form. 
Participant’s Statement 
I understand the above description of this research and the risks and benefits 
associated with my participation as a research subject.  I agree to take part in 
the research and do so voluntarily. 
  










The participant named above had sufficient time to consider the information, 









        IRB 20-05-1487 
        Approved by USM IRB 
        June 17, 2020  
